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Combining Thermal Energy Storage (TES) and mid-temperature nuclear reactors 
is not a new concept. What has not been done is to move the combination of these two 
technologies past the purely conceptual phase. The primary purpose of this work is to: 1) 
create a detailed enough engineering design to be able to 2) propose a fully automatic 
plant control logic under normal operations, 3) to conduct a preliminary safety analysis 
consistent with what was originally done in NUREG-1368, the Preapplication Safety and 
Evaluation Report for the Power Reactor Innovative Small Module (PRISM), and 4) 
evaluate the anticipated operation using real world data. 
What this work shows is that the nuclear TES (nTES) concept is achievable using 
existing technologies and conventional materials. It shows that fully automated plant 
control is achievable meeting an anticipated operational envelope defined by studying 
real world utility level electricity demand data. The proposed design offers a third 
independent safety-grade system to the design reference PRISM, improving the 
integrated nTES safety performance over the already impressive performance of the 
reference design. Finally, this work shows that the integrated design can meet a utility’s 
entire demand profile, with the reactors operating with a capacity factor of over 90%, 
including planned outages. 
The nTES concept successfully decouples the kinetics of the reactor from the final 
output of the turbine generator, allowing the facility to operate with automatic generator 
control and be fully compliant with 10 CFR 50 restrictions requiring only licensed 
operators to control reactor power. The proposed design also shows that electrical power 
iv 
 
is not needed to ensure reactor safety because the integrated design can indefinitely 
passively remove decay heat without operator intervention or electrical power even under 
extreme accident scenarios. The combined system allows nuclear energy to expand 







Nuclear energy faces significant economic hurdles limiting even the viability of 
current generating assets, much less future ones. The current Light Water Reactors, 
LWRs, are well suited to provide low cost power, but the flattening demand curve in 
many deregulated electricity markets is significantly reducing the marginal revenue from 
these facilities. Current operational restrictions and economics prevent these reactors 
from accessing ancillary markets to increase their revenue by supply additional services 
or shifting their generation to times of increased value. 
While next generation nuclear facilities will be able to provide improved plant 
flexibility and diversification into other energy services such as process heat, they are still 
destined to the same fate by simple economics. Nuclear energy has an almost zero 
marginal cost of electricity production and a large fixed cost when compared to other 
power sources. This means that the reactors will need to run at maximum capacity, 
earning maximum income, all of the time to attain the greatest capital recovery. To 
address this limitation, the reactor’s thermal output needs to be separated from its 
electrical output. One viable way to do this is to add some form of energy storage, either 
thermal or electrical. 
Historical implementations of energy storage by a nuclear power plant was done 
by coupling the reactor’s electrical output with pumped hydro facilities. An example of 
this is the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) coupling of Sequoyah Nuclear Power 
Plant (NPP) with Raccoon Mountain pumped hydro facility. During off-peak grid-
demand periods NPP-generated electricity is directed to pumps to lift water below the 
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hydro-plant spillway back up to the hydro facility reservoir. While effective and 
relatively low cost, pumped hydro is significantly limited by geography. What is needed 
is a low cost scalable solution. One such technology that uses thermal storage and is 
commercially deployed globally is solar thermal. In this application, the heat supply is 
variable and the output is constant. In the nuclear application, the heat supply is constant 
while the load is variable. 
Thermal energy storage with nuclear reactors is not an entirely novel concept. 
What has not been shown is taking a detailed conceptual design, sizing it to meet real 
world needs, designing a control methodology, and evaluating the impact of such a 
design on reactor safety. The purpose of the present study was to answer these remaining 
questions. In so doing, more questions emerged and are detailed for future work. 
Solar salt, a binary eutectic of potassium and sodium nitrates, was selected as the 
best candidate for nTES. It has an operational temperature range of 250°C to 600°C, 
which is well suited for sodium fast reactors – primary coolant temperatures of 360°C at 
the core inlet to 499°C at the core outlet. Of these designs, the one that is farthest along 
with the most published data is General Electric-Hitachi’s (GEH) Power Reactor 
Innovative Small Module (PRISM). This work demonstrated the integrated concept with 
PRISM’s larger sibling, the Super-PRISM (S-PRISM). 
The PRISM Intermediate Heat Transport System (IHTS) was split into two 
separate and independent trains. Each IHTS train was given its own Auxiliary Cooling 
System (ACS). Because this design uses a compact heat exchanger to transfer heat from 
the IHTS, there was not enough external surface area to use it for heat transfer to the 
ACS, similar to how the exterior of the Steam Generator (SG) is used to transfer heat to 
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the ACS. This difference in arrangement from the conventional PRISM necessitated the 
ACS to have an additional heat transfer surface for Decay Heat Removal (DHR). Each 
IHTS/ACS train (Figure 1) is an entirely independent safety-grade path for DHR. The 
nTES design has three safety-grade avenues for DHR compared to the conventional 
PRISM’s two. This provided an improvement in off-normal plant operations when one 
safety-grade path for DHR was removed/degraded. Otherwise the response of the nTES 
to the events considered was identical to the conventional PRISM. In the bounding events 
that included a Loss of Heat Sink (LOHS), the use of nTES resulted in significantly lower 
structural temperatures. For every bounding event considered with nTES, the primary hot 
pool temperature never exceeded 630°C, even for events that caused a loss of two safety-




Figure 1 Single channel IHTS/ACS train including safety-grade boundary 
For the scoping study, the nTES was sized to meet the entire load profile for the 
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) using a study period from January 2007 to 
December 2011. To do this, twenty-one Mod B PRISM reactors (840 MW(t) each) were 
needed. For the design, two reactor modules were paired with one thermal storage system 
resulting in 10 independent systems. The thermal storage design for each reactor pair was 
sized to match the Andasol Solar Power Station in Spain. This selection was arbitrary, 
and was done to provide a comparison to a system that had already been built and was in 
commercial operation. Over the BPA study period spanning 35,064 operating hours, the 
largest reactor transient was 4.2%/min, with a very simple bang-bang control for salt tank 
level. This can easily be improved upon. This information was then used to create a 
modern control architecture for the nTES using H∞ synthesis. The plant was required to 
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transition from steady-state 50% power to steady-state 100% power in 10 minutes, while 
maintaining constant salt temperature, having zero power overshoot, and minimal control 
action. This design basis transient was fully achieved, the reactor reached 90% power 
within 3 minutes and used the remaining 7-minutes to achieve equilibrium conditions. A 
maximum reactivity insertion rate of 7.5 pcm/s was used, which is the design limit 
reported for PRISM. This control system had an effective 13.3%/min rate of power 
change, three times that needed for the design basis operational transient, demonstrating 
that fully automatic reactor plant control is achievable with this design. 
This work first sets the policy and market stage in Part 1, putting the utilities’ 
needs in perspective and illustrating how the current nuclear power business model is 
failing in the United States. Unfortunately, a new business model cannot be met by 
conventional LWR designs. That is not to say that conventional reactors won’t serve a 
market niche in the future, just that that niche is smaller than the current generating 
capacity of the existing fleet of LWRs, even in regulated markets. 
Part 2 of the dissertation goes through the conceptual design work for assembling 
a suite of technologies that meet the new business model. This begins with a survey of 
past work, then it shifts to merging the different technologies into a cohesive and 
integrated system. In doing this integration, much of the work will be on simplifying the 
design and collapsing the nuclear island to as small a physical footprint as possible. 
Part 3 looks at how the system would function under normal operations and 
proposes method of integrated and automatic plant control using modern control theory 
under H∞ synthesis. This part answers questions about the stability and controllability of 
the system. If the system is not stable or controllable, it will have serious operational 
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consequences that make it not suitable for a utility’s needs. This part shows that not only 
is the plant stable and controllable, but that fully automatic control with simultaneous 
reactivity insertions from control rods and changing cooling flow is a viable automatic or 
operator assisted control architecture. This dissertation shows that the system is capable 
of level 0 through 3 automation, no automation to conditional automation without a 
human in the loop. 
Part 4 shifts focus to how the plant responds to protected and unprotected off-
normal operations and is divided into three portions. The first portion of this part 
establishes a baseline design reference. This creates a benchmark to compare the 
modifications made to the plant to integrate nTES.. The second portion shows that the 
reactor protective features both inherent and electronic are adequate to ensure plant 
safety. The third portion demonstrates that the inherent safety features provide adequate 
safety margin when the electronic means of plant protection fail. This part uses the 
evaluation approach of NUREG-1368, Preapplication Safety Evaluation Report of the 
PRISM, to provide a more direct comparison between the conventional PRISM and the 
PRISM coupled with nTES. 
Part 5 then answers, “Why should this concept be built?” It does this by 
illustrating what a utility can expect from this power station, what regulatory advantages 
it offers, what potential regulatory hurdles it could face, and what can be done to address 













Nuclear energy is facing significant challenges in the market regarding the 
construction of new power plants and the continued operation of existing units. Many of 
these challenges can be grouped into three main areas: direct regulatory costs, changing 
market conditions, and general energy policy. If we are to consider a more effective 
design approach, we must consider these fundamental constraints in our design 
methodology. Here an effective design is one that can receive the financial backing to be 
built, can be built in a meaningful and economic timescale, and can operate providing 
adequate payment to those providing the financing. 
In the early part of last decade, the existing nuclear plants were being spun off 
from vertically integrated utilities into the new deregulated electricity markets.[2] 
Nuclear at the time had one of the lowest marginal prices of any generator. The utilities 
that spun off these reactors were able to capitalize on the high Locational Marginal 
Prices, LMP, creating a significant windfall and return for their shareholders.[3] This set 
the stage for what was going to be a nuclear renaissance, which abruptly ended in 2011. 
While the accidents at Fukushima Daiichi certainly put a damper on the hopes for new 
nuclear builds, other than some modifications to the existing units, the fallout, wasn’t 
significant.[4] What drove the end of the renaissance in the United States were 
predominantly economic forces. 
While regulation is certainly a factor it serves more to inhibit certain economic 
opportunities, some intentionally and most as an unintended consequence. By restricting 
specific operational activities, certain business activities are correspondingly restricted. 
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This tends to exacerbate negative economic forces making marginal economic activities 
no longer viable. 
This part will first discuss the economic environment that the nuclear industry is 
facing. It will then discuss historical factors, including regulations that have impacted the 
construction and operational costs associated with nuclear reactors. It will then shift to 
how these economic and policy constraints are causing the current business model, 










2.1 Softening Electricity Demand 
The role of energy in the economy is something that is not well understood by 
economists in general. It is generally relegated to the role of a simple exogenous input.[5] 
It is much more than this. Energy is what allows capital to move when directed by labor. 
To give an example of the scale of this consider some food, a shovel, and a laborer. How 
quickly can they dig a ditch? Now, change that to be diesel fuel, an excavator, and the 
same laborer. Comparatively, in which are capital and labor more productive with 
increased economic activity? The latter case has the greatest economic activity, the 
worker’s productivity is orders of magnitude higher. But what drove that productivity? 
Energy is not an end it is the means to the ends. Energy when properly considered 
in economic activity is 80% of GDP.[5] More specifically, exergy, useful work, is 80% of 
GDP. Electricity is basically pure exergy, electrical components have such high 
conversion efficiencies, that conversion from electricity to the useful output is effectively 
1:1. 
Since 2008, electricity demand nationally has been relatively flat. In fact, 2016 
had lower total electricity demand than did 2008 and demand has been relatively constant 
since 2010, Figure 1.1.[6] Using Ayers and Warr’s work, this suggests that there was a 





Figure 1-1 United States (total) electricity demand (left axis), Illinois and Pennsylvania 
(right)[7] 
If we consider the two states with the largest nuclear generation portfolios, Illinois 
and Pennsylvania, their electricity markets are shrinking in size.[8] This suggests an 
overall reduction in economic activity in these states, and growth of economic activity in 
other states. Their declining electricity market is putting downward pressure on the 
capacity and LMP.[8] Based on the structure of the PJM market, there are two markets in 































1.2 shows the downward trend in LMP for the PJM market since 2007.[9]
 
Figure 1-2 PJM Fuel Adjusted Locational Marginal Price (Referenced to 1999 Fuel 
Prices)[9] 
2.2 Market Diversification 
The deregulated markets initially launched as very simple markets, focusing on 
creating LMP. Since this time, they have implemented capacity and other ancillary 
markets, such as regulatory mileage and reserve markets. The increased market 
diversification allows for better pricing to consumers. It does this by differentiating the 
services and specifically compensating those services provided in a competitive market. 
Markets with low diversification will tend to have higher average prices, due to paying 
for services not rendered. This gradual market creation/diversification leads to revenue 
insufficiency for those plants which provide the service but are not appropriately 
compensated.[2] By creating other markets those that can diversify will and those that 
can’t are even more constrained and susceptible to market upsets. 
Nuclear can only effectively participate in the LMP and capacity markets. This is 
due to regulatory and technical issues.[10] As a result, prior revenues that included 
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services that weren’t rendered through aggregation, are now segregated resulting in an 
effective loss of revenue. 
The markets do not adequately compensate for services such as resilience, and 
fuel security.[2] An example of the importance of resilience is the performance of the 
South Texas Project nuclear generating station during the recent hurricane Harvey. STP 
accounted for 50% of the generation operating margin during and shortly after the 
Harvey. Other generators were forced to shut down as a result of the storm.[11] 
Much of nuclear plants’ resilience comes from the regulatory requirements to 
ensure a means of decay heat removal. This translates into significantly hardened sites 
that are resistant to flooding and worst case natural disasters. This makes nuclear plants 
more expensive, a cost that is not currently accounted for in the markets and represents 
“revenue insufficiency” for these generators.[2]  
2.3 Shale Revolution and Monetary Policy 
The shale revolution has had a tremendous impact on the overall supply of natural 
gas in the United States. It has significantly increased market supplies of natural gas, so 
much so that significant investment has been made in building LNG export capacity, 
when only a few years ago, it was an increase in LNG import terminals. This has had a 
corresponding increase in natural gas electricity generation and has suppressed prices in 
markets like PJM.[8] 
Oil and gas exploration/production is a high risk/high yield business. It has 
benefited significantly from investors seeking yield.[1] These investors have been driven 
to seek yield because of the protracted low interest rates, forced to gamble for returns. It 
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is particularly driven by the fixed income groups, insurance and pensions.[12] Other 
investors face similar constraints to those of the fixed income category. 
Investment in the shale revolution has been and continues to be a money losing 
proposition.[1] As the initial hedges that occurred when oil prices declined from their 
previous highs in 2012 start to expire. Oil and gas producers will face further losses as 
market prices are below the expiring hedges.[13] 
 




















Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show how debt and equity investment have followed price 
expectations in the shale plays. The recent decline in investment suggests that yield 
returns are not consistent with price rebounding to higher levels to be able to support 
current production levels. 
The current production of shale has for the first time allowed natural gas to 
displace coal as the primary source of energy for electricity production.[2] This change 
over, was due to multiple factors including increased regulatory costs, e.g. MATS, but 
was predominantly driven by low natural gas prices leading to more favorable conditions 
for natural gas production. This is accelerated by the fact that natural gas plants hare 
highly modular and can be constructed in under two years.  
Figure 1-4 Debt and 
equity investment in shale 
plays. Source WSJ[1] 
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2.4 Variable Renewable Energy 
Renewable energy has seen significant incentives for increasing production in the 
past two decades. This has been mainly driven by a policy goal of electrical grid 
decarbonization in response to concerns over Anthropogenic Global Warming, AGW. 
The policy support has come in two major forms. First is through renewable portfolio 
standards, mandated consumption, and through tax incentives such as production and 
investment tax credits, price supports. This has created a set of incentives for the 
inclusion of VRE in the grid that are not sensitive to market pricing. 
VRE is treated as a fungible commodity to electricity. However, it is not. Looking 
at the historical development of deregulated markets the initial markets just looked at 
marginal prices and did not include certain desirable features that led to revenue 
insufficiency for some generators. With the inclusion of VRE on the grid under current 
market structures there is a new revenue insufficiency for dispatchable generators, which 
creates a revenue surplus for VRE. This is a policy induced market failure. The 
variability of VRE increases the variability in remaining load not serviced by VRE. The 
net load duration curves from Denholm et al., Figure 1.5, show how VRE acts to increase 
this variability, by effectively eliminating baseload energy with as little as 30% market 
penetration. To be entirely fungible with the current grid VRE needs to have 100% 
backup capacity, MW for MW. This is not done so the cost of the uncertainty of the VRE 




Figure 1-5 Load duration curves with different amounts of VRE[15] 
The current markets have responded to the inclusion of VRE through a reduction 
in the capacity market prices and an increase in the regulatory mileage and needed 
reserve capacity margins to be able to balance the VRE. This effectively places a 
premium on flexibility over stability.[2]  
While the markets of PJM and MISO have not had significant VRE penetration 
ERCOT and CAISO have. The proposed closure of Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 cited 
declining market conditions. Indian Point 2 &3, Nine Mile Point, Ginna, and Fitzpatrick, 
all within the NYISO, cited economic conditions for plant closure.[2] NYISO has 23% of 
its power come from VRE, with 3,737 of wind generating capacity in 2016.[16] The 
inability of nuclear to operate in a more flexible manner has led to the planned closure of 
all remaining nuclear generating assets in the state. The impact of VRE in PJM has been 








Regulation has significant impact on the overall construction costs and has been 
identified as an impediment for the construction of new nuclear reactors in the United 
States.[2] It has led to a more than 2x cost and project timeline for reactors in the United 
States.[17] Pertinent federal regulations come from two sources: the EPA, established in 
1971 and the NRC established in 1975. The regulatory warrant for these two agencies is 
fundamentally based on the premise of no-safe-dose, or the Linear-No-Threshold model 
of dose response.[18]  
This chapter will go through the historic evolution and adoption of LNT, as well 
as considering the negative impacts to human life due to its continued use. The next parts 
show how application of LNT in practice creates costs at each stage of a nuclear plant’s 
life. 
3.1 Linear-No-Threshold 
The LNT dose response model has been controversial since its inclusion in 
BEAR-I in 1957. The prevailing understanding and informal basis of radiation dose 
response was based on a concept of tolerance dose.[19] Tolerance dose is the concept that 
to a certain point the human body can tolerate radiation exposure, much like how we can 
tolerate ultraviolet radiation from the sun. This was based on practical experience over 
the previous 60-years since the discovery of radiation in 1896. 
LNT is based on the concept of the “genetic effect” which relies on three 
presuppositions [20]  
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• That the mutagenic effect of a given radiation dose to the gonads is 
independent of the dose rate 
• That the relationship of the mutation-rate to accumulated dose is linear 
• That the spectrum of radiation-induced mutation is similar to the spectrum 
of spontaneous mutation 
The inclusion of the genetic effect and suppression of research that provided 
contradictory evidence was undertaken by Dr. Herman Mueller, who in his 1946 Nobel 
prize acceptance speech stated that there was no evidence to contradict the genetic effect, 
when at the time he was reviewing the work of a study that actually did find evidence to 
the contrary.[21, 22] Mueller was unequivocal in his objection to nuclear weapons. He 
was a signatory of the Einstein-Russel Manifesto. He saw with his longtime collaborator 
Curt Stern, the use of the Nobel platform to use Mueller’s theory of the genetic effects of 
radiation to limit nuclear weapons testing.[21, 22]  
Mueller had an opportunity to make a successful impact and with his credibility 
from his recent Nobel prize was able to be on the panel for the BEAR-I report where he 
was able to introduce the genetic effect into the protection standard. Until this time, 
radiation protection standards for radiation workers and civilians had been based entirely 
on the threshold model of Cantril and Parker. Their work served as the basis of the 
radiation protection standards for radiation workers, but the genetic effect was included 
for the general population. This was able to provide a sufficient policy justification to 
limit atmospheric weapons testing with the Limited Test Ban treaty in 1963. 
What the genetic effect created was the concept of collective dose. Collective 
dose is used in evaluating the impact of radioactive source plumes for design and beyond 
20 
 
design basis. It serves as the justification for emergency planning zones around reactors, 
limiting radionuclide concentrations in water, and for the concept of As Low As 
Reasonably Achievable, ALARA. ALARA is perhaps the most impactful, because under 
the concept of having no-safe-dose, any marginal reduction in exposure saves lives. LNT 
gives the regulator unlimited regulatory warrant. Any regulatory decision becomes 
justified, regardless of the cost, because each incremental improvement can use imagined 
lives saved to justify the cost calculations. 
The concerted act of a small group of individuals to implement a policy for the 
greater good which they knew was contrary to good science has resulted in a serious 
human toll. Not only has nuclear power been limited through increasing regulator action 
based on LNT, so has nuclear medicine, radium needles once used to treat tumors became 
too expensive for hospitals to use in cancer treatment due to regulatory compliance.[23] 
As a result, cancer treatment with radiation has to rely on large doses of external ionizing 
radiation spread out over the entire body causing increased damage to adjacent tissue. 
Doctors are unwilling to give Emergency Room X-rays to children, and as a result broken 
bones and other easily treatable events go undiagnosed and untreated. 
More impactful though is the Japanese response to the Fukushima disaster. An 
estimated 1,600 people died in the evacuation.[24] Those survivors of the evacuation 
continue to face stigmatization, that they are now somehow flawed.[25]  
In 2012 UNSCEAR completed a study began in 2006 regarding policy guidance 
for evaluating low doses of radiation[26]: 
Therefore, the Scientific Committee does not recommend multiplying very low 
doses by large numbers of individuals to estimate numbers of radiation-induced health 
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effects within a population exposed to incremental doses at levels equivalent to or lower 
than natural background levels [100 mSv]. 
The radiation levels proposed by UNSCEAR are consistent with those of 
tolerance dose from Cantril and Parker, who placed the recommended number at 5 
rem/yr, 50 mSv/yr. The difficulty identified by UNSCEAR is that measurement at levels 
consistent with background is difficult to distinguish potential effects from the radiation 
exposure from that of natural background radiation. Shortly after, the International 
Organization of Medical Physicists issued a policy statement that radiation exposure from 
medical imaging less than 100 mSv/yr should not be of a concern for increased risk to the 
patient–that the patient faces increased risk from not having the imaging. They go further 
echoing the UNSCEAR statement that any adverse effects are not identifiable from 
conventional epidemiological methods.[27] 
As recently seen, taking an overly conservative model can cause more harm than 
adopting one that more closely matches what has been observed. The risks inherent in our 
world need to be taken in context with each other. Methods of assessing risk such as 
collective dose and genetic effects need to be removed from public policy for evaluating 
radiation exposure risks. The reality facing nuclear plant operators is that their regulators 
under the current regulatory regime can act without restraint. The current regulatory 
paradigm holds immeasurable risk from any radiation exposure justifying complete and 
arbitrary regulatory action. 
3.2 Pre-Construction/Construction 
Population exposure from radiation and the consequences thereof are the proper 
justification of the design of the power plant. They incorporate many measures that are 
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reasonable and sound. However, they can be taken too far. During the regulatory shift to 
the EPA and NRC in the 1970’s there was a considerable shift in the construction costs 
and construction schedules, particularly to those plants that had yet to be completed. 
 
Figure 1-6 Trends in nuclear plant construction in the United States as a result of the 
response to Three Mile Island accident [17]  
The additional costs associated with construction as a result of complying with the 
additional measures effectively doubled the construction timeline and cost for the 
reactors that did not have their operating license. Additionally, Figure 1.6 does not show 
the number of reactor projects that were abandoned because of the increased costs of 
regulatory compliance. With large multi-year infrastructure projects, delays carry 
significant risk to the company due to the amount of debt needed to finance the project. 
Servicing the debt can force companies into bankruptcy. 
To hedge these risks due to the sheer magnitude of the projects, utilities will 
either be very large, e.g. Southern Company, and/or share the risk of the project with the 
rate payers, SCANA and Southern Company. 
There are other methods for causing delays with reactor projects, some intentional 
and others unintentional. A recent example was form NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko 
delaying the COL for Vogtle 3 and 4 and VC Summer 2 and 3. He was the lone 
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dissenting vote on the Aircraft impact assessment, which was previously determined as 
not applicable to the (4) AP1000 projects by the NRC under a different commissioner. 
Chairman Jazcko made the determination that it was applicable and forced a two and a 
half year delay while the primary containment structures were redesigned.[28]  
An example of a non-intentional delay was a difference in interpretation of the 
specifications for the rebar in the concrete basemat of the primary containment structure. 
This caused a several-month delay in the two projects in Georgia and South Carolina 
while it was resolved.[29]  
3.3 Operational 
The NRC advances new regulation often without thought associated with the cost. 
This was observed by the DOE as needing to be addressed to prevent future nuclear plant 
closures.[2] It is not entirely the NRC, the EPA is capable of inserting additional costs, 
e.g. the recent regulations for condenser circulating water requiring plants to have closed 
loop cooling systems. This regulation forced the planned closure of Oyster Creek and was 
a considering factor in the announcement of Indian Point 2 and 3 closure.[2] 
3.3.1 ALARA 
Perhaps the most insidious cost comes from the NRC regulations for ALARA. 
Significant planning and costs are added to the maintenance on any system. In some 
instances, maintenance items are deferred to another outage due to not having sufficient 
time or man-rem budget left in the outage to address the new items. The trend of 
increasing ALARA standards is not new. ORNL published a report in 1981, “What is 
ALARA?” The report noted that the codification of it in the Federal Register allows a 
continual regulatory ratchet.[30] 
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Some disturbing trends have been identified in recent years. Regulatory agencies 
seem to have rediscovered and redefined AI.ARA to meet whatever ends they may 
wish to serve. This is doing a disservice to radiation protection programs and 
may even be counterproductive. The time has come, in our regulatory process, to 
apply the brakes to these trends. First, the trends must be identified and revealed 
for the frauds they actually are. 
One consuming passion of regulatory agencies is to ratchet dose limits forever 
downward whether scientific evidence for justifying the change exists or not. 
Much of this is done in the good name of ALARA. 
An example of the creeping regulatory ratchet is from my personal experience. As 
an undergraduate nuclear engineering student in the 1990’s I toured Point Beach Unit 1’s 
primary containment for about an hour and a half; walking underneath the reactor vessel, 
around the ECCS accumulators, and over the refueling bridge. 20-years later as a 
developmental Senior Reactor Operator, such a tour was prohibited as it was not in the 
outage’s man-rem budget. There were defined no go areas outside of the primary 
containment where entrance without a man-rem plan were prohibited. Thus, walking 
down all of the primary components for operator training was prohibited. 
UNSCEAR and IOMP both consider exposures to populations of less than 100 
mSv as to have no measurable increase in risk. When coupled with historic data from 
nuclear shipyard workers and form exposure of residents in a Taiwanese apartment 
building, that show “significantly lower mortality” with increased low-level radiation 
exposure, the justification for maintaining LNT as a regulatory basis is untenable.[31-33] 
Evidence and experience show that further reductions in exposure do not provide any 
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measurable betterment to an individual. And, that concepts such as collective dose, upon 
which ALARA is based are inaccurate at best and malicious at worst.  
What is the benefit of following ALARA if it provides no measurable benefit to 
the workers in a nuclear power plant? The amount of cost and time added serve no 
benefit to the workers, no benefit to the utilities shareholders, and all of the cost is passed 
onto the consumer. What is the impact to the nation by artificially increasing the cost of 
electricity generated? The cost of energy is the single biggest factor in determining 
economic growth.[5] Economic growth is significant portion of what leads to long 
healthier lives.[34] 
One can argue that all that is needed to be done is a cost benefit analysis of each 
maintenance evolution to determine the optimal ALARA amounts. It is reasonable after 
all. Auxier and Dicksen[30] properly note that the actual dollar cost of computing such 
dose benefit analysis are inherently time consuming and expensive. One that is plagued 
by the information problem noted by Hayek.[35] Information, Hayek notes exists locally 
and that in the process of aggregation, information is inherently lost. As a result, one-
size-fits all solutions like ALARA will always lead to sub-optimal solutions. 
3.3.2 Security 
The NRC Published SOARCA in 2012[4]. It used various dose truncation levels 
in its calculation it noted the following: 
The LNT model provides a viewpoint that is consistent with the NRC regulatory 
approach, and past analyses using the MACCS2 code have assumed an LNT 
dose-response model. The NRC is neither changing nor contemplating changing 
radiation protection standards and policy as a result of an approach taken in the 
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SOARCA study to characterize offsite health consequences for low probability 
events. Still, the NRC can use different approaches for different applications.  
The adoption of different dose response models resulted in 1-2 orders of 
magnitude reduction in radiation risk. Former ANS President Eric Loewen, 
hypothetically postulated three different kinds of radiation, green or natural radiation, 
yellow or medical radiation, and red radiation from nuclear power operations, and then 
asked, why are each of these treated differently?[36] The NRC in SOARCA stated that 
only LNT was consistent with the current practice. It is not however consistent with 
logic. What is the increased risk from red radiation if the levels do not affect the 
combined total red and green levels? Why is it that the regulators adopt LNT which is 2 
orders of magnitude more conservative (costly), when the effects are entirely 
indistinguishable from background radiation? Why is the red radiation quantitatively 
different? 
Table 1-1 Results from NRC SOARCA Using Different Dose-Response Models[4] 
 
As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a significant 
change in the NRC’s policy toward security. It revised the Design Basis Threat rule in 
2005 and had a series temporary measures as an immediate response to the attacks.[37] 
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The rules are based on revised source terms to the general population similar to those 
assessed in the SOARCA. The NRC treats an attack on a nuclear reactor in a similar 
manner as a Radiological Dispersal Device, a.k.a. dirty bomb. The assessment of risk 
from such attacks is based on utilizing collective dose and the LNT dose-response model 
to large populations surrounding dirty bomb sites–attacked nuclear power plants, contrary 
to the recommended guidance from UNSCEAR and ICRP. 
The overestimation of risk from the use of collective dose and the genetic effect 
adds considerable cost to the production of power from nuclear power plants for no 
measurable benefit. The Nuclear Energy Institute published a white paper discussing the 
trends in the marginal cost of production from nuclear power plants.[38] These increased 
marginal costs, while not directly attributed to plant closures certainly did not facilitate 
their continued operation. 
3.3.3 Post Fukushima 
Another source of regulatory cost were the compliance items with the post 
Fukushima plant upgrades for extended station blackouts. While these events were 
serious and catastrophic, various lessons can be learned from them. First is that the 
decision to vent the primary containments was delayed until after the evacuations were 
started.[39] This ignored the thermodynamics involved eventually leading to the 
containment vessels venting themselves, there was a bang followed by a drop in the 
containment vessel pressure and equalization with reactor vessel pressure.[39] With the 
now compromised containment vessels establishing core cooling became more difficult 
and was eventually not possible due to a series of cascading events that prevented the 
operators from acting.[39] While early venting would have released some particulate 
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fission products, it would have primarily been short lived fission product gases and 
hydrogen.[40] The addition of hardened vents would have helped, however, using the 
non-hardened vents when prescribed by procedure would have been more helpful. Instead 
it appears that concerns over exposure to the general population caused an even larger 
release of radioactive contamination into the atmosphere and directly into the near 
surface ground water. This has led to the stigmatization of an entire population, 160,000 
evacuees from the prefecture.[25]  
There is an entire lack of exploring why the operators elected not to follow the 
procedures at the facility. By not questioning this and focusing on capital expenditures as 
a means of solution, the NRC missed an opportunity to help. Instead a reactionary action 
was taken in lieu of a more thoughtful approach. If our fundamental tenants on radiation 
and risk are flawed and drive us to increase the risk of those charged with operations and 
to the general population, then it is imperative to reassess those tenants. 
3.3.4 Load Following 
Some nuclear reactors, e.g. Sequoyah nuclear generating station, were designed 
for the capability for automatic generator control including both voltage and frequency 
regulation. While this capability still exists in the control room, they are prohibited from 
operating in that mode by the NRC. It places control of reactivity and transitioning power 
levels into the hands of unlicensed remote operators, which is contrary to the plant’s 
operating license and federal regulations.[10] 
New PWRs like the AP-1000 have special control rods called “gray rods” with 
reduced worth (appearing grey to the neutrons) to allow the reactor to adjust power levels 
without requiring changes in boric acid concentration, reducing the need for primary 
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water treatment/disposal. BWRs can adjust power much more simply by changing the 
recirculation flow rate.[10]  The ability to change power levels without having to process 
large volumes of water gives BWRs their reputation for being able to load follow much 
better than PWRs. 
In France, where nuclear generation is approximately 75% of total generated 
electricity, the reactors operate in load following and frequency regulation modes. Load 
following typically has a swing of 5-10% power, while primary frequency regulation is in 
the range of 1 to 2% and has a duration of 2 to 30 seconds.[10] 
However, this type of operational profile, in either type of reactor, is no longer 
considered due to self-imposed fuel conditioning limitations on power transients.[41] 
This type of voluntary operational restriction prevents the plants from operating in any 
mode other than as baseload generators. There is no apparent need to limit leaking fuel 
other than to minimize the costs associated with handling these fuel elements. In all 
phases of plant operations, from operation, fuel handling, fuel storage, dry storage, and 
reprocessing, there are adequate means for handling leaking fuel assemblies.[42]  
Nuclear reactors in Europe, France and Germany, operate in load following 
modes and do not observe the fuel conditioning guidance set by EPRI with typical 
transients in the range of 3-5%/min and do not report an increase in fuel failures due to 
load following transients.[10] Because the European reactors were built using the design 
and operational experience with US reactors,[43] there is no technical reason why US 
reactors cannot load follow. Additionally, European reactors are capable of frequency 




Nuclear plant owners when faced with adverse market conditions, could 
potentially shut down the operating reactor and wait for market conditions to improve. 
This option is not economically viable for them to do so as they continue to carry the 
fixed costs of maintaining the operating license, which includes staffing, security, and 
regulatory compliance. The operational costs for an average reactor in 2016 were $164.5 
million.[38] This does not include fuel which is purchased years in advance. The cost for 
operating the reactor are fixed whether the reactor is operating or shut down. 
Utilities, when faced with a money losing reactor, can face significant losses to 
maintain the operating license or they can shut down and shift the license to a 
decommissioning license.[3] This in effect removes the reactor from the books as the 
decommissioning fund is now funding the decommissioning efforts at the plant, not the 
utilities operational accounts. As most utilities are publicly traded companies, they have 
fiduciary obligations to their shareholders. As such, decommissioning a reactor is a 









Assuming no change in future policy at best and potentially worse conditions in 
the future, how can new nuclear plants be built in the United States? 
The simple answer is, not with the current business model. The current business 
model works well in predictable and more centrally controlled electricity markets, 
associated with the more traditional vertically integrated utilities. It does not port well 
into deregulated electricity markets that can undergo significant market shifts within only 
a few years, as exemplified by the number of plant closures in those markets and the 
absence of plant closures in the conventional regulated markets. To create a new business 
model, the risks associated with building and operating the power plant need to be fully 
considered, otherwise it will be doomed to fail for the same reasons as the current 
business model is failing. 
What does the ideal business model look like? A good starting point is that it 
satisfy most if not all of the reliability attributes developed by PJM, Figure 1-7.[2] Doing 
this would differentiate it from all other generator/fuel business models. It would be a 
disruptive technology and would create significant market potential for utilities that 




Figure 1-7 PJM Reliability Metrics [2] 
The first step in evaluating the business model is to start with construction. 
Merchant generators cannot pass the construction risk onto their customers as vertically 
integrated utilities can. This will limit the size of the projects. Instead of a single large 
infrastructure project, it will need to be smaller incremental capacity additions over time. 
By breaking up the increments of the project similar capacity additions can be made with 
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much more manageable risk profiles. It may even allow Engineering Procurement and 
Construction Contractors, EPCs to return to turnkey projects, where the construction firm 
takes the risk (profit) of the project. But for this to happen the construction time line has 
to be predictable and the plant needs to be licensed under 10 CFR 52[44] with a 
combined Construction Operation License. Additionally, during construction very few 
design changes can be made. It is imperative that the designs for each project be finalized 
before construction starts.[45] Several vendors have developed reactors that were 
purposely built to fulfill this need. These are the Small Modular Reactors. 
Looking at the current business model in Figure 1-7, nuclear completely fulfills 
the Voltage Control, Not Fuel Limited, On Site Fuel Inventory, and Equivalent 
Availability Factor. It partially fulfills Frequency Response, Load Following, and No 
Environmental Restrictions that Limit Run Hours. The new business model must do 
everything that the current nuclear business model fulfills. These are valuable services 
and at a minimum need to be met. To be able to grow in the future, the business model 
needs additional capability. It needs to be able to provide full frequency response 
capabilities, regulation services, contingency response and fully follow load. It also needs 
to be able to cycle and be black start capable. A new plant under this business model 
needs a very large and flexible operating envelope that separates the generator’s transient 
response from the dynamics of the reactor. Most importantly, the plant needs to be able to 
maintain its profitability over time, with a high enough capital recovery to justify the 
capital expenditure to build the unit in the first place, much less follow-on units. 
As the SMR market stands, not a single design can fulfill this need. Of the most 
mature designs of the SMRs, none of them can fulfil this market need as the Power 
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Conversion System is directly coupled to the reactor, meaning that power transients due 
to changing the steam turbine throttle position will have a direct feedback to the control 
of the reactor. This means that to add new capability, new technology is needed. 
If we consider Natural Gas – Steam in Figure 1-7 it provides the remaining 
services that nuclear does not, additionally nuclear provides the services that Natural Gas 
– Steam does not. There are two reliability metrics that neither fulfill due to the 
limitations of steam cycles and those are short minimum run time and startup/notification 
time < 30 minutes. Only Combustion Turbines, Diesel Generators, Hydro and 
Batteries/Storage have those capabilities. 
Solar and wind, while considered by PJM to satisfy many of the reliability 
metrics, are not considered because they are not dispatachable. Solar is available only 
when the sun shines. Based on the physics of photovoltaic cells, once the sun is shining 
you can’t turn them off. Wind is subject to the vagaries of the wind, and can only provide 
reliability services at something that is as poets describe, fickle.[46]  
4.1 Energy Server 
Combining the dispatchable technologies into a more cohesive package requires a 
coupling method that allows independent parallelization. The best comparative analogy 
here is of a server farm where multiple parallel servers provide processing and data 
storage sharing a common communications bus(es). Applying this analogy directly to 
energy, consider an energy server, where components are hot swappable complementary 
modules. To do this the common bus should allow some sort of energy storage. This 
allows the buffering of load response with nuclear reactor response, allowing automatic 
generator control of the PCS. The energy storage also allows a different paradigm where 
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the owner can conduct price arbitrage on the electricity market capitalizing on the 
inherent volatility induced by VRE and one where the PCS can act as a semi-infinite 
inertial mass. The former requires no modifications to policy, the latter needs the addition 
of an inertial mass ancillary market for primary frequency regulation. A completed 
energy server block would look something like Figure 1.6. 
 
Figure 1-8 Conceptual energy server configuration 
Figure 1.8 shows multiple reactor modules in parallel with each other and a 
number of combustion turbines. During operation, the reactors and combustion turbines 
heat salt from the cold tank for storage in the hot tank and the steam plants, conventional 
combined cycle steam plant modules, take the hot salt and convert it into electricity when 
needed. This concept even without the addition of the combustion turbines fully satisfies 
all of the PJM reliability requirements of Figure 1-7. The addition of combustion 
turbines, allows the combustion turbines to operate in simple cycle mode with combined 
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cycle efficiency. The cost of the storage and additional heat exchangers needed for the 
system are not justifiable with the combustion turbines by themselves but is justifiable 
when combined with the nuclear reactors. 
The production and construction of the combined cycle steam plants, combustion 
turbines and storage tanks are all well understood. Typical construction time for a 
combined cycle plant is on the order of 2 years.[47] Thus the reactors represent the long 
lead item. Using a design like GE-H Mod A PRISM, 425 MW(t), the largest single 
component, the reactor vessel, is rail shippable to the site.[48] This allows for very little 
onsite construction compared to conventional reactor designs. 
The massive parallelization of the server allows for incremental capacity additions 
as needed by the utility, a lower Forced Outage Rate, predictable construction costs and 
schedules, and flexible maintenance and outage planning (a single component can be 
taken offline without affecting any others). A COL can be for a number of modules 
expandable to a total final number. For example, a utility can plan the site to contain 12 
reactor modules with integrated storage and obtain a COL for this. Once the COL is 
obtained. The utility can build the first two storage tanks and place the first reactor 
module. Once that is operating additional modules can be built as needed. Because of the 
separation of the reactor from the load, only the cold tank salt pumps suppling an 
individual reactor can affect that and only that reactor’s power. For this reason, the cold 
salt pumps are controlled by the reactor operators. If the salt tanks become damaged and 
inoperative the reactors would shut down on their own even without operator action. 
Because of this, everything else at the site is outside of the scope of NRC regulations and 
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only requires state, local, and EPA permitting for water and environmental emissions like 
a conventional combined cycle plant. 
4.2 Limit Regulatory Liability 
Segregating the energy server as outlined above, creates a compartmentalized and 
limited regulatory scope through design. As shown earlier, arbitrary regulatory action is 
the single largest liability that is hindering the expansion of nuclear power. By separating 
the PCS from the reactor, much of the limitations that hinder the current fleet of 
generators is eliminated. By using a reactor that has a robust fuel, e.g. PRISM’s metallic 
fuel, the reactors can operate at various power levels without concern. By adding the 
storage, the reactors can operate at near maximum power, ensuring profitability, even as 
the PCS cycles to meet demand and access every available ancillary market and provide a 
hedge against market volatility. This allows the utility to now profit off of the inherent 
volatility of VRE. 
If market conditions change, or if policy continues to be arbitrary, the server can 
operate in the mode that best allows maximal capital recovery. Additions can be made as 
new technology becomes available and is economic, allowing the server to change and 
evolve with time. Individual units can be retired if they are no longer economic and not 
affect the remainder of the facility. 
Because of PRISM’s compact nature and its coolant’s chemical reactivity, it 
needs to be segregated from the atmosphere, this limits operator exposure. Contamination 
is always contained and has increased shielding and distance from the operators. This is 
done without adding any special operating procedures or additional equipment. This 
minimizes regulatory risk/cost associated with radiation protection. There are no valves 
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or pump seals that need to be replaced/repaired. There is not the myriad of associated 
contaminated subsystems needed to operate the reactor. There is no boric acid to cause 
corrosion, the sodium doesn’t corrode the structural metal or fuel assemblies.[49] For 
these reasons continued regulatory ratchet associated with ALARA are almost completely 
eliminated. 
By relying on the regulatory framework of other technologies, nuclear is less 
insular and susceptible to “Bootlegger and Baptist” types of regulation.[50] Bootleggers 
and Baptists is a theory developed by Bruce Yandle to explain how environmental 
regulations have their structure. In his theory, different groups can have the same policy 
goal, e.g. prohibition, but for different reasons. The bootleggers like prohibition because 
their business model depends on the restricted markets created by it. The Baptists like it 
because “demon liquor” is outlawed. This forms an informal policy alignment between 
two disparate groups. 
By relying on the same regulatory base as every other generator out there and 
even on much of the same technology, the incentives for the “bootleggers” to block 
through a selective regulatory regime are minimized as they would be blocking 
themselves from the market and their product by itself is not as competitive. For this 
reason, they are disincentivised to implement restrictive policy and are keen to lobby for 
less restrictive policy to preserve their market share. The “Baptists” alone do not have the 
capital resources to affect policy, by eliminating the “bootlegger” funding, prohibition 
fails. A recent example of the “bootleggers” funding the “Baptists” was the Sierra Club’s 
initiative “Beyond Coal” funded by Chesapeake Energy, a natural gas producer.[51] A 
historical one for nuclear can be seen in Roger Stone’s “Pandora’s Promise” where 
39 
 
opposition to Shoreham Nuclear Power Station was in part “sponsored in the public 








There are two main types of policy recommendations from this study. First is to 
allow the deregulated electricity markets to continue to function and innovate. Second is 
to restrict the roll of LNT in regulation, as recommended by UNSCEAR. The former 
appears to have significant traction, the latter is a Sisyphean task and likely not to occur 
in any meaningful timescale. 
The Regional Transmission Operators and Independent System Operators have 
been and continue to innovate to provide the best service to their customers. Even the 
partial market liberalization that occurred with their creation has shown significant 
positive benefits for consumers. Many of the RTOs and ISOs are creating additional 
markets to improve reliability and grid stability, e.g. CAISO and MISO implementing 
ramping reserve markets, and ERCOT designing markets for frequency responsive and 
inertial response reserve markets.[2] Markets are incredibly resilient things, as long as 
they are allowed to have price discovery they can function. Once price controls are 
implemented, the markets fail to find solutions because the distortion of the price controls 
distorts the information of availability that is included in the price.[53] Allowing the 
markets to continue to evolve without enacting price controls will ensure that they will 
eventually find the best possible outcome as a function of the applied policy constraints, 
e.g. RPS.  
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Nuclear power plants generate energy with life-cycle near-zero emission of 
greenhouse gases and particulates.[54] However, there is over one trillion dollars 
stranded in infrastructure related to coal transportation and mining and to fossil power 
plants,[55] and irrespective of nuclear power advantages it is economically not viable to 
simply abandon this infrastructure. The purpose of this study will be to explore the idea 
of repowering existing infrastructure with nuclear power. The goal is to validate the 
proposed approach of effectively decarbonizing electricity production by reusing as much 
of existing infrastructure as possible. The hope is that by reusing existing capital assets to 
the maximal extent possible, regulatory compliance costs can be minimized, particularly 
the proposed rules on greenhouse gas emissions.[56] 
The existing fleet of Light Water Reactors (LWR) are only economically effective 
at high capacity factors acting as baseload energy.[57] Their complexity and size 
precludes many utilities from even considering a new reactor project. Additionally, their 
large size forces utilities without expansive networks to build surplus transmission 
capacity in the event of a forced outage with a large LWR. Grid limitations also impact 
the adoption of renewable energy sources because of the construction costs and difficulty 
in obtaining adequate right of way for the new transmission lines.[58] The remaining 
choice for addressing the changes in environmental regulation is natural gas, but here too 
there are problems such as limited pipeline capacity, volatile natural gas market prices 
with significant fluctuations due to supply and seasonal affects.[59, 60]  
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The focus was to develop a solution that reuses existing infrastructure and relies 
upon technologies already commercially deployed or at least demonstrated at commercial 
scale (e.g. pool type Sodium Fast Reactors, SFR, ready for commercial deployment). The 
design needs to be able to integrate with coal, combustion turbines, and combined cycle 
plants. The reactors need to also operate at a high capacity factor to have favorable 
capital recovery. To be able to load follow, integrate with existing infrastructure, and 
have the reactors operate at a high capacity factor, thermal energy storage is needed. In 
the past, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC, was reluctant to consider allowing 
even advanced reactors from connecting directly with Power Conversion Systems that 
were not considered during the licensing of the reactor without implementing additional 












There are several strategies of energy storage to consider.[62] Historically, 
pumped hydroelectric storage has been successfully integrated with nuclear power plants, 
the TVA’s Sequoyah/Raccoon Mountain is an example of this approach. Other storage 
systems are dictated by the considerations of selecting the reactor design. These methods 
usually involve storing sensible heat, but this is not always the case. There has been some 
work in storing chemical energy, sometimes involving electrolysis or other easily 
reversible approaches, where high reactor temperatures, ~ 800°C, reduce the Gibbs 
potential to minimize the thermodynamic loss of such a conversion approach. Even for 
more conventional sensible heat storage approaches, heat from LWRs is not sufficient to 
be useful. The lower reactor outlet temperatures preclude lower cost inorganic fluids. 
While there are suitable organic compounds that will not breakdown at 260°C, the 
volume required for the relatively small ΔT across the core, ~50°C, and the fluid cost, 
makes this technology prohibitively expensive. 
The most promising storage design is the storage of sensible heat. Some 
approaches use geologic formations and others use high temperature salts.[63, 64] 
Geologic formations were not considered due to additional siting difficulty and the scope 
of those projects limit feasibility, especially when salt storage is already commercially 
available. One of the most cost effective salts is solar salt, 60 NaNO3 – 40 KNO3.[65] It 
has an operational temperature range of 250°C–630°C and is already commercially 
deployed, e.g. Andasol Project in Spain.[66, 67] This provides an adequate operational 
envelope for mid temperature reactors especially the SFR.[15] There has been some work 
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looking at using the less expensive inorganic salts as a storage means for bottoming 
cycles of AHTR.[68] This approach can similarly be coupled with other advanced high 
temperature reactors involving salt or gaseous coolants. If storage of the high temperature 
is desired, more expensive higher temperature salts will be needed. 
In selecting a reactor technology, a more holistic look at the reactor as part of a 
national/global system was taken. If we are considering reactors for meeting future 
energy demand, we need to consider the supply of fissile material as an inevitable future 
constraint.[69] Uranium mining and enrichment has seen significant technological 
improvement in the last 30-years, in-situ leaching and gaseous centrifuges respectively, 
significantly reducing the needed energy and environmental impact of extraction and 
enrichment. This downward price pressure and softening uranium demand due to 
conversion efficiency improvement and post Fukushima nuclear plant shutdowns lead to 
historically low enriched uranium costs in constant dollars.[70] What has been seen is 
that changes in demand can have immediate and significant impacts on price. At one 
point in history, nuclear vendors had included the fuel cost as part of the capital cost of 
the projects. They subsequently defaulted when fuel prices rose in the mid 1970’s.[71] 
Compared to other fuel markets and because of the incredible energy density of nuclear 
fuel, the uranium market has very low volume and therefor high volatility. 
If we consider for the moment the size of the global electricity market, roughly 
20.9 PWh/yr for 7 billion people, and then imagine a simple scaling where average 
electricity use increases from 2.97 MWh/yr-person to 10 MWh/yr-person, consistent with 
the energy demand of the developed world, and the population increases to 10 billion. 
This equates to global electricity demand increasing to 100 PWh/yr. This would result in 
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a 5x increase in the entire supply chain for all fuel sources assuming constant fuel mix 
distribution. For coal, this is a change in supply from ~7,876 Mt/a to 39,300 Mt/a. 
Natural gas infrastructures will have to increase similarly as would oil. The total global 
energy sector investment in 2016 was $2 trillion in 2016.[72] To place this in perspective, 
nuclear uses about 75 Mt/a of U3O8 and with no changes in technology would require 375 
Mt/a of production. Using an open fuel cycle will become prohibitively expensive and 
limit potential market opportunities for a reactor grade plutonium market. 
As can be seen from this simple exercise, the cost of increasing the scale of fossil 
fuel extraction and transportation will not be trivial, especially when compared to the 
fixed cost of increasing the fissile material supply through breeding with a combination 
of thorium and uranium cycles. When fissile breeding is adopted on a global level, it will 
cap the growth in uranium mining/enrichment at the breakeven cost for fissile material 
from breeding.[73] 
It is thus for purely economic reasons and looking at global energy trends, that the 
reactor technology considered for this project is a breeder. Utilities can hedge the cost of 
future fuel cost as a component of CAPEX during construction. Subsequently, the fissile 
material hedge can be turned into an active market or used to fund internal growth. 
Considering the need for breeding and a mid-temperature reactor, the most mature 
of the Gen-IV reactor types is the Sodium Fast Reactor, with global operational 
experience spanning over 60-years and a unit in commercial operation, no other Gen IV 
reactor technology is as developed or even commercially deployed.[73] The GIF 
roadmap estimated that the SFR would be commercially deployed by 2015, the Beloyarsk 




Figure 2-2 PRISM reactor vessel cutaway[48] 
The slate of SFR designs that are available or have been deployed over the years 
is manifold. The SFR falls into two general categories, loop and pool design. Because of 
the inherent safety features demonstrated by EBR-II, the pool type reactor was selected as 
being the best fit as it eliminates LOCA as a part of the design basis.[61] For this reason 
and the availability of published data, we selected the PRISM, Figure 2.2 and 2.3, as the 
most mature design.[2, 16] Because the reactor is a GE-H design and GE is a major 
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vendor of combined cycle plants, we used GE’s extensive line of combustion turbines as 
they would be likely candidates in any contracted project. 
 









The fundamental objective of the design process was to make the design as simple 
and as robust as possible. While the inherent safety aspects of the S-PRISM make it a 
significant improvement in existing reactor designs, the design changes needed to either 
improve safety or do no worse than the baseline S-PRISM. 
To aid in ensuring the design changes did not adversely affect safety, NUREG-
1368[61] was extensively referenced for the specific components that were affected in the 
design modification. This study did not include a change in the risk magnitudes, but 
where appropriate indicated the direction of impact on safety margin and an estimate 
magnitude. Because of the limited documentation and regulatory guidance on SFR design 
evaluation, NUREG-1368 was taken as the primary regulatory reference on this subject, 
even though it doesn’t provide formal licensing guidance. 
For simplicity, a simple single pressure Once Through Steam Generator, OTSG, 
was assumed for the purpose of steam generation on the PCS side of the salt storage 
tanks. There is no technical reason why a multi-pressure steam couldn’t be used, and 
there are several economic reasons why one would want to use one. Multi-pressure steam 
generators are commonly used in Heat Recovery Steam Generators, HRSG. Because the 
salt and water have benign reactions, water is a solvent of the salt with only a dissociation 
reaction at low temperatures, the cost of creating a multi-pressure steam generator is 
reduced, allowing for lower exergy loss in the steam generator. The increased exergy 
recovery is done by creating multiple pinch points instead of one, allowing the steam 
temperatures to more closely follow those of the salt, increasing plant thermodynamic 
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performance. Second, it will allow a lower salt outlet temperature, down to 290°C, which 
was considered as the lowest desired operational temperature. This is also 10°C below 
the operational temperature limit of carbon steel, which is used for the construction of the 
cold salt tank. If the final design uses a higher salt outlet temperature, more expensive 
stainless steel will need to be used to make the cold tank. For engineering and design 
purposes of this study, the lowest salt temperature was based on a 25°C pinch point ∆T 
for a OTSG. The resultant salt outlet temperature was 313.8°C. Because of the economic 
incentives to have as large ∆T of a salt within the operational temperature bounds of 
290°C-500°C, having the highest possible salt outlet temperature carries a significant 
premium. 
3.1 Heat Exchanger Network Design 
The heat exchanger network was designed to have the highest outlet salt outlet 
temperature possible, while minimizing the pressure loss in the PHTS and the IHTS. 
Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 show the design parameters for the reference PRISM and the 
revised nTES design. The steam conditions were set to be the same. The only difference 
in the design of the steam generator is the PRISM has pinch point ∆T of 29.4°C. Other 
proposed SFR S/G have pinch points of 21.3°C. (Conceptual Design of a Helical Steam 
Generator with 750 MWt for an SFR). An arbitrary pinch of 25°C was selected for the 
nTES design and can be seen in Figure 2-4, which shows the T-s diagram of the 
simplified single pressure OTSG. 
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Table 2-1 Reference design heat exchanger network parameters 
 Reference Design 
 PHTS IHTS SGS 
Th [°C] 499 477 452 
Tc [°C] 360 326 216 
∆Tlm [°C]  27.6 57.4 
 
Table 2-2 nTES design heat exchanger network parameters 
 nTES Design 
 PHTS IHTS SSS SGS 
Th [°C] 499 490 480 452 
Tc [°C] 360 326 316 216 
∆Tlm [°C]  19.1 7.0 60.4 
 
 
Figure 2-4 T-s diagram of a concept nTES OTSG 
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Because of the induced thermal stresses in heat exchangers based on the 
temperature differences. The IHTS cold-leg temperature was set to that of the reference 
design. The approach temperatures and the resultant log-mean temperature differences 
∆Tlm were estimated to be consistent with other liquid-liquid compact heat exchangers. 
Because of the desirability of keeping the IHX relatively short, increasing natural 
circulation pressure differential and minimizing sodium pressure drop, the IHX was not 
aggressively sized, and used the reference design’s SS304 as the structural material. 
Correspondingly the SHX, was not aggressively sized due to limiting the amount of P91 
steel in the heat exchanger. A more detailed, exergetic analysis of the entire system needs 
to be done to optimize the size of each of these heat exchangers and this is not worth 
doing unless done in conjunction with a detailed design of the multi-pressure OTSG and 
plant cost optimization. The numbers selected here assume more expensive materials 
compared to the value of the power produced, thus a desirability to limit plant CAPEX. 
3.2 Intermediate Heat Transport and Auxiliary Cooling Systems 
Solar salt has three potential chemical reactions with sodium, 
2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑙𝑙) + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3(𝑙𝑙) → 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂2(𝑙𝑙) + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2𝑂𝑂(𝑠𝑠) 2-1 
2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑙𝑙) + 𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂3(𝑙𝑙) → 𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂2(𝑙𝑙) + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2𝑂𝑂(𝑠𝑠) 2-2 
6𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑙𝑙) + 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂2(𝑙𝑙) → 𝑁𝑁2(𝑔𝑔) + 4𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁2𝑂𝑂(𝑠𝑠) 2-3 
The reaction of 2.1 supplies the reactants for 2.3. All three reactions will occur 
spontaneously and are strongly exothermic. For this reason, the intermediate loop needs 
to remain in the system. The original concept had hoped to find a chemically compatible 
salt, but the sodium proved to be too reactive, with every candidate salt. The solar salt, 
while reactive with sodium, will add the least to the overall capital cost of the project. 
The design focus of the intermediate loop is to minimize entropy generation and system 
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size. High efficiency heat exchangers with low pressure loss will be used. Because all of 
the heat transfer will occur liquid to liquid, the heat exchangers will be much more 
compact and with lower head loss. This will provide for increased natural circulation 
during off normal events. 
The sodium to salt heat exchanger will need to have rupture bellows similar to 
those of the reference design’s steam generator. It will not have enough external heat 
transfer surface to provide a secondary cooling function of the ACS. As a result, we 
designed a purpose-built ACS system. Similar to the S-PRISM and the most recent 
PRISM this ACS will be included in the safety boundary. 
Due to the lack of substantive changes to the PHTS and IHTS, the existing design 
basis of the PRISM will not be affected by this design change. Part 4 will look at the 
thermal-hydraulics under various accident and operational scenarios. The specific 
changes in natural circulation will also be assessed in Part 4. 
Figure 2-5 shows the design for the ACS system. The use of compact heat 
exchangers reduces the total system weight that is supported by the seismic isolations. 
The sodium-water reaction mitigation becomes a sodium-nitrate reaction mitigation, 
those reactions will produce sodium oxide, but will not produce hydrogen. Instead inert 
nitrogen is created, which can create a personnel hazard by displacing oxygen, but is not 
an explosive risk. Further design consideration will need to be given to the exact 




Figure 2-5 Modified PRISM conceptual configuration 
 
The safety-grade boundary is the salt tank side of the Safety Isolation Valves, 
SIVs. The previous ACS had one steam generator attached to both IHXs. This will have 
two separate ACS trains, one for each of the two sodium IHX. Each ACS train is sized to 
passively remove 1% of reactor power, with a design basis ambient temperature of 40°C, 
the entire plant in natural circulation, and natural draft through the AHX. 
3.2.1 Decay Heat Removal 
In the redesigned ACS, the heat removal capacity is based on the heat transfer 
surface area provided in the ACS air heat exchanger, AHX. A single AHX is sized to 
provide enough DHR capability to cool the reactor down from NOT to refueling 
conditions at a nominal Cool Down Rate, CDR, of 2.5°C/hr 3-days after shutdown in 
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natural circulation without forced draft cooling, notionally 0.3% reactor power from 
decay heat, 0.2% reactor power for the desired cooldown rate, and 0.5% reactor power 
margin. The plant cooldown can be accelerated by the use of forced draft fans located in 
the ACS chimney. 
As conceived, the ACS can remove 1% reactor power. A single train can maintain 
PHTS temperature under natural circulation 45 minutes after full power operation under 
natural circulation and natural draft conditions. Two trains can achieve the same 
threshold in 11 minutes. This will limit primary temperature excursions. This also limits 
ACS temperatures below the thermal decomposition temperature of the salt, 630°C. 
Solar salt has a freezing temperature of 220°C. The ACS will need to have freeze 
protection to keep the salt at least 10-15°C above freezing, providing a minimum salt 
return temperature of about 235°C. Typical SFR refueling temperatures are about 200°C. 
The modified PRISM will require adjusted procedures to allow refueling at about 250°C. 
3.2.2 NUREG-1368 Considerations 
Chapter 3 of NUREG-1368 proceeds step by step through the General Design 
Criteria, GDC, providing a justification and basis for how the NRC would likely interpret 
the existing rule structure. To be able to meet the NRC’s standards to license a new unit, 
we need to first go through their logic. While the design isn’t complete, if it is at least 
logically consistent with the regulator’s published interpretations of the existing rules it 
will greatly simplify final approval. 
One immediate consequence is an improvement to GDC 2-Design Basis for 
Protection Against Natural Phenomena, specifically with response to seismic events, as 
the material mass associated with the ACS and IHTS is greatly reduced. GDC 3-Fire 
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Protection has no changes other than the mass of sodium outside of the primary 
containment is considerably reduced. GDC 4-Environmental and Dynamic Effects 
Design Bases is not significantly affected. The salt and the sodium react exothermically 
and require similar systems to the reference plant. Pipe breaks in the salt system, while 
high temperature, do not pose the same risks as steam breaks. The salt is at atmospheric 
pressure and is chemically inert, so mechanical whipping forces are limited. Thus, the 
consideration remains with sodium piping breaks. 
GDC 14- Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary requires a high integrity of the 
reactor coolant pressure boundary. The elevated salt freezing temperature, 220°C, is well 
above the sodium freezing temperature, 98.8°C. Preventing salt freezing in the SHX will 
help to maintain the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This will require heat tracing of 
the ACS and electric heaters in the PHTS to prevent the ACS portion of the salt loop and 
bulk sodium temperatures respectively from falling below 220°C. 
GDC 16 Containment Design offers a marginal improvement due to limiting the 
amount of sodium outside of the reactor pool. The containment boundary acts as a second 
pressure boundary to the reactor coolant pressure boundary. In this regard, the entire 
IHTS is a part of the containment boundary and the SHX needs to be rated to the pressure 
of that boundary. There are Safety Isolation Valves (SIVs) that isolate the ACS from the 
remainder of the non-safety-grade salt loop. This is to prevent the salt loop from 
interfering with the safety operation of the ACS, e.g. a restoration of pump flow can 
cause the AHX to solidify as reverse salt flow through the ACS check valve is not 
adequate to prevent freezing with un restricted airflow across the AHX. The ACS will 
require a means of pressure control and over pressure protection, similar to the IHTS, 
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using an accumulator and relief valves/rupture bellows. The accumulator would be 
normally online, and appropriately heat traced. It would also benefit from being within 
thermal contact with the remainder of the ACS piping to delay the need for power 
restoration to prevent freezing. A novel approach for the accumulator would be to have 
the accumulator as an annulus around a vertical portion of ACS piping. In this scenario, 
as long as the IHTS was above 230°C, there would be a positive and entirely passive 
means of pressure control in the ACS. 
The increased DHR capability of the ACS allows increased margin to fuel 
damage in events where there is a station blackout. The inclusion of the ACS in the safety 
boundary allows inclusion in the design basis. GDC 17-Electric Power Systems requires 
extremely reliable power to the systems and components that are important to safety. The 
reliance on natural circulation and natural draft along with the ACS dampers that fail 
open ensures that the system provides additional safety margin even in the event of a 
SBO without a SCRAM. The design basis for the plant will be slightly modified, reactor 
SCRAM with a loss of a single ACS train. The inclusion of the loss of both ACS trains is 
not considered reasonable. 
GDC 20-Protection System Functions covers the RPS initiation. GE-H stated in 
the PSID that RPS actuation would result in the following: “(1) release of all control rods 
and operate rod drive-in motors, assuring full rod insertion, not exceeding the design fuel 
limits and (2) initiate primary sodium coolant pump coastdown, containment isolation, 
and plant control system adjustments to respond to the reactor trip.” This defines the 
sequence of events for a reactor trip which we will use to assess the transient and accident 
response in RELAP. On a plant trip, once the SCRAM has been confirmed with a stable 
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negative period of ~80s, the SIVs will close. With a time delay set at the SIV stroke time, 
the ACS dampers will open, and the ACS fans would start. In the event of a SBO the 
CRDM would disengage as they would in a SCRAM. The SIV’s would close after a time 
delay to allow system pressure to stabilize as the salt pumps coastdown. The ACS 
dampers would fail open after a time delay drop out to allow the SIVs to actuate. The 
purpose of the SIVs closing before allowing airflow through the AHX is to ensure that an 
inadvertent restoration of salt flow would close the ACS check valve securing natural 
circulation flow through the AHX and causing it to freeze. 
Because of the GEMs, rod latching would not be allowed until the RCPs were at 
100% flow. This is also a measure to mitigate any potential blockages in a fuel 
assembly.[61] This will ensure that GDC 28- Reactivity Limits will be met. The 
reactivity feedback from the salt system is buffered by the minimum tank volume in the 
cold salt tank resulting in near constant temperature from the salt tank. Additionally, the 
worst-case reactivity initiation would be maximal salt flow with reactor critical with 
power just above the source range. Such worst-case events can be handled with 
procedures such as not opening the SIVs until the reactor is above the point of adding 
heat. Once above the Point of Adding Heat, POAH, any reactivity insertion will have 
prompt fuel Doppler feedback mechanisms ensuring immediate negative reactivity 
insertion compensating for the positive reactivity from fuel cooling. The coolant Doppler 
results in a positive temperature coefficient of reactivity, thus cooling coolant causes a 
negative reactivity insertion, lagged by the more positive reactivity insertion of the fuel 
doppler. Ensuring that the reactor is above the POAH will ensure that a fuel thermal limit 
will not be exceeded. 
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GDC 29-Protection Against Anticipated Operational Occurrences requires that the 
RPS and reactivity control systems perform their functions with high reliability. A more 
detailed consideration of the events needing consideration is given in Part 4. 
GDC 34 Residual Heat Removal has a third independent DHR path. This will be 
specifically addressed in Part 4. 
3.2.3 IHX Design 
The IHX is a critical component and many heat exchanger improvements have 
occurred over the last decade, including the commercial availability of ASME ‘N’ 
stamped compact heat exchangers.[74] Because of the importance of natural circulation 
in the PHTS and the IHTS/ACS using high NTU low pressure drop will greatly improve 
overall plant safety by increasing safety margins. 
3.3 Balance of Plant 
The BOP can be divided into the Power Conversion System, the energy storage 
system, and the auxiliary site power. Being able to bootstrap the grid is a critical feature 
for the facility and needs to be allowed for in the design. The site has tremendous 
quantities of stored energy in the salt tanks which can be used to start up the reactors. 
Because the reactors don’t require any electrical power for RHR, the need to have power 
available for RHR is obviated. Also, with multiple independent sources of power onsite, 
there is designed redundancy in power supplies that should assuage any argument against 
operating the reactors in island mode. 
3.3.1 Power Conversion System 
The PCS should consist of multiple smaller independent steam plants. This has 
two operational benefits: reduced EFOR due to a trip in one PCS not affecting another 
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and increased capacity factor due to taking out a smaller unit for a planned outage, 
instead of the entire facility. The design also decouples the reactor outages from PCS 
outages providing increased flexibility to the owner in planning and executing scheduled 
maintenance. From the grid operator’s perspective, this type of arrangement with smaller 
generators will limit the impact of forced outages improving grid stability. It lessens the 
rolling reserve requirements because one single trip of a 250 MW unit is far less than the 
impact of the trip of a 1,250 MW unit. An additional benefit is that the storage system 
acts like an energy RAID that is hot swappable. One component of the server might fail 
but that can be addressed without affecting the server’s availability, only a slight 
reduction in capacity. Independence between the reactor and the PCS prevents a trip from 
either affecting the other. 
The PCS would likely be a Rankine cycle because S-CO2 Brayton cycles are not 
currently available in the size needed for this facility. With smaller power packages, the 
owner can change them out as economics dictate. For the Rankine cycle, the steam 
generator can be similar to the S-PRISM S/G, which is a single pass helical design. It 
would be slightly smaller, for a 250 MW(e) PCS, the steam generator would be about 625 
MW(t), larger than a 425 MW(t) Mod A PRISM and slightly smaller than the 840 MW(t) 
Mod B variant. Additionally, the SG would be better suited for multiple pressures, 
consistent with the SG’s used in solar thermal applications. This will minimize the effects 
of the pinch points, by going from one to two to three spread out over the salt’s 
temperature profile. This will allow lower overall cold tank temperatures, 290°C which is 
common in solar thermal applications. 
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Each PCS would be an adaptation of the bottoming cycle of a combined cycle 
plant, with the only significant changes being the replacement of the Heat Recovery S/G 
with the single pass helical salt S/G. The modularity of this approach allows nearly 
infinite customization in a site even after the facility is operational. This can allow an 
owner to adjust to long term market trends and technological availability. 
The independence of the PCS from the reactors allows the PCS to be operated 
with Automatic Generator Control, providing voltage and real-time frequency response, 
improving the power profile on the network. This opens all of the ancillary markets to the 
owner, who can then specify regulating reserve, rolling reserve, and standby capacities to 
the ISO that will result in the highest ROI on the assets. The regulating reserve and 
associated regulating mileage offers perhaps the greatest market opportunity. The 
Rankine PCS can respond nearly instantly to changes in operational set points, when 
attached to a semi-infinite constant temperature energy supply. Being quick to respond to 
Area Control Error, ACE, signals gives the owner access to the mileage before competing 
energy sources. 
3.3.2 Energy Storage System 
The energy storage system needs to be sized to meet the operational profile 
specified by the operator. While there are multiple types of salt thermal storage systems, 
the two-tank variant will result in the greatest cycle efficiency and consistency of 
temperatures to the PCS and to the reactors. As with the redundancy needs of the overall 
project, each salt tank needs to have multiple redundant pumps, sized so that a pump can 
be taken off service, removed and refurbished and reinstalled without affecting the 
remaining operational pumps. 
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3.3.3 Auxiliary Site Power 
The salt system has a comparable temperature range to the exhaust gas 
temperatures from a combustion turbine. This allows the bulk of the thermal energy 
recovered by a conventional combined cycle plant to be recovered by the salt. Placing 
simple cycle combustion turbines in parallel with the reactor provides additional 
generating capacity and redundancy from different fuel sources and an additional source 
of heat for the salt tanks. These combustion turbines can provide simple cycle response 
time with combined cycle efficiency. Because the cost of the natural gas is the main cost 
of the power from the combustion turbines, their duty cycle can be varied to follow fuel 
prices and electricity prices. 
The simple cycle combustion turbines, when coupled with a pony diesel can 
provide blackstart capability allowing the startup of a reactor and the PCSs. A larger 
pony diesel can be used to start up a hot tank salt pump and PCS which can then 
bootstrap a reactor. The second approach would be used to blackstart with an outage in 









Figure 2.1 nTES conceptual site layout shows the proposed layout of the 
integrated storage system. A simple way of understanding the modularity of the nuclear 
Thermal Energy Storage, nTES, is to think of it as an energy bus much like an electrical 
switchboard. The salt storage tanks act like a battery buffering the temperature (voltage) 
variation of the bus. The heat from the reactors and the heat recovered from the 
combustion turbines act like electrical generators. Everything attached to the bus is in 
parallel. This allows a component (load or generator) to be removed from service through 
either forced or planned outage without affecting the entire system. It also allows scaled 
capacity additions, increasing the utilities’ flexibility in adding/retiring smaller steps of 
capacity with demand fluctuations, helping to increase capital utilization without 
impacting grid stability. 
The intention for salt tank operation is to not take the tanks out of service. For this 
reason, there are at least two reactors, multiple combustion turbines, and several Rankine 
Power Conversion System, PCS, attached to each set of tanks. Refueling outages are used 
to adjust for major fluctuations in seasonal demand. With at least one reactor on service 
the tanks will always have a means of restoring their level. Similarly, the PCS are 
redundant allowing seasonal adjustment and continued operation with a forced outage. 
The combustion turbines are another level of redundancy. The site can at some level 
always maintain electrical power and can restore power quickly after a station blackout 
without the need for offsite power. The redundancy and the ability to restore plant 
operation from on site is a critical design feature allowing the plant to bootstrap the grid.  
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The use of a berm between the reactors and the salt tanks provides a barrier to 
direct the salt around the reactors in the event of a salt tank catastrophic failure. This can 
be extended further to provide a missile barrier from any remaining BOP components.  
The missile criteria is the one remaining source of “feedback” from the BOP that 
can affect the nuclear island. Other approaches include using distance, thus creating 









The storage system is constrained in its material selection due to the chemical 
interactions of the salt with the metal. Careful consideration was needed to find materials 
that are compatible with coolants. The materials had to exhibit low general corrosion 
rates and prevent localized corrosion, e.g. crevice corrosion cracking. Additionally, 
materials need to withstand duty cycle and transient temperatures without failure. 
Carbon steel exhibits adequate corrosion resistance (5mils/yr) at 460°C.[75] In 
solar thermal applications, carbon steel is limited to 300°C.[67] Carbon steel in nTES 
similarly has an operational and transient limitation of 300°C. Stainless Steel (SS316) has 
corrosion rates of 0.03-0.04 mils/yr at 600°C.[75] SS316 is one of 5 alloys; SS304, 
SS316, 2.25Cr-1Mo, Alloy800H, and ASTM A213 Grade T91, allowed for structural 
applications under ASME Code Section III Subsection NH for high temperature 
structural integrity in nuclear applications.[76] SS316 exhibits low corrosion rates, <0.02 
mils/yr, in the temperature range of the heat exchanger, < 500°C, and has low rates of 
decarburization in this temperature range.[77, 78] 9Cr-1Mo at 600°C has corrosion in salt 
< 0.9 mils/yr.[75] 9Cr-1Mo (ASTM A213 Grade T91) is widely used in combined cycle 
heat recovery steam generators.[79] T91 could also be used in the PCS steam generators. 
The cold tank is made out of carbon steel ASTM-A516-70.[67] The cold tank 
piping is not made out of ASTM A106 carbon steel, recommended by Moore et al., due 
to issues of galvanic corrosion between stainless and carbon steels. All salt supply and 
return piping and the hot tank are SS321 or SS347. There needs to be galvanic protection 
where the cold pipes interface with the cold tank. 
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The IHX is made out of SS304 similar to the design reference IHX. The SHX and 
AHX are T91, however, SS316 and SS304 were considered as viable candidates, but 
require stricter chemistry controls on the salt increasing capital costs along with O&M. 
Selecting slightly more expensive materials in favor of reduced operational costs over the 
life of the plant appeared to be more prudent. Any final material determination is going to 
need careful engineering and cost consideration. The combustion turbine heat exchanger 
is T91, with supply and return piping made out of SS321 or SS347. The cold supply 
piping, in this application, being made out of SS321 or SS347 prevents degradation of the 
pipe due to the frequency of back flow initiation from cycling the combustion turbines. 
All of the components and piping outside of the SIVs are non-nuclear using conventional 
ASME codes. Figure 2.4 shows the safety grade boundary. The system configuration of 
the ACS prevents carbon steel from being exposed to higher temperatures seen in natural 
circulation decay heat removal. 
SS304 and SS316 are susceptible to crevice corrosion cracking in the presence of 
impurities in the salt. For this reason, Moore et al recommend using SS321 or SS347 in 
every application where SS304 and SS316 are used. This is an economic choice, does the 









The reactor protection system’s primary purpose is to ensure that an adequate 
means of DHR is on service. Because of the inherent reactivity feedback effects 
associated with the metallic fuel and low stored thermal energy in the fuel, tripping the 
reactor is not necessary to show protection and limit temperature excursions. Instead, 
securing coolant flow and establishing natural circulation are what is needed to show 
protection and limit temperature excursions. 
The RPS has three means of providing protection, over power SCRAM, primary 
hot pool over temperature SCRAM, and a low salt flow SCRAM. The first limits heat 
generation, the second provides protection against loss of decay heat removal, and the 
third limits temperature excursions. The LSF SCRAM may not be needed for protection, 
as the Th SCRAM provides protection for a loss of salt flow. Instead, the LSF may be a 
cutback, driving the rods in at normal rod speed until reactor power is less than the 
protective action’s set point. To make this determination one of the more challenging loss 





Figure 2-6 Reactor Protection System Logic 
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Figure 2.6 shows the ladder logic implemented in RELAP for the RPS. The plant 
trip, 401, is for manual trips. The Th SCRAM, 403, uses the thermocouples in the lower 
portion of the hot leg riser as its input signal. The LSF SCRAM, 602, relies on two 
inputs, that fission power is greater than 20% and that cold inlet salt flow just upstream of 
the branch supplying the two SHXs is less than 10% of the design flow rate. The over 
power SCRAM, 406, is based on a fission power that is greater than 113% of rated 
indicated reactor power. 
The pumps will trip based on the following logic (reactor period shorter than -80 
seconds, 407, OR 5 seconds since a reactor trip, 408) AND a reactor trip, 604. The SIVs 
close 20 seconds after a pump trip, 409. The ACS dampers open 15 seconds later, 410. 
This sequence is to ensure inward rod motion before removing forced circulation and 
then provide a stately transition to natural circulation conditions. The reactor SCRAM is 
delayed 0.5 seconds, 12, from a reactor trip signal, 604. This is to account for 
instrumentation, processing, and actuation delays. 
The control rods are assumed to have an integral rod worth of $17.[80] and follow 
the SCRAM response testing of [81]. The assumed zero reactivity point of the control 
rods was assumed to be 650 mm corresponding to [81]. Total rod travel was assumed to 
be the active fuel height of 1.016m with a differential rod worth that followed a cosine 
function, this left around $14 for shutdown. Unfortunately, the previous work did not 
provide data on the rod worth and full power control position to allow more accurate 
modeling. 
The Gas Expansion Modules use the grid plate pressure to provide for their 
reactivity feedback mechanism. The gas was assumed to be isothermal, temperature does 
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not affect reactivity. This is significant simplification, but without the heat structure data 
of the GEMs a more accurate model is not possible. The GEMs were assumed to have an 
integral worth of $1.4 with a cosine shaped differential worth. Normal operating 
conditions were set at a level of 95% of design compression. Minimum static pressure 
was calculated at a hot leg of 499°C and was 442 kPa. Maximum design pressure was 
796 kPa. The GEM reactivity was calculated using Equations 2.4 and 2.5. 










INTERMEDIATE HEAT TRANSPORT AND AUXILLARY COOLING 




Preliminary sizing was done to estimate the configuration of the IHX. Several 
different configurations of heat exchangers were considered, from conventional shell and 
tube, Printed Circuit Heat Exchangers (PCHX), and Fin Plate Heat Exchangers (FPHX). 
The conventional PRISM design uses a shell and tube design rated to the operating 
pressure of the steam generator, 14.7 MPa.[48, 61] This significantly increases the weight 
and complicates the design. Additionally, the heat exchanger requires special design to 
accommodate thermal expansion.[61] We examined PCHX, however, these are 
unsuitable for applications with sodium because of its high thermal conductivity can 
cause channel clogging.[82] Because the salt system is vented to atmosphere, the 
discharge pressure of the 
AHX, and the remainder of the 
IHTS, under normal operations 
can at most be 60.9 kPa due to 
design pressure loss in the 
pipe, 5.5 kPa, and the static 
head of the pipe leading to the 
hot tank, 55.4 kPa. Assuming a 
blockage downstream of the AHX the peak pressure is the shut off head of the cold tank 
salt pumps, 1.24 MPa. Because the pressure limit on the design reference was set to the 
normal operational pressure of the steam plant and in the modified design the steam plant 
Figure 2-7 Heatric heat exchanger operational envelope 
from Southall and Dewson[1] 
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is replaced with salt, 1.24 MPa is new design pressure for the IHX, well within the 
operating envelope for FPHX.[82] This will also serve as the design pressure for the 
AHX and SHX. 
 
7.1 Regulatory Design Considerations 
The NRC based the review characteristics of the IHX on GDC 15, 30, 31, and 
32:[61]  
• GDC 15, “Reactor coolant system design”: Design conditions of the 
PHTS [Primary Heat Transport System] shall not be exceeded under 
normal operation or anticipated operational occurrences. 
• GDC 30, “Quality of reactor coolant pressure boundary”: The PHTS 
shall be designed to the highest practical quality standards and shall 
provide a system for leak detection of sodium and cover gas. 
• GDC-31, “Fracture prevention of reactor coolant pressure boundary”: 
The reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed with sufficient 
margin to assure that when stressed under operating, maintenance, 
testing, and postulated accident conditions (1) the boundary behaves in a 
non-brittle manner and (2) the probability of rapidly propagating fracture 
is minimized. The design shall reflect consideration of service 
temperatures and other conditions of the boundary material under 
operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions and 
the uncertainties in determining (1) material properties, (2) the effects of 
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irradiation on material properties, (3) residual, steady state and transient 
stresses, and (4) size of flaws. 
• GDC-32, “Inspection of reactor coolant pressure boundary”: The PHTS 
shall be designed to permit periodic inspection and testing of components 
to assess structural and functional integrity.  
Because of the reduced pressure requirements, GDC-31 is satisfied with a heat 
exchanger designed for lower operational pressures, allowing a reduction in mass and 
simplification in design. However much more detailed design analysis will be required to 
fully satisfy GDC-31. Verifying the IHX integrity through a pressure drop test and weld 
inspections or other testing satisfies GDC-32. Using an approved high temperature 
nuclear code and placing a nuclide trace cover gas in the primary coolant and monitoring 
the cover gas of the hot salt tank for that isotope satisfies GDC-30. Designing the IHX to 
withstand pump shutoff head satisfies GDC-15. 
The separation of the primary system to the steam generator with a vented 
intermediate system creates an air gap. The air gap makes it physically impossible for the 
water to be introduced into the IHX. If any leakage occurs in the steam generator it will 
enter the cold salt tank (290°C, 1 atm) where it will evaporate and leave the tank vents. 
7.2 Intermediate Heat Transport System and Heat Exchanger Design 
Taking into account the regulatory considerations of 2.2.1.1 and the limitations of 
sodium requiring larger channel sizes, we determined the FPHX would give the best 
performance characteristics. We settled on using the Kays and London’s wavy plate-fin 
surface 17.8–3/8W for both sides of the IHX. The sodium side of the AHX used plain 
plate-fin surface 12.00T. These combinations maximized the compactness of the IHX and 
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minimized PHTS and IHTS pressure drops. The primary pressure drop across the IHX is 
218.6 kPa, roughly half of the 430 kPa across the core. The secondary side has a pressure 
drop of 157.8 kPa. At lower natural circulation flow rates, the secondary pressure drop 
will be very little, allowing for a reduced elevation difference between the AHX and the 
IHX. The heat exchanger has a total compactness of 1,538 m2/m3 resulting in significant 
performance improvements.  
Figure 2.8 shows the flow configuration of the IHX and how each IHX is 
assembled. Table 1 lists the pertinent design parameters for the IHX. Each IHX assembly 
consists of 4 counter-flow FPHX modules, two modules on either side of the salt supply 
pipe. We selected an approach temperature of 9°C between reactor core outlet and the 
IHTS hot-leg. This was done to limit the overall pressure drop across each side, and to 
Figure 2-8 Intermediate Heat Exchanger (a) plate profile view (b) IHX top down view 






raise the center of the heat exchanger. The higher heat exchanger center of volume and 
the relatively low pressure drop improve the PHTS natural circulation flow rate, lowering 
the core’s ∆T and thus fuel peak temperatures. Each IHX spans ¼ of the circumference of 
the reactor vessel. This posed a maximum heat exchanger module width of 1.478 m and a 
thickness of 0.618 m, assuming the annulus outside of the core rise is 0.626 m wide. Each 
IHX was sized to remove half of the net heat input into the primary. The RCP 
thermodynamic efficiency was assumed to be 35% with 100% of the heat and work being 
transferred to the primary system. Also for design purposes, RVACS was assumed to 
remove 1.4 MW of heat during normal operation. The net heat removal of each IHX is 
424.9 MW and the corresponding length was 3.432 m. Based on the experience of EBR-
II fouling of the IHX heat transfer surfaces was not considered, as the machine marks 
were still visible on the reactor vessel internals during decommissioning.[ 
Using the exact same IHX support structure as the conventional PRISM, the 
center of the IHX moved higher 1.66 m. Coupled with the reduced pressure drop and 
increased elevation, primary natural circulation is greatly enhanced. 
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Table 2-3 Compact intermediate heat exchanger design parameters 
Reactor power [MW(t)] 840  
IHX Design Power [MW(t)] 424.9  
   
# IHX/Reactor 2  
# Modules/IHX 4  
   
Module Dimensions   
Length [mm] 3,432  
Width [mm] 1,483  
Thickness [mm] 618  
Surface Area Density [m2/ m3] 1,538  
   
 Primary Secondary 
Plate Type 17.38 3/8W 17.38 3/8W 
Fin Type wavy sine wavy sine 
Plate Divider Thickness [mm] 1 1 
Plate Thickness [mm] 10.49 10.49 
Fin Pitch [fins/m] 701 701 
# Plates/Module 65 64 
Re 12,546 10,248 
Pr 0.00544 0.00544 
Heat transfer coefficient  325.5 299.2 
Totals for IHX   
Flow Area [m2] 1.500 1.489 
DH [m] 0.002123 0.002123 
Total Heat Xfer Area [m2] 9,767 9,617 
∆P @ 100% Flow [kPa] 218.6 157.8 
Flow [kg/s] 2,391 2,022 
IHX inlet Density [kg/ m3] 866.7 874.2 
 
The original heat exchanger was 6.75 m long. While entirely possible to make the 
new design having the same length and a much closer approach temperature, we would 
lose the benefit of the 1.66 m higher heat exchanger center, create a larger pressure drop, 
and increase heat exchanger manufacturing costs. The pressure drop across the PHTS is 
what limits the RHR capability of the ACS. 
Raising the displacement of the IHX center of volume will have a significant 
positive impact on the natural circulation and passive Decay Heat Removal (DHR) 
characteristics of the PRISM, higher elevation differences between the heat source and 
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heat sink increases loop differential pressure, increasing natural circulation flow, which 
in turn increases DHR of the ACS, limiting plant temperature perturbations in various 
accident scenarios, increasing the margin to sodium voiding improving plant overall 
safety especially for Anticipated Transients Without SCRAM (ATWS). 
7.3 Salt Heat Exchanger 
As the Salt Heat Exchanger, SHX, is within the safety-grade boundary it needs to 
meet the same qualification requirements as the IHX. To do this and ensure maximum 
compatibility with the salt, P91 was selected as the structural material. The SHX is 
designed to have minimal pressure drop with close approach temperatures. The minimal 
pressure drop is to facilitate natural circulation flow with minimal elevation change. We 
took the reference design cold leg piping as is. The hot leg piping was shortened because 
the SHX is located 2 m above grade and the heat exchanger is only a few meters in 
height, 3.533 m. The elevation difference between the SHX and the IHX is 9.959 m. A 
consequence of raising the IHX center 1.66 m to improve PHTS natural circulation, is 
that the SHX needed to be raised similarly to keep the IHTS temperature difference 
lower. 
The SHX is composed of two different plate types, plain plate-fin 12.00T for the 
sodium side and wavy plate fin surface 17.8 3/8W for the salt side. The high heat transfer 
coefficient of the salt side did not require the additional surface area provided by the 
wavy plate fin and the IHTS is much more sensitive to pressure drops than the ACS. The 
ACS is a very compact system and the salt undergoes a much larger density change than 
the sodium reducing needed elevation differentials. Table 2.4 provides the design 
parameters for the SHX.  
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Table 2-4 Salt Heat Exchanger Design Parameters 
Reactor power [MW(t)] 840  
SHX Design Power [MW(t)] 426  
   
# SHX/Reactor 2  
# Modules/SHX 4  
   
Module Dimensions   
Length [mm] 3.553  
Width [mm] 2,397  
Thickness [mm] 1,065  
Surface Area Density [m2/ m3] 1,373  
   
 Secondary Salt 
Plate Type 12.00T 17.38 3/8W 
Fin Type Plain Triangular wavy sine 
Plate Divider Thickness [mm] 1 1 
Plate Thickness [mm] 6.35 10.49 
Fin Pitch [fins/m] 472 701 
# Plates/Module 127 128 
Re 6,449 334.1 
Pr 0.00544 8.724 
Heat transfer coefficient  84.94 3.615 
Totals for AHX   
Flow Area [m2] 3.182 5.091 
DH [m] 0.00287 0.002123 
Total Heat Xfer Area [m2] 15,760 34,080 
∆P @ 100% Flow [kPa] 10.52 18.65 
Flow [kg/s] 2,022 1,718 









The ACS is designed to maximize natural circulation and to reject approximately 
700 kW at 40°C ambient air conditions for each ACS heat exchanger. It is designed for 
passive initiation with or without isolation from the remainder of the IHTS. The primary 
function of the ACS is to function as a Direct Reactor Air Cooling System (DRACS), but 
by relying almost entirely on equipment used by other systems. Figure 2.7 shows the 
conceptual ACS flow path that will be evaluated in Part 4. 
 
8.1 System Flow Path 
The ACS heat exchanger (AHX) for each train is located directly above its 
associated SHX, e.g. the ‘A’ train AHX is located directly above the ‘A’ SHX. The AHX 
is outside of the primary containment and at an elevation of 6.631 m above grade. This is 
 
Figure 2-9 Conceptual ACS flow path 
SHX 
‘A’ SIVs ‘B’ SIVs 







about 6 m below the mid-point elevation of the helical S/G in the conventional S-PRISM 
design. This elevation difference was set to provide a 40°C salt ∆T at a design heat 
removal capacity of 700 kW(t) with 40°C ambient conditions. It can be lowered or raised 
as necessary to adjust the outlet ∆T. The three systems, PHTS, IHTS and ACS have 
corresponding ∆Ts of 57.7°C, 67.1°C, and 40°C respectively. Figure 2.9 shows the 
natural circulation temperature profile.
 
Figure 2-10 Natural circulation temperature profiles 
 
Position changes have a significant impact on the natural circulation driving head and 
careful consideration needs to be given to heat exchangers and piping system head loss. 
The downcomer from the AHX is a straight vertical pipe that goes directly to the inlet 
plenum of the associated SHX. The riser pipe from the SHX only extends a few meters 
above the SHX to the AHX, and uses long radius pipes as much as possible. The tee’s 
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from the SHX module discharge and supply headers going to the AHX use radiused tee’s 
to promote natural circulation. 
The SIVs are located at the top of the IHX inlet and outlet pipes. The remainder 
of the Salt Heat Transport System, SHTS, salt piping returns to normal grade from the 
respective common salt header. This elevation change acts as a loop seal in the event of 
any pipe ruptures in the non-safety grade piping located outside of the ACS and SIVs. 
The SIVs are the defining boundary between safety and non-safety grade components. 
The SIVs also form the system boundary for their respective train to keep the trains 
independent. The SIVs close automatically on a loss of power or on a reactor trip. They 
have additional features that allow local operation either to open or close them. 
Local operation of the SIVs allows restoration of forced circulation to the ACS to 
allow additional DHR capability via the cold salt tank to the IHX. This additional 
redundancy will help to limit any accident’s temperature transient and aid in plant 
stabilization. However, shifting to forced circulation requires closing the air dampers of 
the AHX prior to initiation of forced circulation to prevent salt freezing. 
The butterfly check valve will actuate passively based on the system pressure 
differential. The valve can have external penetrations or it can be designed to have no 
external penetrations. The simpler design is to have no external penetrations as there is no 
packing to seize and prevent operation. However, this removes the ability to have an 
opening assist, e.g., a spring plunger with a hold open solenoid, and removes the ability 
to verify valve position. These features need to be considered in a more thorough PRA. 
One can replace the check valve with a fluidic diode. This will increase system reliability, 
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but reduce performance. Further evaluation needs to be made on which technology is 
more appropriate in this application. 
The ACS chimney extends 11m above the AHX and is 2.5m ID. For 
conservatism, the surface was assumed to be bolted steel, with a 2mm absolute 
roughness. The redesigned chimney extends approximately 1.5m above the elevation of 
the original helical S/G ACS chimney and should pose no additional design challenges. 
There are forced draft fans in the chimneys. These are only needed for normal 
operations during plant cooldown for maintenance and refueling. The safety related 
dampers open automatically on a loss of power and on a reactor trip and are the ‘normal’ 
means of DHR. During an accident, the fans can provide additional DHR capability 
provided electrical power is available. 
Pressure is maintained in the ACS when the SIVs are closed by using a gas 
accumulator attached to the ACS downcomer. The accumulator is an annulus with the 
central part of the annulus being the dowcomer. Nitrogen is used as the cover gas. 
8.2 Check Valve 
At the outlet of the AHX natural circulation flow path, there is a butterfly check 
valve. These valves are used in Chinese naval nuclear power plants to prevent loop 
backflow and allow natural circulation primary coolant flow at power.[83] The check 
valve will allow better leakage protection and offer a lower natural circulation pressure 
drop than a fluidic diode. Fluidic diodes are being developed for work in the AHTR, but 
have non-trivial forward pressure drops and reverse flow rates.[84] While fluidic diodes 
provide a more reliable initiation solution, they are better indicated for situations where 
there is no ability for remote access, e.g. inside the PHTS pool. Because the check valves 
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are located outside of the primary containment, they are accessible for inspection and 
repair. With two independent ACS systems, one can be taken offline, drained and 
serviced including replacement/repair of all components. This allows periodic component 
inspection to satisfy safety related design basis criteria. 
The check valve needs to have a design backflow to keep the AHX warm and 
passively prevent salt freezing. We estimated this to be around 1% of the total salt flow to 
the IHX without significantly impacting outlet salt temperatures. A full system design of 
the ACS is needed to obtain the actual number and is beyond the scope of this work. 
To have a check valve for modeling in Part 4 a simple non-optimized one was 
designed according to Rao. 
 ∆𝑃𝑃 = 0.5(𝑁𝑁 + 𝑏𝑏𝜃𝜃 + 𝑐𝑐𝜃𝜃2 + 𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃2)𝜌𝜌𝑣𝑣2 2-6 
where the terms 𝑁𝑁, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐, and 𝑑𝑑 are constants with the values 26.184, 0.091, -0.014, and 
1.11⋅10-4 respectively. The other terms are valve angle (from vertical), 𝜃𝜃, fluid density, 𝜌𝜌, 
fluid velocity, 𝑣𝑣, and pressure drop across the valve, ∆𝑃𝑃. 
The various torques associated with the valve in the system are given by the 
following equations where 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 is the torque from the pressure gradient across the valve, 
𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉is the hydrodynamic torque from flow impingement, 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺 is the gravitational torque, and 
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 is the frictional torque. 
 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 = ∆𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿2 − 𝐴𝐴1𝐿𝐿1) cos𝜃𝜃 2-7 
 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 = 𝜌𝜌𝑣𝑣2(𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿2 − 𝐴𝐴1𝐿𝐿1) cos 𝜃𝜃 2-8 
 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺 = (𝑚𝑚2𝐿𝐿2 − 𝑚𝑚1𝐿𝐿1)𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 sin𝜃𝜃 2-9 
 𝑔𝑔 = 𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑−𝜌𝜌𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔
𝜌𝜌𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 2-10 
 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 = 0.02 + 2𝑘𝑘𝜃𝜃 2-11 
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 ∑𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 − 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 2-12 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖, and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 are the respective valves areas, moment arms from the pivot, and masses. 1 
denotes the portion that is above the pivot, 2 the portion below the pivot. 𝑔𝑔 is the density 
ratio to account for buoyancy form the valve’s displacement of the working fluid. 𝑘𝑘 is 
0.005 for 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 16°, 0.0045 for 16° < 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 50°, and 0.00335 for 𝜃𝜃 > 50°. 
The frictional torque was found using the following conditions: 
For 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑






= 0 and, 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 − 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 < −𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆, 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆, or 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 − 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 > 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆, 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = −𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆, or 
|𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 − 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆| ≤ |𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆|, 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 = −(𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 − 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 and 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 are experimentally determined constants, 0.01 and 0.12 respectively. 
All units for the respective terms are MKS, degrees and Pascal. 
To determine the valves equivalent orifice opening relative to the upstream pipe, 
𝜀𝜀𝑇𝑇, and the vena contracta area, 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐, relative to the downstream pipe the following 
equations were used. 𝜀𝜀 is the ratio of the downstream to upstream flow areas, taken here 
to be 1. 
 ∆𝑃𝑃 = 1
2
𝜌𝜌 �1 − 𝜀𝜀
𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑇𝑇
� 𝑣𝑣2 2-14 
 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐 = 0.62 + 0.38𝜀𝜀𝑇𝑇3 2-15 




The resulting design is summarized in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2-5 Summary of Butterfly Check Valve Design Parameters 
Material SS 347 
IDpipe [m] 0.7176 
ODdisc [m] 0.7176 
∆disc [m] 0.009525 
Axis offset [m] 0.06396 
I [kg-m2] 1.211 
A1 [m2] 0.1662 
A2 [m2] 0.2599 
L1 [m] 0.1205 
L2 [m] 0.1802 
m1 [kg] 12.43 
m2 [kg] 19.44 
Design flow [kg/s] 138.3 
Design Open Angle [°] 42.26 
Design ∆P [Pa] 426.6 
Orifice Area [m2] 0.001647 
 
The disc will have an orifice in it to allow 0.5% of nominal salt flow, 8.59 kg/s, to 
bypass the SHX and back flow through the check valve orifice which has an area of 
0.001647m2. Thus, total salt flow into the ACS during normal full power operation is 
1,726.63 kg/s. 
8.3 Heat Exchanger Selection 
The conventional helical coil ACS S/G has an outside surface area of 
approximately 253 m2, with an estimated UA of 6.17 kW/K. The final selected AHX 
should have an air surface area and UA of at least this much. When conducting the 
natural circulation calculations this was too large of an area. 1% heat removal was 
achieved with a heat exchanger of roughly half the surface area, 148 m2, with an airside 
UA of 5.777 kW/K. 
The heat exchanger should have a maximal cross section for air flow with a 
minimum thickness. Because of the difference in the volumetric heat capacities of the salt 
and the air, 2,746 kJ/m3-K and 0.635 kJ/m3-K respectively, the air is the limiting fluid in 
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designing the heat exchanger, which is further complicated by the desire to minimize the 
pressure drop across either side under NC conditions. For these reasons, the crossflow 
heat exchanger is the best and most commonly used for liquid-gas heat exchange. 
To select the most appropriate heat exchanger fill, we opted on using a compact 
fin plate heat exchanger. We evaluated 57 different geometries from Kays and London 
and selected the plain plate-fin surface 2.0 (Figure 10-19) for each side by evaluating the 
total heat removed from the PHTS under NC with the primary coolant at 434.15°C. For 
each side the plain plate-fin surface 2.0, trapezoidal geometry, performed the best. 
Table 2-6 AHX Design Data for 40°C air inlet and Tave of 432°C 
AHX heat removal [MW(t)] 8.65  
# AHX/Reactor 2  
# Modules/IHX 4  
   
Module Dimensions   
Length [mm] 1,250  
Width [mm] 1,250  
Thickness [mm] 200  
Surface Area Density [m2/ m3] 237  
   
 Salt Air 
Plate Type 2.0 2.0 
Fin Type plain plain 
Plate Divider Thickness [mm] 1.02 1.02 
Plate Thickness [mm] 19.05 19.05 
Fin Pitch [fins/m] 78.74 78.74 
Plate width [mm] 200 200 
# Plates/Module 124 125 
Re 4,731 4,224 
Pr 4.50 6.12 
∆T [°C] 26.13 372 
Heat transfer coefficient  1,070 38.92 
Totals for Single AHX   
Flow Area [m2] 0.428 2.67 
Total Heat Xfer Area [m2] 148 148 
∆P @ 100% Flow [Pa] 231.3 62.5 
Flow [kg/s] 217.7 21.0 




The indicated heat transfer surface characteristic data is in Table 2.6. To provide 
an initial size estimate of the heat exchanger, the β (heat transfer surface area to total 
volume) is 249.672 m2/m3 for a given channel. Thus, the salt side should have a volume 
of at least 1m3 to keep the surface area similar to the conventional ACS. Assuming the 
final heat exchanger will be 0.2 m thick on the air side, this results in approximately 82 
salt plates sandwiched between 83 air plates. We took the plate thickness to be 1.02 mm. 
The heat exchanger was sized to be square for simplicity and was 3.3 m on a side and 0.2 
m thick. This is a workable size and can be broken up into smaller sections in a folded 
core arrangement.[85] fig 2-42) The size of each panel if breaking the heat exchanger 
into fourths is 1.6 m on a side and is easily fabricated and shipped. The footprint of the 
foldable unit, assuming a 30° tilt on the panel from vertical results in a form factor of 1.6 
m x 4 m x 1.4 m. 
The actual designed unit was much smaller than the one indicated in the rough 
sizing. The heat transfer for the given conditions would be about 13.9 MW(t). This is 
much greater than what is needed for the design specification. This shows how easily 
heat transfer area can be scaled and not have a significant impact on the form factor of 
the AHX. The folding of the heat exchanger will introduce additional pressure drops into 
the air system from inlet and outlet ducting. Simply increasing the surface area can bring 
the pressure drop back to within that needed for the desired airflow. 
8.4 Heat Exchanger Calculations 
Using the methods of Hesselgreaves[86] and Kays and London[85], we conducted 
a steady state natural circulation evaluation of the ACS. Piping fixture head loss, 
including IHX and AHX end effects were estimated using the equivalent length method, 
89 
 
with a resulting salt piping length of 737.1 m of a nominal 29.25” ID schedule 40s pipe. 
The piping surface was assumed to be adiabatic and axial conduction was neglected in 
each heat exchanger. Fin efficiencies and all thermophysical properties were calculated 
using EES internal built in functions. 
The test loop heat exchanger network was then simulated in RELAP consisting of 
one IHX, one SHX, and one AHX, their associated piping and ACS check valve. The 
system’s boundary conditions were: IHX primary wall temperature was held constant at 
456.9°C and the ambient dry bulb temperature was 40°C. This resulted in the test 
channel removing 1.03 MW(t) with corresponding steady state conditions listed in Table 
2-7. Note, the salt was simulated using sodium as the working fluid. 
Table 2-7 ACS Performance for Uniform Primary Wall Temperature of 456.9°C and 
Ambient Temperature of 40°C 
 ?̇?𝑚 [kg/s] Tc Th ΔT 
IHTS (Na) 66.57 443.91 456.84 12.93 
ACS (Salt) 35.98 434.36 456.36 22.00 
UHS (Air) 8.902 40.0 154.05 114.05 
 
The performance of the system with a uniform primary wall temperature checks 
with the observed performance during actual simulations. Figure 2-11 shows a single 




Figure 2-11 Single channel ACS performance for various salt inlet temepratures to the 
AHX 
  
































The system proposed in Figure 2-1 was evaluated using data from the Bonneville 
Power Administration.[87] This data set contained 5-minute service area load and 
generator data. The concept was to have (21) 840 MW(t) Mod B PRISM reactors fulfill 
100% of the load profile of the BPA service area to see if a) this was conceptually 
possible, b) what sort of transients could be expected, and c) to understand how the 
integrated system would respond. 
The control system for the combined sites was greatly simplified. The combustion 
turbines were set to operate in a bang-bang mode. They were either all on or all off. This 
system had roughly 60 combustion turbines, and could easily scale output even with 
individual turbines running at 100%, thus the model is quite contrived and in no way, 
represents actual operations. The reactors were assumed to operate at full power 
whenever salt levels were below full capacity and then to modulate their output once the 
salt tanks were full. There were no predictive capabilities assumed, even though the BPA 
service area can be reasonably modeled to account for weather, which drives a large 
portion of the daily variability in load. An actual system would likely use some form of 
model predictive control to optimize the overall system for a specific service area and 
market conditions. Such consideration is well beyond the scope of this work and was not 
done. 
The starting and stopping of the combustion turbines was controlled by the hot 
tank’s salt level. Two scenarios were considered, the CT starting at a salt tank level of 
85% and lowering stopping once the salt tank was at full capacity, and the CT starting at 
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a salt tank level of 35% and lowering stopping once the salt tank was full. The results 
from each control logic is shown in Figure 2-12. The 85% CT control was able to prevent 
salt tank level from falling below the minimum level, while the 35% CT control was not. 
This shows that more effective controller design will easily accommodate this system in 
real life allowing the user to control the overall system more elegantly. 
 
Figure 2-12 85% Combustion Turbine Control Salt Tank Level in m3 for BPA service 
area from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2011. The red line is the minimum tank level 




Figure 2-13 35% Combustion Turbine Control Salt Tank Level in m3 for BPA service 
area from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2011 
For purposes of defining a transient response from the reactor the 35% CT control 
was selected as it would more closely match the ultimate implementation. This resulted in 
a reactor capacity factor of 90%, Figure 2-13 even when accounting for planned plant 
outages, Figure 2-14. Taking this data the histogram of reactor transients in each 5 minute 
integrating period above 1% per minute was < 0.2% of all 5 minute periods over the 4-
year study period, Figure 2-15. The peak rate power change was 4.2%/minute and was 





Figure 2-14 Outage schedule for BPA service area when repowered with 840 MW(t) 
Mod B PRISM reactors using nTES. Reactors assume an 18-month cycle and 1 month 
refueling outages. 
 
Figure 2-15 Histogram of power transients greater than 1%/min (0.01 on the X-axis) for 








One of the challenges with S-PRISM and that which has limited core outlet 
temperatures is maintaining fuel temperatures within the desired margins during various 
accident scenarios. The approach taken here allows one train of the ACS to always be 
considered in limiting fuel temperatures, and as importantly salt temperatures. The 
conventional PRISM only has one ACS system increasing the likelihood of having it 
unavailable during deterministic design scenarios. 
This capability will be specifically evaluated in subsequent RELAP calculations 
as it improves the economics of storage and the overall thermodynamic efficiency of the 
PCS improving total plant economics. What will limit the final core outlet temperature is 
that solar salt begins to undergo thermal decomposition at temperatures above 630°C. 
Accident scenarios need to limit the time above decomposition temperatures to prevent 
the evolved gas from gas binding the AHX and preventing natural circulation. It may be 
necessary to add a gas trap near the AHX. The temperature response of the ACS to 
various off normal transients was evaluated and is discussed in Part 4 and normal 
operational transients in Part 3 as a part of designing the control system. 
Overall the compactness of this design as well as the introduction of a third 
independent pathway for DHR represents a significant improvement in the overall design 
of the nuclear island. The simplification of the ACS portion of the SHTS piping provides 




The integration of energy storage creates an opportunity for the entire system to 
be able to access all portions of the electricity market including the entire ancillary 













The proposed control system is intended to be condition based autonomy within a 
defined operational envelope. The control synthesis simultaneously adjusts reactor power 
to a directed power level while maintaining a stable salt outlet temperature to the hot 
tank. It does this by controlling external reactivity through control rod position and salt 
mass flow rate into the system. To simplify the controller and reduce the risk of a prompt 
reactivity insertion from the gas expansion modules, the primary sodium flow rate will be 
constant. An additional simplification to the design is to neglect the time delays 
associated with the intermediate loop and to treat the system as if it were just the PHTS 
and the SHTS. 
The model is a linearization of a nonlinear system. The two nonlinear components 
are the reactor and the IHX. While the reactor linearization introduces small errors for 
𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡) ≪ ?̅?𝛽, the IHX has an 8% error with system power of 20% from the linearization 
point, worsening farther away from it. For this reason, the controller needs to have an 
integrating capability around the desired 0 dB crossover frequency. It also needs to have 
a strong roll off at frequencies above cross over to attenuate the model errors. 
We use H∞ control theory to determine an optimal controller that will exhibit the 
desired error cancellation at low frequencies and robustness at high frequencies. The 
approach taken here is based on Suzuki et al[88] work on designing a linearized H∞ 
controller for nonlinear instabilities in BWRs at low flow and high power. Because our 
approach here is so heavily based on their work, we chose to present the material in a 
similar fashion. In Chapter 2, we present the nonlinear model of the nTES and discuss its 
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linearization. Chapter 3 presents the design of the controller design, beginning with the 
basic Linear Time Invariant, LTI, model and adding in instrumentation and control delays 
to form a complete system. We then present the desired loop shaping to create an 
augmented model that will be what the controller is based upon. In chapter 4 we simulate 
the non-controlled/non-augmented model to show basic control input transients and then 
show how the controlled plant functions in a closed loop to the specified command 
inputs. 
CHAPTER 2 




For simplicity, the underlying model for the reactor is based on the single group 
delayed neutron precursor zero power point kinetic reactivity model. The S-PRISM has a 
very large neutron mean free path relative to the size of the core providing a strong 
leakage term. This leakage strongly shapes the flux distribution. This distribution is 
relatively constant over the entire power profile, neglecting control rod flux perturbation 
and changes in leakage due to varying axial and radial sodium densities, of the reactor 
allowing the separation of variables from the time dependent and the spatial dependent 


























(𝑡𝑡) − Θ𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)� −
2𝑈𝑈11𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶
(𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶2−𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹2)〈𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃〉𝐶𝐶





�Θ𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) − Θ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡)� −
?̇?𝑚1〈𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃〉𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝
𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝〈𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃〉𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝
�Θ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) − Θ1(𝑡𝑡)� 3-5 
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Where Θ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖(0), 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒(𝑡𝑡) =
1
2
�𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑇𝑇1(𝑡𝑡)�, 𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) =
𝑁𝑁(𝑑𝑑)−𝑁𝑁(0)
𝑁𝑁(0)
, and 𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑑𝑑)−𝐶𝐶(0)
𝐶𝐶(0)
 are the reduced temperatures, average coolant temperature, 
reduced power and reduced delayed neutron precursor concentrations respectively. The 
system of ordinary differential equations is entirely linear except for the first term of 
equation 1.a. By keeping 𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡) ≪ ?̅?𝛽, the nonlinearity can be removed with only small 
prompt neutron effects observable at the initiation and termination of control rod motion. 
These high frequency terms can be removed by the controller’s strong attenuation of 
noise above the cutoff frequency. The linearization of Equation 3-1around 𝑛𝑛(0) leaves us 










The remainder of the PHTS is modeled by using a first order delay model based 
on Roetzel’s [89] linear approximation of a network of heat exchangers. In their model, 
the transport of the fluid in adiabatic portions is best is a first order time delay. To 
approximate the IHX we use the log mean temperature approximation of a counter-flow 










�Θ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) − Θ2(𝑡𝑡)� 3-8 

















 and 𝑤𝑤3(𝑡𝑡) =
?̇?𝑚3(𝑑𝑑)
?̇?𝑚3(0)
are the ratio of heat capacities multiplied 
by the mass flow rate and the ratio of the mass salt mass flow rate to nominal flow. γ is 
not unity because of the larger temperature rise across the salt side of the heat exchanger 
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compared to the flow rate of the salt. This will contribute to an exergy loss in the system, 
but allows for a lower cost energy storage system. 
Renaming the terms in equation 3.9 we have the following: 
𝑇𝑇ℎ,𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤3(𝑡𝑡)�𝑇𝑇2(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑,𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑔𝑔�𝑤𝑤3(𝑡𝑡)� 3-10 
 and plotting 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤3(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝑓𝑓�𝑤𝑤3(0)� and 𝐺𝐺 = 𝑔𝑔�𝑤𝑤3(𝑡𝑡)� − 𝑔𝑔�𝑤𝑤3(0)� in Figure 3.1 
we can see the nature of the nonlinearity. This nonlinearity when linearized will introduce 
a low frequency noise, particularly from 𝐺𝐺(𝑥𝑥). Because the controller is designed to have 
a low frequency integration term, it will be able to handle this particular modeling error. 
 
Figure 3-1 Counter-flow heat exchanger governing equations 















where 𝑥𝑥3(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑤𝑤3(𝑡𝑡) − 1 is the reduced salt flow rate. 
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The temperature linearization was done around the full power point, this was an 
arbitrary decision to make the system as accurate as possible near the operating limits. 
This induces more error at low powers, but with the increased margin from thermal 








The control system design is an adaptation of the SISO control model of Suzuki et 
al.[88] The two monitored state variables used for control are the reactor power and the 
salt outlet temperature of the IHX. The two control inputs are control rod position and 
salt pump speed. Figure 3.2 shows the general plant model. The reference input vector 
𝒓𝒓𝑇𝑇 = [𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 0] where 𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑 is the operator input desired power level. 𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐(𝑠𝑠) is the controller 
transfer function and 𝑲𝑲𝒄𝒄(𝑠𝑠) is the controller output feedback transfer function. 𝑮𝑮𝟎𝟎(𝑠𝑠) is 
the LTI model of the reactor and heat exchanger system and 𝑮𝑮𝒊𝒊(𝑠𝑠) is the model of the 
indicated parameters used for plant control. 𝑮𝑮𝒂𝒂(𝑠𝑠) is the augmented plant model that 
contains: 𝑮𝑮𝒄𝒄(𝑠𝑠), 𝑲𝑲𝒄𝒄(𝑠𝑠), 𝑮𝑮𝟎𝟎(𝑠𝑠), and 𝑮𝑮𝒊𝒊(𝑠𝑠). 𝚫𝚫(𝑠𝑠) is a multiplicative modeling error 
between the real-world controlled object and the augmented plant model. The entire 
controlled object is 𝑮𝑮(𝑠𝑠). 
 
Figure 3-2 General closed loop controller model 
𝑲𝑲(𝑠𝑠) 𝑮𝑮𝟎𝟎(𝑠𝑠) 𝑮𝑮𝒊𝒊(𝑠𝑠) 
𝒓𝒓 𝒆𝒆 𝒖𝒖 𝒚𝒚 







Augmented Model 𝑮𝑮𝒂𝒂(𝑠𝑠) 
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3.1 Instrumentation and Control 
The models of the CRDMs and Nuclear Instruments are taken directly from 





where the motor’s gain factor, 𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚, is assumed to be 0.4 s-1. The position feedback gain 
factor, 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒, is taken to be 2.5. 





where the salt pump motor’s gain factor, 𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝, is assumed to be 0.1 s-1 and the pump flow 
feedback gain factor, 𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝, is 1. Combining the CRDM and pump models and feedbacks 
we have 









The NI detector and the salt IHX outlet Resistance Temperature Detector, RTD, 
response transfer functions are taken to be first order lag functions. And in matrix form 
the instrumentation transfer function, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠), is: 







where 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 and 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 are assumed to be 1. 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑 is 0.1 s. Without knowing the construction of 
the RTD, we can approximate its lag as 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑 =
𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔〈𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃〉𝑔𝑔
2ℎ𝑔𝑔
 and assumed a final value of 1 s. 
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3.2 State Equation 
Expanding the reactivity term of equation 3.6 we incorporate the feedback effects 
from fuel Doppler and axial expansion and coolant Doppler and related core radial 
expansion. 






�𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡)� 3-19 






�𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑥𝑥3(𝑡𝑡)� 3-20 










�Θ3(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡)� 3-22 
for the NI and RTD respectively. 




= 𝑨𝑨𝒙𝒙 + 𝑩𝑩1𝒘𝒘 + 𝑩𝑩2𝒖𝒖 3-23 
 𝒛𝒛 = 𝑪𝑪1𝒙𝒙 + 𝑫𝑫11𝒘𝒘 + 𝑫𝑫12𝒖𝒖 3-24 
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𝒙𝒙(𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = [𝑛𝑛 𝑐𝑐 Θ𝐹𝐹 Θ𝐶𝐶 Θ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 Θ1 Θ2 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑 𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑 𝑥𝑥3] 
𝒘𝒘(𝑡𝑡) = [𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑] 𝒖𝒖(𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = [𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐] 
with the outputs of, 
𝒛𝒛(𝑡𝑡)𝑻𝑻 = [Θ𝐻𝐻 𝑧𝑧𝜌𝜌 𝑧𝑧𝑝𝑝] 𝒚𝒚(𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇 = [𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑] 
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where 𝑧𝑧𝜌𝜌 is the reactivity of the control rods, 𝑧𝑧𝑝𝑝 is the measured salt pump flow rate, 𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑 is 
the indicated NI power, and 𝑦𝑦𝑑𝑑 is the indicated salt IHX outlet temperature. The 𝒛𝒛(𝑡𝑡) 
vector was included to show how non-control outputs are calculated for model outputs of 
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Table 3.1 and 3.2 list the Design parameters used for building the control model. 
Table 3-1 Core Physical and Control and Instrumentation Design Parameters 
Control and Instrumentation Core physical parameters 
𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚 0.4 s-1 CRDM gain 
factor 
𝑄𝑄0 106 kW Nominal Reactor 
Power 
𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒 2.5  CRDM 
proportional 
feedback gain 
𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 0.499363 m3 Total Heavy Metal 
Volume 
𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝 0.1 s-1 Salt pump gain 
factor 
〈𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃〉𝐹𝐹 1,835.87 kJ/m3-K Fuel volumetric 
heat capacity 
𝑘𝑘𝑝𝑝 1  Salt pump 
proportional 
feedback gain 
𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 0.002738 m Fuel radius 
𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑 0.1 s NI response time 
delay 
ℎ 197.132 kW/m2-K Fuel to Clad heat 
transfer coefficient 
𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 1  NI gain 〈𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃〉𝐶𝐶 4,169.61 kJ/m3-K Clad volumetric 
heat capacity 
𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑 1 s RTD response 
gain 
𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶 0.00372 m Clad radius 
𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 1  RTD gain 𝑈𝑈11 92.3814 kW/m2-K Clad to coolant 
heat transfer 
coefficient 
    𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 49,717  Number of fuel 
pins 
    𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 1.016 m Active core height 
 
Table 3-2 Loop Design Parameters 
PHTS Parameters IHTS Parameters 
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 7,195.58 kW/K  𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑 4,950.81 kW/K  
𝑇𝑇2 772.15 K Hot-leg 
temperature 
𝑇𝑇3 765.15 K IHX outlet 
temperature 
𝑇𝑇1 633.15 K Cold-leg 
temperature 






𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴 36,542 kW/K IHX heat 
transfer 
coefficient 
𝜏𝜏4 35.722 s Hot-leg time 
delay 
    
𝜏𝜏5 48.930 s Cold-leg time 
delay 
    
𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 1.540619 m3 Active core 
coolant 
volume 




Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 provide the delayed neutron and reactivity feedbacks used 
in building the model.  
Table 3-3 Core Reactivity Feedbacks at Various Times in Core Life 










 pcm/K pcm/K pcm/K pcm/K pcm/K pcm/K 
BOC -0.3401 -0.4655 -0.8056 0.7577 -0.1950 0.5627 
MOC -0.3438 -0.5818 -0.9256 0.8007 -0.1978 0.6029 
EOC -0.3467 -0.4386 -0.7853 0.8366 -0.1978 0.6388 
 
Table 3-4 Delayed Neutron Parameters at Various Times in Core Life 
Delayed Neutron Precursor Data 
 ?̅?𝛽 𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 Λ 
 pcm s-1 s 
BOC 373.8 0.5311 2.670E-07 
MOC 379.1 0.5320 2.707E-07 
EOC 378.9 0.5322 2.704E-07 
 
3.3 Design Specification 
The controller has fundamental physical limits that it needs to maintain. First deal 
with reactivity and the others deal with operational needs. The control rods have two 
limits, rate and magnitude, placed on them pertaining to reactor safety. The rod 
withdrawal speed is limited to ensure a maximum reactivity insertion rate of 2¢/s, 7.5 
pcm/s, and a rod stop limit of 20¢, 75 pcm.[61, 90] Another constraint on control rods is 
to minimize control rod motion for transients.[91] Applied to an automatic control 
scheme, control rod mileage needs to be limited with minimal control action overshoot. 
From an operational perspective, from looking at the model in Part 2, the reactor 
needs to have a design rate of power change of at least 4.2 %/min. To achieve this, we 
110 
 
want to have a rise rate for a doubling of reactor power to be less than 5 minutes, 
specifying a minimum closed loop control bandwidth of 0.0067 rad/s.[92] The control 
rod speed and desire to minimize rod motion will put an upper limit on the bandwidth, 
but this needs to be evaluated during loop shaping. 
The closed loop model needs to be stable, maximum real value of the closed loop 
model’s 𝑨𝑨 eigenvalues needs to be less than zero.[93] It needs to satisfy performance 
criteria, low sensitivity at low frequencies, and the model needs to satisfy robustness 
criteria, that at frequencies above cross over the closed loop transfer function and 
complementary sensitivity have a roll-off of 20-40 dB/decade.[88] This will ensure that 
the negative gain will grow faster than the positive gain from measurement noise. 
3.4 Loop Shaping and H∞ Synthesis 
We followed the approach of Suzuki for loop shaping with some modifications. 
First is that there is a need for our controller to have good error cancelation around the 
cross over frequency. To do this we used a PID to shape the low frequency signal and 
modified it to include a lead compensation feature. 





5 (𝑠𝑠2+ 0.1𝑠𝑠 + 0.01)
𝑠𝑠 (𝑠𝑠+34)
� 3-26 
Because the H∞ synthesis was done using the built in Matlab™ function of the 
Robust Control Systems Toolbox™, ncfsyn, the complementary sensitivity shaping 
was done with a simple lag compensator as the built-in synthesis requires a proper 
transfer function to be input. Other Matlab™ synthesis approaches have even more 
restrictive stability criteria and do not allow poles of zero. Because our sensitivity 
shaping transfer function is based on an integrator, it has a zero pole, and the integrating 
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function is needed to reduce model error at low frequencies, we were unable to use the 
other synthesis functions. Matlab technical support reason for this was: 
“…[W]e discussed that we do only consider systems with poles having a negative 
real part as stable. The systems given in the weights [𝑾𝑾𝑺𝑺(𝑠𝑠)] are considered as 
marginally stable. One rationale for this is to see the behavior of these systems 
with constant inputs. For example, if you provide a step or a constant input to 
either of the systems, the output that comes out is a ramp signal, which goes 
unbounded as you increase the simulation time, which does not show a stable 
behavior.” 












− 1.189∙1012𝑠𝑠 – 8.07∙109







where the first column represents from 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝, the second column is from 𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐 the first row is 
to 𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑 and the second row is to 𝑥𝑥3. The final H∞ synthesis controller 𝐾𝐾, has 36 degrees of 
freedom and was generated using the Robust Controller Toolbox™ command, 
[𝑲𝑲 ~ 𝛾𝛾] = ncfsyn(𝑮𝑮𝒂𝒂 𝑾𝑾𝑺𝑺 𝑾𝑾𝑻𝑻). The resulting 𝛾𝛾 = 2.004 being less than 3 shows 
that the controller tracks the loop shaped model within acceptable bounds. 
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During modeling, we encountered problems with being able to obtain satisfactory 
gain margins with the need to have low frequency error cancellation with an integrator. 
Because there is a pole at zero, the shaping regulator can become unbounded with high 
frequency errors. This was frequently observed during model development. This 
unsatisfactory response for high frequency performance can also be seen by our inability 
to obtain negative gain margins and achieve the desired plant performance characteristics, 
even for a marginally stable controller that met overall design objectives, equations 3.26 
and 3.27. Figure 3.3 shows the closed loop Bode diagrams for the final closed loop 
system. We attempted the use of improper transfer functions to force the desired high 
frequency gain response similar to that taken by Suzuki. This approach could not yield a 




Figure 3-3 Bode diagrams for the closed loop system. 
Examining the response of the plant in Figure 3.3 using sensitivity, 𝑺𝑺 =
1
1 + 𝑮𝑮𝒂𝒂𝑲𝑲�  and complementary sensitivity, 𝑻𝑻 = 1 − 𝑺𝑺, we can see that the closed loop 
plant has excellent low frequency performance with complementary sensitivity near 0 dB, 
no resonance peak and bandwidth that results in a desired final controlled plant response, 
0.0104 and 1.103 rad/s for reactor power to pump control and salt outlet temperature to 
external reactivity respectively.[92] The sensitivity function for reactor power to pump 
control has a 0dB crossover of 0.0758 rad/s, indicating that plant inputs with a frequency 
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less than this value will be attenuated, and others will be amplified. 
 
Figure 3-4 Sensitivity and complimentary sensitivity graphs. 
The salt outlet temperature to external reactivity control does not have a 0dB 
crossover, indicating that all higher frequency noise will be attenuated to some level. The 
maximum sensitivity remains close to 0dB for both responses, indicating monotonic 
noise amplification. This can be seen better by looking at the load disturbance gain, 
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𝑮𝑮𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 = 𝑮𝑮𝒂𝒂𝑺𝑺, and the measurement noise gain, 𝑮𝑮𝒖𝒖𝒖𝒖 = 𝑲𝑲𝑺𝑺, as seen in figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3-5 Controller disturbance and noise gains 
Figure 3.5 also contains low pass filters for the measured parameters, 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑑𝑑 =
0.12
(𝑠𝑠 + 0.1)2�  and 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,3 =
0.1
(𝑠𝑠 + 0.1)� . By including the low pass filters outside of 
the H∞ synthesis of the controller, we can achieve satisfactory high frequency 
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performance for the plant. The final plant controller is shown in Figure 3.6 where 𝑭𝑭𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 =
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑔𝑔(𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,𝑑𝑑 𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝,3). 
 
Figure 3-6 Final closed loop controller 
  
𝑭𝑭𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝑠𝑠) 𝑲𝑲(𝑠𝑠) 𝑮𝑮𝒂𝒂(𝑠𝑠) 












4.1 Open Loop Simulation without Control 
To assess the uncontrolled plant model and get an estimate for the error induced 
through linearization of the IHX governing equations, we evaluated the open loop plant 
model both in steady state to steady state step changes and in transient response. 
To evaluate the steady state to steady state transient response, we set the time 
derivative of equation 3.23 to zero and solved 𝒙𝒙 = −𝑨𝑨−1𝑩𝑩2𝒖𝒖 for the desired step 
response of 𝒖𝒖. Table 3.5 provides the results of the step changes in reactivity and flow. 




𝑛𝑛 0.008204 0.4115 
 
𝑐𝑐 21.62⋅106 1.085⋅109 
 
𝛩𝛩𝐹𝐹 0.97 -34.07 °C 
𝛩𝛩𝐶𝐶 0.85 -39.80 °C 
𝛩𝛩𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 0.67 -48.78 °C 
𝛩𝛩1 0.33 -107.67 °C 
𝛩𝛩2 1.01 10.11 °C 
𝜌𝜌𝑐𝑐 0.4 0 pcm 
𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑 0.82% 41.15% 
 
𝛩𝛩3 0.98 -30.80 °C 
𝑥𝑥3 0% 100% 
 
 
There are some useful operational parameters that can be obtained from Table 3.5. 
For every 1 pcm of reactivity corresponds to a 2.44°C change in salt outlet temperature 
and a 2.1% change in reactor power. For a 1% change in salt flow, reactor power will 
change 0.41% and salt outlet temperature will change -0.31°C. 
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In evaluating the dynamic response, the best way to describe the response of the 
reactor responds to control inputs sluggishly, Figure 3.7. It is like driving a semi-tractor 
compared to a sports car. There is a significant thermal inertia associated with the system 
due to the overall sodium mass and the strong prompt negative reactivity feedbacks make 
for very docile plant response to reactivity perturbations. For a 0.4 pcm reactivity 
insertion at a rod speed of 5 pcm/s, the rise time of salt outlet and reactor power were 84 s 
and 26 s, respectively. 
One concern that further justifies the measured indication filtering in the final 
controller design, is the prompt jump/drop upon initiation and termination of rod motion. 
The large and immediate error signal generated could cause rod chatter (inward/outward) 




Figure 3-7 Transient response to a step change in pump flow 
 
4.2 Closed Loop Simulation with Optimal Control 
The closed loop response to a unit step function in target reactor power is shown 
in Figure 3.8.While this response is not physically achievable in real life, it represents 
going from 100% to 200% power, it is useful in showing the dynamics of the closed loop 
system to a more challenging transient than what is in its operational envelope (50%-
100% power at 100% primary flow rate). All other transients will result in a less 
aggressive controller action (lower magnitude in error signal). Reactor power and salt 
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pump are both slightly under damped, some improvements can be had by making them 




Figure 3-8 Closed loop response to step change in desired power level. 
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Focusing on the initial portion of external reactivity’s response to the design 
change in target reactor power, Figure 3.9, we can see how the final controller is well 
within the design objectives. First, examining the plot shows that the control rods are 
slightly overdamped, this was done to bring the rise time for the reactor power to be less 
than 5 minutes, further reductions in reactor power rise time will increase the CRDM 
control effort, as the CRDMs initiate the transient acting to raise reactor power, while 
reactivity feedbacks are controlled by varying the salt flow rate. The maximum reactivity 
insertion rate is 5.6 pcm/s within the design limits of the CRDMS of 7.5 pcm/s. Next, the 
control rod traveled a maximum of 20.8 pcm, well within the rod stop limit of 75 pcm. 
Finally, the CRDM has an ideal mileage of 18.8 pcm and an actual mileage of 20.9 pcm, 
11% above the ideal amount, which is reasonable and should be within the lifetime 
mileage of the CRDMs based on a reasonable anticipated number of transients, yielding 
acceptable maintenance and replacement criteria.
 
Figure 3-9 Closed loop external reactivity response to step change in desired power. 
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The CRDM motion is shown to be a continuous function, not step wise 
continuous at a fixed rod speed. With the advancement of solid state technology, there is 
no operational/technical reason to not have variable speed CRDMs. Because of the 
plant’s sensitivity to high frequency noise, smoothing the CRDM reactivity insertions 









This study shows one approach to implement a modern robust microprocessor 
control to a SFR to achieve desired power transients on an operationally meaningful time 
scale while maintaining a nearly constant salt outlet temperature to the energy storage 
system. This study is meant only to show the feasibility of the concept. Further 
consideration needs to be given to the impact of this active control scheme on passive 
safety responses, extending the work of Ponciroli et al. to this model. Their work showed 
that for conventional SFR’s the active control has little impact on the passive safety 
ability to show protection. With the design simplification of the nTES and simplified 
control, 2 measured parameters and 2 related control outputs, the closed loop nTES 
should provide additional margin to those of a conventional SFR. 
The approach of using H∞ synthesis in designing reactor control schemes is not 
without precedent. Nor is the using other modern control strategies such as µ-synthesis, 
which handles uncertainty more explicitly than what was done with this approach. Future 













The limited safety evaluation undertaken in this part was done to evaluate the 
plant in off-normal situations to be able to verify that fuel and coolant temperature 
limitations were not exceeded during plant trips and a set of Beyond Design Basis 
Accidents, BDBAs which included ULOHS, ULOF, ULOF/ULOHS, and UTOP. To be 
able to make comparisons for the purposes of evaluating the design changes discussed in 
Part 2, two separate models were implemented in RELAP5-3D. The first model was for 
the reference design, a 1,000MW(t) S-PRISM variant. The second model was the 
modified version of the reference design which included the replacement of the IHX with 
a compact version and the addition of a TES and the proposed ACS trains. 
Because of the limitations of the license available for using RELAP5-3D, we 
were unable to model the solar salt in the proposed IHTS. Solar salt has been successfully 
implemented in RELAP5-3D and validated in an experimental model.[94] The issue is 
not a technical one, just one of having the correct binary fluid files for RELAP5-3D. 
Thus, sodium was used to approximate the solar salt. This approach was suitable for our 
needs as this work is only a conceptual study.  
Chapter 2 will first provide a background of the S-PRISM including the extension 
of the previous model upon which this study is based and how this study differs from the 
former. Chapter 3 will outline the objectives of this part and how those objectives were 
met. Chapter 4 will provide a brief summary of the computational tools used. Chapter 5 
will discuss how the computational model was implemented. Chapter 6 will discuss the 
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results of the transient simulations. And then, the conclusions of this study are discussed 








Because of the desire to have a low cost thermal energy storage system, the 
energy storage media selected was solar salt. Solar salt is a binary eutectic consisting of 
60% NaNO3 and 40% KNO3. It is commonly used in TES system applications especially 
in solar thermal. It has an operational temperature range of ~600°C to 270°C. It is 
commonly used as an industrial working fluid and is available in bulk at about ~$750-
$1,300/ton depending on the grade, with low chloride concentrations being preferred.[95] 
The salt has a thermal decomposition temperature of 630°C which may prove to be an 
issue during accident scenarios. The operational temperature profile fits well with SFRs, 
510°C to 310°C. Of the SFR designs, aside from the already commercially deployed BN-
800, GE-H S-PRISM is the next closest to commercialization and with the availability of 
data will serve as the reference model for this study. 
S-PRISM is an extension of the DOE’s IFR program that ran at INL from 1984-
1994 when Congress cancelled it for political purposes three years before completion. In 
parallel with the development of the IFR, GE began development on the 471 MW(t) 
PRISM. In 1986 GE submitted a Preliminary Safety Information Document to the NRC 
and amended the original in response to NRC comments. The NRC responded with 
NUREG-1368 in 1994 concluding “that no obvious impediments to licensing the PRISM 
design have been identified [in the PSER][61].” GE later expanded the PRISM into an 
840 MW(t) design. These two original PRISM designs were a part of the DOE’s ALMR 
program. At the conclusion of the ALMR program GE increased the size of PRISM into 
the S-PRISM, 1,000MW(t) and increased core outlet temperatures 11°C. Recently, GE-H 
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brought back the original PRISM and the ALMR together and refers to them as Mod A, 
425 MW(t), and Mod B, 840 MW(t). Both variants have the core outlet temperature 
reduced back to 499°C. The Mod A reactor vessel and all of its internals are rail 
shippable. The Mod B reactor can be transported overland and via barge, similarly to how 
steam generators and reactor vessels are transported to the current fleet of LWRs.[48] 
Because the PRISM is based on the IFR, it is fully intended to integrate on site 
fuel reprocessing in a Nuclear Fuel Recycling Center. A site with multiple reactors can 
share and use the NFRC to produce all of the driver and blanket fuel. A key technology 
developed in the IFR program was pyroprocessing which electrorefines the metal fuel in 
a molten chloride salt bath. The uranium is removed in a dendrite form from the salt bath 
on a carbon electrode. The TRU are collected in a molten cadmium electrode and are 
never separated from each other. This improves the proliferation resistance of the 
metallic fuel cycle. With no pure plutonium on site extra steps which are easily 
identifiable would have to be added or material would have to be transported off site. 
Thus, inventory audits and external monitoring can assure that no fissile material can 
leave the site. Additionally, with extended core residence times the plutonium is 
considered reactor-grade and is not weaponizable. 
On site fuel production allows a PRISM reactor to be loaded at construction with 
all of the heavy metal that it will need to operate. This can include spent fuel from 
LWR’s that is first reduced before pyroprocessing. Thus, the PRISM only needs a supply 
of non-nuclear consumables to produce the fuel and operate the plant over its entire 40 to 
60-year lifetime. Having all the fuel ever needed to operate the plant on hand is the 
definition of fuel security. Current LWR’s can have up to a few years on hand, coal 
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plants have a few months, diesel generators have a few weeks, and natural gas has a few 
seconds. 
2.1 Summary of Previous S-PRISM Study 
The previous study that this one is based upon was completed in 2010.[90] It 
consisted of an evaluation of different fuel types and their performance under different 
accident scenarios. There were three fuels considered in that work: metallic, oxide, and 
nitride. The investigator conducted a detailed design of each core in ERANOS 2.0.  
The investigator built a simple RELAP5-3D model of the S-PRISM variant. This 
model contained two independent IHTS, one S/G for each of the two IHX, a slight 
modification from the design reference S-PRISM which has only one S/G for the two 
IHXs. 
The model contained two lumped feedback effects. First, the fuel Doppler and 
axial expansion reactivity feedback mechanisms were tied to the heat structures of the 
fuel. The physical expansion of the fuel was not explicitly modeled it was converted into 
a fuel temperature feedback. The complexity of directly modeling the feedbacks in a 
separate control system would not add any additional value to the model. 
The three remaining reactivity feedback mechanisms are coolant Doppler, coolant 
leakage, and fuel radial expansion. The coolant feedback mechanisms are a function of 
coolant density and were simultaneously calculated in ERANOS. These were the only 
feedback mechanisms that provided positive feedback. The fuel radial expansion occurs 
due to the heating of the upper and lower core restraints. The detailed engineering design 
of the constraints weren’t available. The assumed model was an upper support grid of 
HT9 that expanded with temperature. The lower core retentions weren’t modeled. In this 
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scenario, the fuel would flower inserting negative reactivity. The upper restraint was not 
included in the RELAP model as a separate heat structure. Instead, it was lumped into the 
coolant temperature, assuming instantaneous heat transfer to the restraint, neglecting the 
time lagged capacitive effect of the mass of metal of the restraint. Table 4.1 provides a 
summary of the reactivity feedback effects from the previous work. RELAP models the 
coolant feedback in terms of coolant density not temperature. The model was run to 
determine the reference temperature and density for steady operations at the initiation of 
each event. NUREG-1368 reported reactivity feedbacks for fuel Doppler, -0.61 pcm/K, 
axial expansion, -0.27 pcm/K, sodium density, 0.67 pcm/K, and radial expansion, -0.69 
pcm/K. The net fuel prompt feedback was -0.88 pcm and the coolant temperature 
feedbacks of -0.02 pcm.[61] The reactivity feedbacks used in this study are therefore 
conservative estimates based on the available data. 
Table 4-1 Previous Study S-PRISM Reactivity Feedbacks 










 pcm/K pcm/K pcm/K pcm/K pcm/K pcm/K 
BOC -0.3401 -0.4655 -0.8056 0.7577 -0.1950 0.5627 
MOC -0.3438 -0.5818 -0.9256 0.8007 -0.1978 0.6029 
EOC -0.3467 -0.4386 -0.7853 0.8366 -0.1978 0.6388 
 
The zero-power point kinetic reactivity RELAP was used to control the heat 
source term during transients. Because of the large neutron MFP relative to the core side, 
the neutron flux in the reactor is strongly shaped. Using a nodal kinetics model does not 
add any benefit in model performance as the flux spatial and time dependent portions are 
separable to a small error. The nodal kinetics would unnecessarily add to the 
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computational overhead. Table 4.2 provides a summary of the delayed neutron 
parameters. The conventional 6-group delayed neutron precursor model was used. 
Table 4-2 Modeled S-PRISM Delayed Neutron Precursor Data. 
 BOC MOC EOC 
𝛽𝛽1 [pcm] 8.238 8.335 8.331 
𝛽𝛽2 [pcm] 69.99 70.83 70.79 
𝛽𝛽3 [pcm] 60.88 61.64 61.62 
𝛽𝛽4 [pcm] 138.5 140.5 140.4 
𝛽𝛽5 [pcm] 70.78 71.91 71.88 
𝛽𝛽6 [pcm] 25.42 25.85 25.85 
𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 [pcm] 373.8 379.1 378.9 
 
𝜆𝜆1 [s-1] 0.01331 0.01331 0.01331 
𝜆𝜆2 [s-1] 0.03055 0.03056 0.03056 
𝜆𝜆3 [s-1] 0.1191 0.1191 0.1191 
𝜆𝜆4 [s-1] 0.3178 0.3178 0.3178 
𝜆𝜆5 [s-1] 0.9636 0.9635 0.9635 
𝜆𝜆6 [s-1] 3.022 3.023 3.023 
Λ [s] 2.670E-7 2.707E-7 2.704E-7 
 
During modeling the built in RELAP, ANS 1990 standard was used to 
approximate fission product heat generation. The GEMs were modeled with a $1.4 worth. 
The GEM differential worth was assumed to be cosine, and the GEM level a function of 
the gridplate coolant pressure, Equations 2-4 and 2-5. 
The previous work [90], did not account for changes in fuel thermophysical 
properties as a function of fluence or plutonium content. To compensate for this, two 
materials were created to represent the driver and blanket assemblies using the material 
composition of [90]. The BOC fuel data assumed 100% theoretical density and modeled 
entirely fresh assemblies. The MOC and EOC fuel assumed 75% and 85% porosity for 
the driver and blanket assemblies respectively. This represented the assemblies that have 
achieved at least 1 atomic % burnup, (2nd or 3rd cycle assemblies). This was to account 
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for the degraded thermal conductivity in these assemblies, since the fresh fuel was 
analyzed in the BOC run. The MOC and EOC assembly conductivity and volumetric heat 
capacity assume sodium logging in the pores. For temperatures above 1,200K, sodium 
was assumed to have voided the fuel pores and was not included. The thermal 
conductivity was taken to be 72% that of fresh fuel, which accounted for the sodium 
logging. The fuel correlations were taken from [96] and the sodium thermophysical data 
was taken from [97]. Tables 4-3 and 4-4 were used for the volumetric heat capacities and 
thermal conductivities, respectively, for each of the assembly types and show the 
comparative data from the previous study, [90]. 
Table 4-3 Fuel Volumetric Heat Capacity (J/m3-K) 
  BOC MOC/EOC 
K Sumner[90] Driver Blanket Driver Blanket 
293 1.838E+06 2.102E+06 1.876E+06 2.414E+06 2.232E+06 
400  2.299E+06 2.023E+06 2.443E+06 2.256E+06 
500 2.194E+06 2.484E+06 2.162E+06 2.697E+06 2.472E+06 
600  2.676E+06 2.290E+06 3.022E+06 2.739E+06 
700  2.865E+06 2.420E+06 3.398E+06 3.051E+06 
800 2.733E+06 3.046E+06 2.545E+06 3.783E+06 3.372E+06 
868 2.87E+06     
890  3.173E+06 2.634E+06 4.133E+06 3.665E+06 
900  3.181E+06 2.640E+06 4.008E+06 3.558E+06 
1000 2.342E+06 2.436E+06 2.077E+06 2.724E+06 2.462E+06 
1100  2.454E+06 2.090E+06 2.706E+06 2.443E+06 
1200 2.672E+06 2.563E+06 2.167E+06 2.688E+06 2.424E+06 
1300  2.738E+06 2.291E+06 2.670E+06 2.002E+06 




Table 4-4 Fuel Thermal Conductivity (W/m-K) 
  BOC MOC/EOC 
K Sumner[90] Driver Blanket Driver Blanket 
298 6.3095 9.0031 14.7191 6.4822 10.5977 
400 10.8523 10.9656 16.7321 7.8952 12.0471 
500 14.2958 12.9915 18.8742 9.3539 13.5895 
600 17.1094 15.1185 21.1832 10.8853 15.2519 
700 19.4883 17.3465 23.6590 12.4894 17.0344 
800 21.5489 19.6754 26.3016 14.1663 18.9371 
900 23.3666 22.1053 29.1110 15.9158 20.9599 
1000 24.9925 24.6362 32.0873 17.7381 23.1028 
1100 26.4633 27.2681 35.2304 19.6330 25.3659 
1200 27.8061 30.0009 38.5403 21.6007 27.7490 
1300 29.0413 32.8348 42.0171 23.6411 30.2523 
1400 30.1849 35.7696 45.6607 25.7541 32.8757 
 
Because of the higher fuel temperatures in the oxide and nitride fuels compared to 
the metallic fuel, the unprotected transients considered had much higher PHTS coolant 
temperature excursions. These oxide and nitride fuels are less compatible with the 
temperature constraints of the solar salt. As a result, they are not considered in the present 
study due to increased effort to have compatibility. 
2.2 Modification of S-PRISM 
Because of the fidelity of the data the 1,000 MW(t) S-PRISM variant was selected 
for this study. The core outlet temperature used was 499°C to make more direct 
comparisons with the Mod A and Mod B PRISM variants. The other modifications 
consist of replacing the shell and tube IHXs and steam generator with compact plate-fin 
heat exchangers and adding a plate-fin heat exchanger in parallel with the main salt flow 
to/from the storage tanks for the AHX. 
Compact heat exchangers are not new and have been around for several decades. 
They are extensively used in applications where a small form factor and high 
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performance are needed. The design reference S-PRISM contained a compact heat 
exchanger, the helical-coil steam generator. There has been recent work to qualify 
compact heat exchangers for nuclear applications.[ 
There are two main methods of fabrication for compact heat exchangers suitable 
to the application at hand. First is diffusion bonding, were the plates are stacked and 
heated at high pressure and temperature fusing the plate pack into a contiguous block. 
The other form of fabrication that is acceptable is welding the plates together. Each of 
these methods of construction are needed in the plant. First the IHX which serves as a 
primary vessel boundary needs to have the greatest degree of integrity, especially 
considering that it is part of the reactor vessel boundary. The SHX would similarly be 
diffusion bonded, due to the chemical incompatibility of the two coolants. The AHX is 
external to the reactor vessel and has a lower operational pressure and temperature 
requirement, thus using welding to assemble the plate pack is suitable in this application. 
The AHX is accessible during normal operation and can be easily inspected during 
outages to monitor weld performance over time. 
Compact heat exchangers have the benefit of being extremely modular due to 
their size and how they are made. This allows for much easier scaling of heat transfer 
surfaces without adversely affecting the system pressure drop. It is for this reason that 
these types of heat exchangers are being extensively considered in the current NGNP 
design study for the steam generator and recuperators.[98] This design work has also 
been extended into RELAP and tested against empirical models to assess the method of 












The approach in assessing the design effectiveness of the modifications to PRISM 
was to follow a similar methodology to that in NUREG-1368 which divided the sets of 
transients considered into three categories: 
EC-I Anticipated Operational Occurrences 
EC-II Unlikely Events 
EC-III Extremely Unlikely Events 
The NRC used a deterministic approach to evaluate the performance of the reactor, using 
risk informed engineering judgement to select which deterministic events should be 
considered. Additionally, the design focus here extended to that in the PSID was that of 
accident prevention, not mitigation. To this end the objective was to prevent fuel melting 
in all three event classifications. EC-I and II have more restrictive temperature 
constraints, as they are more likely to occur and thermal excursions should be limited to 
prevent accelerated creep in core, vessel, and structural materials. 
The fuel temperature for EC-I and EC-II events should remain below the null 
fuel-cladding reaction temperature of 977.6K.[99] Primary coolant temperature 
excursions should not exceed peak operational temperatures by 50°C for longer than 1-
hour. The fuel temperature during EC-III events should not exceed 977.6K for one hour 
not to exceed 1,090K.[99] The ACS temperature in the operative ACS should not exceed 
600°C for longer than one hour, not to exceed 630°C. Based on NUREG-1368, the EC-I 
and EC-II events would have negligible impact on long term reactor and core 
performance (4.2.6). Fuel temperatures above 977.6K correspond to a cladding 
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dissolution of approximately 0.9 µm roughly 0.2% of the original cladding thickness.[99] 
Because using high temperature structural codes was beyond the scope of this, the 
transient temperature limits for EC-I and EC-II seemed to be a reasonable engineering 
judgement. 
Fuel melting temperatures for the driver fuel and blanket fuel are reported at 
1227K and 1298K respectively.[99] The driver fuel is based on conservative plutonium 
alloying quantities. The blanket assemblies which are only a binary uranium zirconium 
eutectic have a higher melting temperature than the ternary alloy of the driver fuel.[99] 
3.1 Transients to be Evaluated 
The approach taken here to select the bounding events mirrors those of NUREG 
1368. We did not make a rigorous quantification of the probabilities associated with the 
events and relied on good engineering judgement informed by available probabilities. 
The following assumptions were used to select the bounding events. 
• Select worst case plant states (specified by system, pressure, temperature, 
flowrate, etc.) as initial conditions for the challenges to the safety 
functions. 
• Assume non-safety grade equipment fails (either as an initiator or in 
response to the initiating event in a way that exacerbates the accident to 
the maximum degree physically possible, unless a lesser degree can be 
justified. This will account for any uncertainties caused by using 
commercial-grade procurement and construction, and the lesser 
operational surveillance associated with the non-safety grade designation. 
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• Assume failure of unique safety-grade equipment for a period of time 
(bounds uncertainties in failure probabilities of safety-grade equipment). 
• Allow a reasonable time (consistent with emergency planning provisions 
to recover safety-grade equipment where no plant damage has occurred) 
anticipated transient without SCRAM, station blackout, loss of all cooling. 
• Assume multiple human errors or other initiating events consistent with 
events that have actually occurred. 
• Assure at least an equivalent challenge to that applied to LWRs. 
For simplicity, the bounding events of NUREG 1368 that can be tested on the 
reference S-PRISM model will be tested. The process of determining the appropriate 
bounds for the modified design will use the above outline. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 
contains the applicable bounding events and their specifications for the reference model 
and are taken directly from NUREG 1368. Of these, only BE-7, flow blockage, cannot be 




Table 4-5 Bounding Event Description 
 Description 
1 Unprotected transient overpower (UTOP) events. Assume that the worst-case 
control rod withdrawal event occurs. Assume that all control rods remain full 
out (at the mechanical stops) for 12 hours and then the reactor is scrammed. 
Analyze this event for two cases on one module: 
• A All Forced Cooling remains functional. 
• B All Cooling except the RVACS is lost at the time the control rods are  
 withdrawn. 
2 Station blackout. Assume that SCRAM occurs and natural circulation cooling is the 
only available cooling for all modules on the site. Assume 24-hrs pass before AC 
power is restored. 
3 Loss-of-heat-sink events. From full-power conditions, assume that all cooling via 
the normal cooling system and the auxiliary air cooling systems is lost (loss of the 
intermediate loop). A SCRAM is assumed to occur as soon as the reactor protection 
system detects off-normal conditions. Analyze the event for two cases: 
• A All airflow pathways in RVACS are assumed to be fully blocked for 12-hours. 
Assume sabotage on one module and analyze until the peak temperatures have 
passed. 
• B Assume a 75-percent blockage of the RVACS airflow pathways for an 
indefinite period of time. Assume an earthquake that affects all modules and 
analyze until the peak temperatures or 12 hours have passed. 
4 Unprotected loss-of-flow (ULOF) events. Assume an unscramed ULOF event on 
one module and analyze this event for two cases: 
• A Assume that the flow through one pump stops suddenly and the others 
continue to operate normally. Analyze the event until new equilibrium power 
and flow rates have been established. 
• B Assume that the pumps are tripped and begin to coastdown. For this case, one 
of the pumps does not coastdown and it ceases pumping instantaneously. 
Analyze for the first 10-minutes of the event. 
5 Steam generator tube rupture event. Determine a justifiable number and the 
sequence of steam generator tube ruptures and analyze assuming failure to isolate 
or to dump water from the steam generator for 12 hours. Evaluate this event 
without forced cooling (one module). 
6 Large sodium (Na) leaks (single module). Assume leaks in the intermediate heat 
transport system piping. Determine the size of the leak in accordance with the 
criteria for moderate-energy fluid system piping. Evaluate for sodium fires and 
leaks from the reactor vessel into the guard (containment) vessel. 
7 Flow blockage. Assume blockage of flow to or from one fuel assembly. 
8 External events. Evaluate external events that exceed those traditional analyzed as 
design basis events in a manner consistent with their application to current-





Table 4-6 Bounding Event Summary 
 Description Probability range estimate 
BE-1 Assumed worst case failure of non-safety-
grade control system (due to fire or other 
mechanism). Results in inadvertent 
withdrawal of all control rod, combined with 
failure to SCRAM 
• Fire or control system 
failure, 10-1-10-4/yr 
• Failure to SCRAM, 10-5-
10-7/yr 
• Modules on site 10 
Rang or prob. = 10-5-10-7/yr 
BE-2 Two- to sixteen-hour station blackout is 
assumed for light water reactors (LWRs). 
Additional time added to compensate for lack 
of design detail. 
• 2-16 hr station blackout, 
10-5/yr for LWRs 
• Additional 20-hr loss, 10-2-
10-3/yr 
• Modules on site 10 
Rang or prob. = < 10-7-10-8/yr 
BE-3 Severe external event could cause loss of 
offsite power and temporary loss of reactor 
vessel air cooling system (RVACS). 
Auxiliary cooling system is non-safety-grade. 
• External event causes loss 
of offsite power and blocks 
RVACS, 10-7/yr 
• Modules on site 10 
Rang or prob. = < 10-6/yr 
BE-4 Loss of one synchronous machine is an 
anticipated event combined with anticipated 
transient without SCRAM (ATWS). 
• Instantaneous loss of flow 
through one primary pump, 
10-2/yr 
• Failure to SCRAM, 10-5-
10-7/yr 
• Modules on site 10 
Rang or prob. = 10-6-10-7/yr 
BE-5 Steam generator (SG) and its water dump and 
isolation system are non-safety grade. 
Experience with SG tubes indicates multiple 
failures have occurred. Exact number to be 
determined later but should be at least 40 
based on prototype fast reactor (PFR) 
experience. 
Multiple SG Tube ruptures 
have occurred in the past. Such 
ruptures would leave plant on 
RVACS cooling only. 
BE-6 Consistent with Clinch River Breeder Reactor 
(CRBR).[leak from reactor vessel or IHTS] 
• IHTS or reactor vessel 
leak, 10-6-10-7/yr (per 
CRBR PRA) 
• Modules on site 10 
Rang or prob. = 10-5-10-6/yr 
BE-7 Fabrication error results in blocked assembly 
being inserted into core. 
Fabrication errors have 
occurred in the past. 
Experience shows fabrication 
and loading errors occur. 
BE-8 Severe external event analysis Under development for 





3.2 Baseline Events 
The design basis event for the PRISM was a reactor SCRAM from full power 
with maximum power history and only RVACS available. NUREG-1368 reported that 
this event resulted in a peak PHTS sodium temperature of 607°C with 95% certainty of 
being less than 646°C with system equalization occurring in 30-hours. This event will 
test the model of the hydrodynamic volume, decay heat, and the RVACS. All of which 
are critical to this study. 
The UTOP for a $0.30 reactivity insertion, BE-1, has a peak fuel temperature of 
1251K and a peak coolant temperature of 656°C.[99] Based on the equilibrium of 130% 
power this is BE-1A where all forced cooling remains functional. These temperatures 
will be checked for the reference model. Because the reference model is 11°C cooler than 
the one reporting these temperatures, the comparison will be appropriately compensated 
for the temperature difference. 
Of the 8 bounding events, 4 challenged the containment boundary, BE-1 (UTOP), 
BE-3 (protected LOHS for 36-hours), BE-4 (ULOF), and BE-7 (single assembly flow 
blockage).(NUREG) BE-7 will not be considered in this study, thus the comparison 
between the reference model and the modified S-PRISM will use the first three for the 
comparison. 
3.3 Modified Design Basis Event 
The design basis event for the purpose of the modified design will remain 
unchanged, Reactor SCRAM from full power and worst-case power history with loss of 
ACS. This event will be simulated by initiating a reactor trip with a failure of one ACS 
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check valve. The failure of an AHX discharge check valve has an estimated failure rate of 
10-2-10-3/yr-valve for significant reverse flow failure but not affecting forward flow. 
Reverse flow leakage is considered an operational issue. The main concern is with a 
jamming of the check valve in the closed position. This is estimated to occur at a rate of 
10-2/yr provided that the check valve has failed. Assuming 10 reactors on the site and 
estimating a SCRAM occurrence at 10-1/reactor yr. the resulting probability is 10-4 - 10-
5/yr. Failure of both check valves or a failure of a single channel to actuate pushes the 
probability of a reactor SCRAM with loss of both ACS trains to an EC-III event and is 
not anticipated to be worse than the DBE for the original PRISM. 
The check valve used in this application will have very few duty cycles, forced 
shut for 18-month operations then in forward flow for natural circulation for 1-month 
refueling outages. This will reduce wear on the stem and spring. The check valve failure 
probability was for ECCS accumulator swing check valves, where back leakage can 
cause pressure equalization with the primary system and cause early ECCS discharge in a 
LOCA.[84] Here seat leakage only affects system efficiency. Only valve failure to open 
affects safety and is a much less probable event. A failure of the opening assist torsional 
spring, does not cause a valve failure. It closes the valve about 0.5°. 
3.4 Modified Bounding Events 
BE-1 
The BE-1A will remain unchanged and will serve as a direct comparison between 
the published data and the reference plant. The component that this will validate is the 
compact IHX. Because the NTU were set to have an equivalent TTD to the reference 
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model and natural circulation is not entered, there should be little to no difference 
between this and the reference plant. 
BE-1B will require modification. The failure of both ACS trains to actuate would 
push this into EC-III, due to the posterior probability being <10-9. To keep this in EC-II 
only one ACS train will fail to actuate. For a failure of both ACS trains, the plant 
response would be identical to the reference design. 
BE-2 
This bounding event will have no modification. It is expected to have much lower 
temperatures than the reference case due to the loss of neither ACS train. 
BE-3 
This bounding event will have an indefinite loss of the RVACS. The inclusion of 
the loss of either train of the ACS pushes this event into EC-III. As such it will be 
evaluated for a loss of RVACS with a single operational ACS train. 
BE-4 
The ‘A’ bounding event will have no modification. The ‘B’ bounding event will 
include a failure of one ACS train of ACS to actuate. While this is an EC-III event it is a 
partial loss of heatsink coupled with the ULOF. It is assumed that the non-safety grade 
salt tanks are unavailable. 
BE-5 
This bounding event is modified by simulating a double end break on the salt inlet 
piping without a protective action. The lack of a protective action is due to operator error 
failing to recognize the event. While forward flow through the ACS is assured, operator 
action is required to manually trip the plant, opening the AHX dampers. This is a similar 
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event to BE-3. Because the AHX remove much more heat than the RVACS. It is 
expected that this event will provide a more severe temperature excursion. Operators will 
trip the plant at 12-hours into the event. 
BE-6 
There will be no modification to this bounding event. It will not be analyzed here 
because the design of PRISM prevents uncovering the IHX in this bounding event. BE-5 
is the comparable version of this BE-6 but because of the break being salt the risk for a 
sodium fire is eliminated, and becomes a high temperature fluid spill which poses burn 
risks to personnel and equipment. The difficulty of modeling the spread of the salt and 
the risks associated with it is beyond the scope the present work and will have no further 
consideration, but requires resolution if this concept is pursued further. 
BE-7 
This bounding event will remain unchanged and is beyond the capabilities to 
model in RELAP. 
BE-8 
The faulted modes of the reference design where there is a loss of the ACS and 
instances where there is a temporary loss of all DHR are beyond design basis events. The 
previous work in modeling them shows adequate margin to fuel damage, or benign fuel 
melting due to the lack sodium boiling allowing the melted fuel to re-solidify and be 
transported out of the core. Additionally, the non-safety grade salt piping out of the safety 
boundary can be used to provide DHR in the event of the simultaneous loss of all three 
safety DHR paths. Consideration for such events, e.g. aircraft impact or kinetic weapons, 
removing RVACS and both ACS trains needs to be done on a probabilistic basis. Here 
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operator action and credit for other non-safety paths for DHR can be considered. As these 
events duplicate the reference plant’s BE-3A, the modified plant will have better 
performance in these situations than the reference plant as the likelihood of damaging the 
installed piping and cold salt tank/pumps, located several hundred meters away is greatly 
reduced. 
Where this bounding event needs consideration has been done in the modified 
BE-4B and BE-6. These bounding events show how a complete physical separation of the 
reactor from the cold tanks is entirely benign. These events do not include a loss of off-
site (outside the nuclear island) power. The BE-8 considered here will be these two 
bounding events compounded by a SBO and ATWS. The purpose of doing this is to 
provide technical justification for the NRC to not regulate structures outside of the 
nuclear island, and reactor control station. The unprotected step increase of salt pump 
flow to 200% of rated flow, which is 110% of design flow, will also be simulated to show 
how complete control system failure has a benign impact on the plant with adequate 
margins to fuel failure outlined above. These transients are considered EC-II because no 









The primary tool used for evaluating the safety performance of the reference and 
modified S-PRISM was RELAP5-3D. This code was originally designed to model reactor 
accidents in LWRs. It includes a fully integrated multidimensional thermal-hydraulics 
and kinetics models making it suitable for modeling reactor systems in transient events 
where reactivity feedback mechanisms are controlled by various thermodynamic states in 
the plant. RELAP has been extensively modified to allow modeling of advanced reactors 
including various liquid metal and molten salt cooled reactors, with built in 
thermodynamic models for these various working fluids. For a more comprehensive 
review of the software the reader is recommended to the previous work of which this 
current work is an extension. 
RELAP5-3D is a command line code with a highly-structured set of inputs. It can 
be difficult and time consuming to generate the input decks and parse the generated 
outputs. To aid in this process, SNAP, Symbolic Nuclear Analysis Package, was used to 
generate the model files, control restart files and parse the output data. SNAP includes 
direct interfaces with Matlab™ to allow direct access from inside Matlab™ to plot data 
generated from inside RELAP, simplifying generating final output data and evaluating 
transients. SNAP was developed by the NRC to aid in nuclear analysis and is very 
powerful tool in this regard. The Job Stream programming tool in SNAP was very useful 
in creating and running the different scenarios. It allows creation of a remote server 
which can be accessed remotely for file processing. It also allows for problem 
parallelization as multiple cases can be run simultaneously or in a planned sequence. 
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In generating the inputs decks for RELAP there was significant difficulty in 
creating the gas pressurizers which are used extensively in SFRs for plant pressure 
control. RELAP has difficulty calculating the various parameters in two phase systems 
where one fluid is a liquid with a low vapor pressure and the other is a non-condensable 
gas. To be able to generate the needed parameters for steady state conditions, the gas 
pressurizers were replaced with time dependent volumes containing the incompressible 
working fluid with temperatures and pressures near where the final operating point would 
be to aid in model convergence. 
The Steady State option of RELAP was not acceptable in this application as it led 
to significant model instability and increased real-world time in developing the solutions. 
Future users are not recommended to use this feature. Additionally, careful review of the 
code manual is recommended for the general input constraints especially on time steps 
and how those steps are advanced. The maximum time step is limited to the Courant 
Limit that is computed at each time step. It is recommended to run the problem to get a 
sense for the limiting time step Courant limit and set the maximum time step below that 
to ensure that the code advances smoothly with minimal computation time. Different 
problems require additional features. For example, the implementation of the helical 
steam generator needed a water packing model designed, option 12 of card 1, originally 
for the Hanford N-reactor. Without this option specified the outlet temperature and 









The computational model, while based on the previous study, is a significant 
departure from it. Because the first study’s focus was on designing and testing the 
suitability of a new fuel. The bulk of the model fidelity was spent on that. This study’s 
focus is on the thermal-hydraulic aspects of comparing two separate modeled plants. The 
nuclear data: reactivity feedbacks, delayed neutron precursor information, and decay heat 
were taken directly from the previous study without modification. 
5.1 Baseline S-PRISM 
Piping sizing information was extracted from several sources, mainly by taking 
measurements off of published drawings to estimate the relative sizing. In some cases, 
CAD models were built to determine volume fractions of the discretized three-
dimensional structures in RELAP. This was done specifically to calculate the volume 
around the reactor vessel lower elliptical head up to the tops of the lower outer core 
support baffles. Where needed thermal-hydraulic models were built in EES with the 
appropriate data brought into modify the structures in RELAP. 
As stated previously, the model is based on the 1,000 MW(t) S-PRISM because of 
the publicly available reference material was much more plentiful and with enough 
fidelity to be able to put together a somewhat reasonable approximation to the more 
detailed proprietary design work done by GE-H. 
The greatest modeling effort was on the heat transfer surfaces and getting the 
relative elevations of the various components as close as possible to the actual design. 
Because the structure of the PRISM module is mostly open the natural circulation 
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pressure losses are concentrated in three areas: the core, the IHX and the internal piping 
which included the RCPs. 
5.1.1 Nuclear Fuel 
There were three main components considered as a part of this study: driver fuel, 
blanket fuel and the GEMs. The driver fuel was split into two groups of assemblies, 
average driver fuel and hot driver fuel each containing 114 and 25 assemblies 
respectively. The blanket fuel was divided into three groups, average internal blanket, hot 
internal blanket, and the radial blanket each of 37, 12, and 48 assemblies 
respectively.[90] No other core structure had a hydrodynamic structure. The control rods, 
GEMs, and reflectors were not included in this model. 
All of the heat generated from fission, including gamma and neutron radiation 
was assumed to be generated entirely within the fuel assemblies. This will lead to slightly 
hotter assemblies as the heat from the gamma and neutron radiation that is normally 
generated in the control rods, reflectors, sodium outside of the assembly ducts, and in the 
shielding and transported by the core bypass flow is now entirely in the main core flow. 
To obtain a reasonable hydrodynamic model for the core pressure drop, the core bypass 
flow rate was assumed to be 1.5%. This further elevated fuel temperatures. While this 
approach is not a good physical model it is a conservative model with higher fuel 
temperatures than what would be in the production core. 
The pressure drop across the metal core is reported at 430 kPa.[100] This was 
assumed to neglect the 64.5 kPA pressure form the elevation change over the 4.07035 m 
pin height. Using the core thermal hydraulic model from the previous study, the observed 
pressure drop using RELAP rod bundle estimates was a fairly uniform 220 kPa across 
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each assembly at full flow. This needed modification. To better estimate the pressure 
drop and needed assembly orificing the following model was used for the Darcy friction 
factor: 
 𝜆𝜆𝑝𝑝 = 𝐴𝐴 + 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒−𝐶𝐶 4-1 
where, 
𝐴𝐴 = 0;  𝑔𝑔 = 0.210�1 +
124
�ℎ 𝑑𝑑� �
1.65 �1.78 + 1.485�
𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑� − 1�� �
𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑� − 1�� ;  𝐶𝐶 = 0.25 
1.0 ≤ 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑� ≤ 1.5; 10
4 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 ≤ 2 ∙ 105;  8.0 ≤ ℎ 𝑑𝑑� ≤ 50 
This model is applicable to ±15% over the above range for triangular pitch pins. 
To provide a starting point, minimum assembly flows were calculated to maintain 
assembly coolant outlet temperatures below 583°C. To estimate the needed orificing, the 
assembly outlet temperatures were set to be that assuming adiabatic mixing of the core 
flow with the 1.5% core bypass with bypass temperature remaining constant at the core 
inlet temperature of 371°C. The mixed outlet temperature was set at the hot-leg 
temperature of 499°C. This resulted in an assembly outlet temperature of 506.4°C. Table 
4.5 lists the results of the modeling including the needed orificing to reach the actual 
430kPa pressure drop in the metallic fueled S-PRISM. There was also a calculation to 
determine the core bypass orificing. Because of the limitations in how the modeling is 
implemented the pin and orificing pressure drops were considered to include all of the 
pressure drops across the assembly including the pressure drop through the nozzles below 
the grid plate, lower and upper shielding, and the assembly handling structures. 
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Flow Assy Flow 
Area 




  MW kg/s kg/s m2 kPa  m m2 
Ave DF 114 607.61 2,146 3,257 0.8511 39.83 158,675 0.04786 0.205 
Hot DF 24 159.07 561.9 852.6 0.1792 58.33 197,317 0.05396 0.05489 
Ave IB 37 119.64 422.6 641.3 0.1801 24.56 191,897 0.03694 0.03965 
Hot IB 12 42.01 148.4 225.2 0.05841 28.22 207,761 0.03852 0.01398 
RB 48 71.67 253.2 384.1 0.2336 6.353 88,611 0.02483 0.02324 
Bypass    282.1    0.1746  
 
The pin hydraulic model of Equation 4.1was added into RELAP with the 
following parameters. RELAP has the capability of modeling hydraulic losses across the 













. Table 4.6 contains the 
parameters included in the fuel assembly hydrodynamic structures and Table 4.7 contains 
the fuel assembly parameters. 
Table 4-8 Fuel Assembly RELAP Darcy Friction Factor Correlations 
 A B C Φ𝑆𝑆 
Driver Fuel 0 0.253840 0.25 0.9898 




Table 4-9 Fuel Assembly Physical Parameters 
[mm] Driver Fuel Blanket Fuel 
Assembly Pitch 161.417 161.417 
Duct Gap 4.318 4.318 
Duct Wall Thickness 3.937 3.937 
Pin Count 217 127 
Pin OD 7.4422 12.0142 
Pin Cladding Thickness 0.5588 0.5588 
Fuel OD 5.47624 10.0457 
Spacer Wire Diameter 1.4224 0.9398 
Spacer Pitch 203.2 203.2 
 
The fuel assembly hydrodynamic volume length was set at 4.07035 m It was 
discretized into three separate areas: lower plenum, active core, and upper plenum. The 
active core did not contain any axial blankets and was 1.016 m in length and divided into 
8 separate volumes. The lower plenum was 1.00744 m and broken up into 4 equal 
hydrodynamic volumes. The upper plenum was 2.04691 m and broken up into 4 equal 
hydrodynamic volumes. Each assembly was connected to the grid plate volume (102) and 
the grid plate upper elevation was adjusted 0.05182 m lower to accommodate the pin grid 
overlap. This placed the core mid-plane at an elevation of -15.9903 m below grade. The 
IHX mid-plane was -8.7161, leaving an elevation difference of 7.27442 m to drive 




Figure 4-1 Core RELAP hydrodynamic structures 
Figure 4.1 shows the hydrodynamic volume layout for the core portion of the 
PHTS, the darker red volumes have associated heat structures. The junctions between the 
fuel assembly lower plenums (113, 123, 133, 143, 153) and the grid plate branch were 
where the fuel orifices were placed. The orifices for the core bypass flow were modeled 
as the grid plate branch (102) connecting to the radial sodium shield pool (103) and the 
upper discharge plenum branch (104) connecting to the radial sodium shield pool. 
The active fuel heat structures were divided into 9 radial nodes, 6 for the fuel, 1 
for the gap and 2 for the clad. There were no other heat structures associated with the fuel 
pins. No special correlations were used to model the fuel and the rod bundle with 
crossflow option was used to estimate the heat transfer coefficient. This was checked 
against the following model: 
 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢 = 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 + 𝑓𝑓�𝜀𝜀6, 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑� �𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒
𝜑𝜑�𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑� �, 4-3 
1 ≤ 𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑� ≤ 2;  0.1 ≤ 𝜀𝜀6 ≤ ∞; 1 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 ≤ 4000 
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The 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 is the laminar flow Nusselt number, Equation 4.4, 𝜀𝜀6 is a thermal modeling 
parameter calculated by main harmonics, 𝑘𝑘 = 6, in Equation 4.5; and 𝑓𝑓 and 𝜑𝜑 are given 
by Equations 4.6and respectively. 


























































; 𝑅𝑅0is the fuel 
radius, 𝑅𝑅1is the inner clad radius, 𝑅𝑅2 is the clad outer radius, 𝑘𝑘 = 6 indicates that this 
correlation uses the harmonics of a central coolant channel and not an edge channel, 𝑘𝑘 =
1, 𝜆𝜆0 is the fuel thermal conductivity, 𝜆𝜆1 is the gap thermal conductivity, 𝜆𝜆𝑤𝑤 is the clad 
thermal conductivity, and 𝜆𝜆𝑒𝑒 is the coolant thermal conductivity. 
Because the proper correlation could not be used to account for the special core 
geometry, the heated hydraulic diameter was adjusted to more closely approximate the 
predicted heat transfer coefficients. This was done during BE-1B where there were 
significant changes in fuel temperatures and core flow rates. Data was taken at each axial 
position for each assembly at all three core ages in 0.1 second increments. This was done 
several times to reduce the model error from an initial average error of >25% to -2.5% for 
the driver fuel and 7.24% for the blanket fuel. The corresponding heated hydraulic 
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diameter was 7.248 mm and 18.995 mm for the driver and blanket fuel assemblies 
respectively. 
The edge and corner pins heat Nusselt numbers were evaluated using the 
empirical relationship of Equation 4.8 and Table 4.8: 
 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢 = 𝑁𝑁 + 𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 4-8 
Table 4-10 Edge and Corner Fuel Assembly Pin Heat Transfer Correlations 
































Under normal conditions at full power operations Table 4.9 provides a 
comparison between the Nusselt numbers for each of the pins including the maximum 
temperature non-uniformity, ∆𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥. The pin location plays a significant role in the peak 
temperatures of the fuel and needs to be considered for the fuel temperature limits. 
Because RELAP is not capable of inputting these relationships, an external routine was 
developed. Because the edge and corner pins are a minority of the overall pins in the 
core, they were neglected in considering their reactivity feedback effects. To compensate 
for the error in the fuel reactivity feedbacks, the reactivity weighting was split between 
the average driver fuel and the average inner blanket. This was done because RELAP 




Table 4-11 Comparison of Various Fuel Pin Nusselt Numbers 
 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 ∆𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 [K] 
Ave DF 14.91 34.92 8.222 6.353 0.1091 
Hot DF 16.67 35.9 9.173 7.124 -0.01734 
Ave IB 20.06 15.99 6.959 4.561 0.09587 
Hot IB 20.17 16.24 7.296 4.817 0.05079 
RB 19.08 14.19 4.487 2.772 0.3894 
 
5.1.2 Containment Vessel and RVACS 
The RVACS design was based on the data provided in [101] and [61]. NUREG-
1368 reported RVACS heat transport between 700-900 kW(t) during normal operations 
and reaching a peak of 2.5MW(t) in accident scenarios. Assuming the DHR is 
proportional to the surface area, the PRISM analyzed in NUREG-1368 has a reactor 
vessel surface area of ~304 m2 along the cylinder wall. The modeled PRISM has a 
cylindrical surface area of 496 m2. The increased surface area corresponds to a DHR 
capability of 1.1 to 1.5 MW(t) under normal conditions, rising to ~3.5 MW(t) at elevated 
temperatures. Taking the reactor vessel dimensional data from both references, the 
normal operating condition RVACS losses should be ~1.4MW(t) for the S-PRISM. 
Because radiative heat transport represents 97% of the heat loss from the reactor 
vessel,[102] a radiative heat transfer model was assumed. 
The reactor vessel liner, sodium gap, and reactor vessel were explicitly modeled 
in RELAP. A test model was built that had the primary plant internals removed and was 
an isothermal pool at 640K. This was coupled with a heat flux boundary condition at the 
surface of the reactor vessel. The boundary condition was controlled by 𝑇𝑇0, the 
temperature of the UHS, 313.15K, and the surface temperature of the reactor vessel, 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤. 
It is given by Equation 4-9. 
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 𝑞𝑞′′ = 2.078 ∙ 10−8[𝑊𝑊 𝑚𝑚2𝐾𝐾4⁄ ]�𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤4 − 𝑇𝑇04�  4-9 
This was then tested with the full model under steady state conditions with, non-
uniform wall temperatures. The resulting heat loss was 1.375 MW(t), and was considered 
acceptable for modeling the scenarios. It was only during BE-3 that the heat flux from 
RVACS appreciably changed, every other accident scenario had very little fluctuation 
from steady state conditions. 
5.1.3 PHTS Flow Path 
The PHTS was modeled predominantly with multi-dimensional structures in 
RELAP. The RCP downcomer piping was assumed to be 20” NPS Schedule 10S. Figure 
4.3 shows the modeled flow path for the modified version, the only differences are with 
the IHX and its downcomer piping. Elevation data for the PHTS was taken from [91]. All 
elbows and area changes were explicitly modeled using the information from [103]. All 




Figure 4-2 nTES primary heat transport system 
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The piping configuration followed published data as closely as possible. The 
RCPs have a 42% thermodynamic efficiency.[104] The remaining thermal energy from 
pumping was added into the primary system using a source term that was proportional to 
flow. The RCP outer surface was approximated as being adiabatic. This is not entirely 
accurate as there is a layer of insulation and some heat transfer occurs with the coolant 
between the hot pool and cold pool divider plates. The energy transfer mechanism was 
done because the reactor coolant pumps are self-cooled and all of the heat is transferred 
to the coolant.[104] The RCP stators are in two parts. There are an inner stator and an 
outer stator. There is an annulus that is formed between the two stators and a central 
pipe.[104] The central pipe was assumed to have a radius of 0.077m and the outer 
annulus had a gap of 0.077 m.[104] Using the flow area from [104], the inner stator’s 
outer wall was 0.453 m, and the outer stator’s wall was 0.906 m. This is consistent with 
the dimensions in [104] For simplicity, the stator heat structures were lumped into the 
outer stator with all of the flow in the RCP inside of it. A more accurate model would be 
to explicitly model the two stators as separate heat structures and to use three 
hydrodynamic structures: the central channel, the annulus, and the shroud pool. This 
would allow development of accurate temperature profiles within both stators with little 
additional modeling effort. The as modeled stator heat structures are 0.375 m thick SS 
304. This is not the same as the actual composite copper, black iron, and insulation.[104] 
A more accurate approach would develop a composite heat capacity and thermal 
conductivity for the stator assemblies. 
Because of the additional PHTS pressure drop, the radial dimensions of the 
160m3/min pump were taken as given. Each RCP was extended another 3.296 m past the 
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original design’s 4.4 m length to allow greater pumping power and fit within the drawing 
takeoffs for the pump length.  
The RCP hydrodynamic volume did not do any actual pumping, even though 
RELAP does allow for EM pumps. The engineering data needed to use the built-in pump 
model was not available. Instead, a time dependent junction was used to model the pump 
flow for each of the 4 RCPs. During transients that required the pumps to trip, the EM 
pump coastdown curve from NUREG-1368 was used, Figure 4.3. The RCPs take their 
suction from the radial shielding outside of the core riser region. This allows them to 
draw coolant from low in the cold pool. 
 
Figure 4-3 EM pump coastdown curve(NUREG) 
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Because the RCPs’ are supported from the reactor vessel closure head,[48] their 
expansion joint with the pump suction is not fully sealed. The design leakage is very 
important through the shroud pool as it represents a significant surface area of the reactor 
vessel and thus is critical for DHR providing approximately 252 m2 of surface area to 
RVACS. There are two sources of leakage for this important area to have adequate flow. 
The first is through the aforementioned RCP lower expansion joints, the other is through 
the IHX expansion joints, the IHXs are hung similarly to the RCPs.[48] The upper 
horizontal baffle has gaps in it for the reactor coolant pumps and the IHXs. For 
simplicity, the bypass flow path was from the RCP penetrations to the lower IHX 
expansion joints. The leakage path to the RCP suctions was attempted, but was not used 
due to modeling anomalies when non-condensable gases were used as the cover gas for 
the top of the primary pool for pressure control. The other system bypass is the core 
bypass and was discussed previously. 
The surface of the primary pool was set at a pressure slightly above atmospheric, 
34.5 kPa gage, (5 psig). Helium was used as the cover gas.[102] During establishing 
steady state, helium was replaced with a time dependent sodium volume at the interface 
level, at hot-leg temperature, and the desired system pressure, structures 68 and 69 for the 
volume and junction respectively. 
5.1.4 IHTS Flow Path 
The each IHX consisted of 5,700 tubes [90] with a surface area modification to 
achieve the designed log mean temperature difference. The heat exchanger consists of a 
lower inlet branch that provides flow to inside of the IHX tubes. Flow then leaves the 
tubes and goes into an outlet branch attached to the IHX secondary outlet annulus. 
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Primary flow begins with cross flow across the tubes in the hot pool, flow then flows 
down around the outside of the tubes, but inside the IHX assembly. Flow then exits and 





Figure 4-4 Reference S-PRISM IHTS 
The sodium inlet to the steam generator is a torus located immediately above the 
steam generator with 4 separate downcomer pipes. There is a small pool in the top of the 
steam generator with very few tubes. The sodium flow diffusers were not modeled, and 
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were just left as abrupt pipe endings. Sodium flow is then downward in an annulus 
around outside of the steam helix tubes. Sodium then leaves through two pipes at the 
sides of the steam generator and then moves upward through the secondary EM pumps 
which are modeled in a similar fashion to the primary EM pumps. Flow then changes 
direction and goes back down to the grade level and into the IHX lower inlet plenum. 
The containment isolation valves were not modeled, explicitly. By setting the 
time dependent junctions for the IHTS pumps to 0 flow that will secure all IHTS flow. 
5.1.5 Steam Generating System 
The S-PRISM steam generator plays an important function in DHR as the outer 
shell provides the heat transfer surface to the ACS. Figure 4.4 shows the S-PRISM S/G 
configuration. The tube sheet was taken to contain 617 tubes with a helix height of 10.49 
m. The unknown was the pitch to diameter ratio of the tube sheet. The P/D determines 
how closely the tubes are packed which in turn determines how many times the tubes are 
wrapped around the annulus, and thus the overall length of the tube-sheet. The approach 
taken in estimating these dimensions was taken from [68] where helical steam generators 
were modeled for NGNP. The estimated P/D was 1.3787 and resulted in a total tube sheet 
length of 153.26 m. The sodium and water/steam inlet and exit conditions were taken 
from [48]. A more rigorous approach would be to develop an empirical model of the heat 
transfer surfaces using the models in [86] but this was not necessary. When the steam 
generator model was applied to RELAP it resulted in the correct steam conditions for the 
given sodium flow rate. 
To maintain stability in the computation, the Hanford N reactor, developmental 
model option 12 was used. Without this and options 8 (void fraction change timestep 
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control), 10 (pressure change timestep control), and 13 (vertical stratification), the 
thermodynamic state within the SG was unstable and lead to frequent program crashes. 
These options also helped with dealing with the non-condensable gases within the 
accumulator portions of the system. 
The external flow of the sodium was modeled by determining the free flow area 
of the sodium and its hydraulic diameter. Because of the shallow pitch of the tubes, they 
can be approximated as a pure cross flow heat exchanger from the sodium reference 
frame with little loss of accuracy. This approximation was used to estimate the hydraulic 
diameter. 
To allow “plant startup” a simple PI controller was developed to regulate the 
steam temperature and feed water flow. For simplicity of design, the steam pressure was 
held constant as it was assumed to be regulated by the turbine throttles, outside of the 
steam generator control boundary. This was approximated by having a time dependent 
volume at the appropriate pressure to act as the steam dump. A combined error term 
which included steam outlet temperature program error and steam flow rate to sodium 
temperature difference was used. The combined error then controlled the feedwater flow. 
More complicated controllers can be implemented [105-107]. Additionally, by including 
the controllers from [105] into RELAP, one can assess the impact of the controller on any 
of the anticipated transients. This was not done in this study as the focus was not on 
designing a plant control scheme for the conventional S-PRISM, but designing a 
modified version. An interested person could take the model developed here and 








The ACS is a very simple system. It consists of an insulated shroud around the 
outside of the steam generator shell. This system and the IHTS are not considered part of 
the containment boundary. Their purpose is to limit transients for the purpose of 
protecting equipment for long term use. The ACS, unlike RVACS, is normally offline 
with a set of inlet and outlet baffles. These baffles open on a loss of power and can be 
manually operated. There is also a fan in the system that is used for plant cooldown 
during refueling operations.[48] Because the ACS performs a safety function it was 
included. Because of the lack of available data, it was unable to be benchmarked, and 
comparisons needed to be made without it in service. The two factors that need to be 
tuned are the ACS surface area and the annulus gap. With appropriate data, the ACS can 
be sized to provide the necessary DHR capability. 
5.2 Modified S-PRISM 
The modified plant consists generally of a compact FPHXs for the IHTS and a 
redesigned safety-grade ACS. The basis of these systems was discussed in Part 2. This 
part will focus on how the designs were implemented in RELAP. 
The piping system modification for the IHTS is shown in Figure 4.7. The ICP are 
no longer on the rising portion of the leg of 211. They are shifted to the lowering (right 
hand side. The accumulator for the loop is 231, and is at the point of lowest pressure in 
the system. It is an annular accumulator with the enclosing pipe being a 50” NPS 
Schedule 40S. Because of how the ICP is simulated with a time dependent junction 210, 
the accumulator entry point is at the suction of the pump, not where it would be actually 
located in the third segment of 211. The trip valve 234, allows simulation of natural 
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circulation in the IHTS and opens once ICP flow has decayed to that consistent with 
natural circulation. This was done because time dependent junctions with a flow set at 
zero act like closed valves in RELAP. The time dependent volume 233 is used to 
initialize the problem and was removed once steady state conditions were established. At 
that time, the accumulator 231 was changed from being solid to being half helium half 
sodium, with the helium at a pressure resulting in 136 kPa absolute in the uppermost part 
of 211. 
 
Figure 4-6 'A' Train IHTS for nTES S-PRISM 
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The Salt Heat Transport System, SHTS, is in Figure 4.8. The salt isolation valves, 
310, 316, 320, and 316 are 30” NPS motor operated gate valves with a stroke time of 3 
seconds in the closed direction. The ACS heat exchangers are 331 and 341 and their 
associated butterfly check valves are 333 and 343. The tee’s for the ACS portion of the 
piping, 330, 334, 340, 344 are angled tees with the branch coming from the vertical pipe 
at a 45° angle as shown. This is to minimize the natural circulation head loss in the 
system. These piping sections also include a 45° elbow to return the piping back to 
horizontal. To minimize the number of volumes all of the remaining ACS piping was put 
into 332 and 342. The ACS piping is the same size as the remainder of the SHTS piping, 
30” NPS Schedule 40S and similarly uses long radius fittings to minimize pressure loss. 
Similar to the IHTS the ACS accumulators, 317 and 327, are annular, but are 65” 
NPS Schedule 40S. They encircle the cold downcomer piping 311 and 321, and are sized 
to allow the transition from forced circulation (high pressure side of the system) to 
natural circulation (low pressure side of the system). Their connections to the cold 
downcomer piping, 318 and 328, are located as they would be in the actual plant 
locations. The SHX’s are components 319 and 329 and are discussed in more detail in 
section 5.2.1. The SHTS check valves, 303 and 306, are 42” NPS swing check valves. 
Their function is to prevent system backflow during pipe breaks outside of the piping 




Figure 4-7 nTES Salt Heat Transport System 
5.2.1 IHX 
The IHX is a counter flow compact heat exchanger with a β=1,538 m2/m3, (ratio 
of heat transfer surface area to total volume. The channel flow data using Equations 4.1 
and 4.2 is in Table 4.10. 
Table 4-12 IHX RELAP Darcy Friction Factor Correlations 
 A B C Φ𝑆𝑆 
Sodium 0 4.32 0.425 0.7095 




The turbulent friction factor data was taken from Hesselgreaves[86] (eqn 5.43, 5.44 and 
5.49) and the shape factor was determined from Shah and London [109] using tabulated 
data of the pitch/span for triangular ducts and sine ducts. The both PHTS and IHTS 
channels uses a sine duct Kayes and London wavy plate-fin surface 17.8-3/8W.[85] 
The pressure drop across the primary side was 371 kPa with a Reynolds number 
of 14,890. The secondary side had a pressure drop of 268 kPa for a Reynolds number of 
12,237. Each IHX was sized to remove half of the nominal core power plus the heat from 
(2) RCPs minus half of the nominal RVACS DHR at full power. The net IHX power was 
520 MW(t). Stainless Steel 304 was used as the heat exchanger material. 
Table 4-13 IHX RELAP Hydrodynamic and Heat Structure Data 
 Primary Secondary 
Flow Area, m2 3.489 0.8306 
Hydraulic Diameter, m 0.002123 0.000805 
Flow Length, m 2.982 2.982 
Heat Transfer Area, m2 19,601 238.5 
Heated Diameter 0.002123 1.6⋅10-5 
Pitch, m 0.001427 0.000547 
Span, m 0.01049 0.00254 
 
5.2.1 SHX 
The SHX is a counter flow compact heat exchanger with a β=1,373 m2/m3, (ratio 
of heat transfer surface area to total volume. The channel flow data using Equation 4.1 
and 4.2 is in Table 4.12. 
Table 4-14 SHX RELAP Darcy Friction Factor Correlations 
 A B C Φ𝑆𝑆 
Sodium 0 0.17 0.2 4.9456 




The inability to have the salt thermo-physical data is a significant problem. The 
difficulty is introduced that the density, viscosity, and thermal conductivity of the two 
fluids are not matched. Sodium has a much higher thermal conductivity but lower density 
and viscosity, while the salt has a lower thermal conductivity and higher density and 
viscosity. 
Two independent modifications needed to be made to the salt side of the heat 
exchanger. The secondary sodium flow rate needed to be above that of the salt, due to the 
difference in heat capacities of the two fluids. The salt flow for a heat exchanger was 
1,594 kg/s and the corresponding sodium flow would be 1,889 kg/s. This resulted in a 
heat exchanger pressure drop of 473.6 kPa, which will result in reduced natural 
circulation performance, which is acceptable as it adds a measure of conservatism. The 
salt side of the IHX has a UA=63,688 kW/K. To keep this constant the resulting heat 
transfer coefficient for the sodium on the salt side was 267.1 kW/m2-K requiring a 
surface area of 238.5m2. The sodium side of the heat exchanger UA was 4.194·106 
kW/K. These initial values were used to initialize the model. After steady state 
calculation, the surface area of each side was adjusted to give the desired UA. The wall 
thickness is 0.001 m and P91 was used as the heat exchanger material. 
Table 4-15 SHX RELAP Hydrodynamic and Heat Structure Data 
 Primary Secondary 
Flow Area, m2 3.489 0.8306 
Hydraulic Diameter, m 0.002123 0.000805 
Flow Length, m 2.982 2.982 
Heat Transfer Area, m2 19,601 238.5 
Heated Diameter 0.002123 1.6⋅10-5 
Pitch, m 0.001427 0.000547 





Like the SHX the AHX will require modification from the original salt design to 
approximate the salt characteristics when using sodium as the working fluid. For 
simplicity, the ducts, surface straight fin shape 2.0, which are trapezoidal were 
approximated as being square. The Shah and London [109] correlation was used to 
determine the shape factor. The turbulent parameters were taken from Hesselgreaves[86] 
(5.41) 
Table 4-16 AHX RELAP Darcy Friction Factor Correlations 
 A B C Φ𝑆𝑆 
Sodium 0 0.771836 0.356542 0.9218 
Salt 0 0.771836 0.356542 0.9218 
 
A similar flow increase of the sodium as a replacement working fluid was needed, 
original salt flow was 217.7 kg/s the replacement sodium was 260.6 kg/s. A similar 
approach in adjusting the heat transfer surface to obtain the desired UA was 
implemented. The desired air and salt side UAs are 5.76 kW/K and 158.3 kW/K 
respectively. The heat exchangers were configured to be as they would in the actual plant 
with a folded core design. Each of the 4 heat exchanger modules are 1.25 m x 1.25 m x 
0.2m, resulting in an approximate footprint of 3.3 m 1.25 m x 1.08 m allowing for a 
simpler placement above the SHX. To limit computational overhead, the number of 
hydrodynamic volumes and heat structures were limited. To do this the AHX was 
approximated as one, long heat exchanger, each of the (4) modules stacked end on end. 
The salt and air flow lengths were unaffected, just the respective flow areas. The AHX 
material was modeled as P91. 
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Table 4-17 AHX RELAP Hydrodynamic and Heat Structure Data 
 Secondary Air 
Flow Area, m2 0.3391 6.158 
Hydraulic Diameter, m 0.01445 0.01445 
Flow Length, m 1.25 0.2 
Heat Transfer Area, m2 2.283 148 
Heated Diameter 2.23⋅10-4 0.01445 
Pitch, m 0.0127 0.0127 
Span, m 0.01905 0.01905 
 
5.2.4 ACS Piping 
Figure 4-8 shows the nodalization of the ACS system in RELAP. The AHX 
piping was taken to be the same as the main salt header piping, which was the same as 
the reference model IHTS system piping. 
The AHX butterfly check valves (333 and 343) were modeled in RELAP using 
the same approach as Rao [83], however instead of directly inputting the check valve, the 
check valve was modeled using a time dependent junction where the equations from Rao, 
were solved to provide junction flow as a function of the differential pressure across it. 





















where 𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡) is the angle of the check valve in degrees, where 0° is vertical and closed and 
90° is horizontal and full open. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) are the torques associated with the valve, see Part 2, 
and 𝐼𝐼 is the valve disc’s moment of inertia. Equations 4.10 and 4.11 were modeled in 
RELAP using the standard Integral function. The integral controller representing 𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡) 
was limited to 0° to 90°. With an actual valve design, these limits can be set accordingly. 
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Each check valve was modeled as being a servo control valve with its own 
controller. The respective valve’s controller was its angle. The valve area as a function of 
valve angle, Equation 4.12, was tabulated for use in the servo control valve. 




The terms 𝑁𝑁, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐, and 𝑑𝑑 are experimentally determined constants with the values 26.184, 
0.091, -0.014, and 1.11⋅10-4 respectively.[83] 𝜀𝜀𝑇𝑇 is the ratio of the valve’s flow area to 









6.1 Comparison to Published Data 
 
6.1.2 Baseline Event 1 – SCRAM with loss of ACS 
This event is taken directly from NUREG-1368. Because NUREG-1368 did not 
consider the ACS as part of the safety boundary, and was considered as part of the safety 
boundary here, two different versions of this accident scenario were run. The first option 
included the thermal mass of the IHTS and the ACS, but without any heat removal 
capability from the AHX’s. The second version consisted of a reactor plant trip with 
IHTS pump coast down occurring within 2 seconds.[61] 
Figure 4.9 shows the comparison between NUREG-1368 with RVACS 
performing nominally (a) and the modified S-PRISM showing the loss of both ACS 
channels with IHTS and ACS hydraulic volumes remaining intact (Nominal) and the 
direct comparison to NUREG-1368 where the ICP’s coasted down in 2 seconds and the 
IHTS and SHTS removed from the model. The transient initiation temperatures differ by 
approximately 84°C. This is due to the RELAP model taking into account the entire 
thermal mass of the primary system. The cold leg volume is approximately twice the size 
of the hot leg volume. Another factor may be that the mass of the modeled PHTS may be 
too large and not accurately take into account the volume of coolant displaced by the 
reactor vessel internals. For lack of better information, the remainder of the analysis will 





Figure 4-8 Comparison of NUREG-1368 to the modeled plant. Figure (a) is from 
NUREG-1368. Figure (b) is the model in two different scenarios, the one labeled 
NUREG is for a direct comparison to (a) the nominal assumes an intact safety boundary. 


















6.1.3 Baseline Event 2 – UTOP with $0.3 Reactivity Insertion 
This baseline event is a $0.30 reactivity insertion with a failure to SCRAM and no 
plant trip. This event provides a comparison of the reactivity feedbacks associated with 
the S-PRISM core used in this study and the one published by [99].  
The simulation was run in several different configurations. First, it was tested 
using the fuel as specified by [90] under BOC conditions. Then the fuel thermophysical 
properties were set to those derived from [96] while using the different fuel kinetic data 
from [90]. 
Table 4-18 Summary of UTOP Temperatures[99] 
Table 4-18 provides the summary 
of the UTOP for the reference S-PRISM at 
various reactivity insertions.[99] 
The power transient of the 
modeled reactor did not match that of the reference reactor using the thermophysical and 
kinetic data of [90]. The reference core had a peak power of 180% and a final steady state 
power of 130%. Similarly, the reactor described in NUREG-1368 undergoing a 40¢ 
reactivity insertion reached peak power at 172% with final power stabilizing at 120%. 
Peak fuel, cladding and coolant temperatures occurred approximately 31 seconds into the 
transient (near the end of rod motion) and were 1,292 K, 979 K, and 951 K 
respectively.[61] The reactivity feedbacks associated with the NUREG PRISM are a on 
the same order as the reference S-PRISM, but of a slightly larger magnitude. The 
modeled reactor of [90] had a peak power of 284% and a steady state power of 267%.  
 This suggests a significant difference in the doppler and density reactivity 








30 1250.9 929.3 
40 1325.4 975.4 
50 1412.6 1031.5 
60 1507.0 1094.8 
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assumed. The reference plant had a steady state to steady state transition of 510 °C to 
803°C. Assuming a constant core inlet temperature of 371.1 °C, the reference reactor had 
an average coolant temperature change of 73.1 °C for a 30¢ reactivity insertion. The 
modeled reactor had an average coolant temperature change of 185.5°C for a similar 
reactivity insertion. Using the expected change in Tave, the effective reactivity insertion 
was 76.2¢ with an equivalent temperature feedback of the reference design.  
Table 4-19 Reference to Model Comparison for BLE-2 
To provide a more direct 
comparison the data from [99] was 
extrapolated to the estimated equivalent 
reactivity, the first row of Table 4-17. The last row is the hottest pin from the hottest 
channel, with the temperature adjusted for the higher core outlet temperature of the 
reference S-PRISM conditions of [102], 510 °C instead of 499.5°C. Because the core 
inlet temperature was not known, for the reference design accident scenario, it was 
assumed to be proportional to the change in core inlet temperature of the model plant. 
The modeled plant had core inlet temperature increase 185.5°C for a 267% power 
excursion. The reference plant had a 130% power excursion, which corresponded to a 
90.4°C increase in core inlet temperature. 
Once the difference in temperature feedback, 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇, is accounted for, the modeled 
plant’s 30¢ UTOP corresponds to a 47¢ UTOP in the reference plant reported by [99]. 
For the purposes of safety analysis, a lower magnitude 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇, generally provides a more 
extreme power and temperature excursions and can be considered as being more 
conservative. There is one accident scenario, BE5-C a transient overpower, where the 








47.0 1386.6 1018.3 
30 1372.0 1087.4 
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explanation for the difference is that the reactivity feedback is only considered for two 
assembly groups, the average driver fuel and the average inner blanket. The hot inner 
blanket, hot driver fuel and average radial blanket are not considered. The blanket 
assemblies, because of their increased U-238 content will have a larger contribution to 
doppler feedback than the few driver assemblies that weren’t considered. The impact on 
leakage from the central assemblies will be more pronounced because the radial blankets 
will absorb more neutrons that leave the core, reducing the fraction reflected, and will 
absorb more of the reflected neutrons. 
Table 4-20 Full Power Fuel Assembly Bulk Coolant Outlet Temperatures 
The peak channel outlet temperature for nominal 
full power reported in [102] of 594°C when adjusted for 
the change in core inlet temperature of the modeled S-
PRISM which is based on that reported by [48] for the 
PRISM, the limiting assembly bulk coolant outlet 
temperature is 565°C. The orificing of the channels 
mentioned earlier resulted in satisfactory performance as shown in Table 4-18, with the 
average radial blanket assemblies having the highest coolant outlet temperature of 
548.2°C. 
The PRISM reactor described in NUREG-1368 had a net prompt reactivity 
feedback of -0.88 pcm/K.[61] The BOC net prompt reactivity feedback of [90] was -0.23 
pcm/K. When the fuel thermophysical properties were changed to those derived from 
[96], the model was not able to achieve steady state conditions and melted fuel for each 
core age after approximately 150 seconds for the BOC and MOC cases, and 123 seconds 















thermophysical properties places the magnitude of the underestimate in the prompt 
reactivity feedback closer to 4 which is consistent with that observed with the NUREG-
1368 PRISM core. To assess this impact, the thermophysical properties derived from [96] 
were combined with the fresh fuel configuration and the kinetics data from NUREG-
1368. Figure 4-9 shows the response for this configuration. The peak power of 172% 
checks with that reported in NUREG-1368, however the time of the peak, 220 seconds, is 
well after the reported 30-seconds. Reactivity peaked at 10¢ occuring 11-seconds into the 
event. The settling time reported in NUREG-1368 was 100-seconds and was at 120%. 
Here the settling time was 1,000-seconds with power at 160%. One possible explanation 
for this difference is that the fuel’s thermophysical properties may differ. Of note, the hot 
pool temperature reaches 607.9 °C. The maximum salt oulet temperature under this 
scenario is 578.2 °C, well below the long term decomposition limit of 600 °C. 
 
Figure 4-9 UTOP BE-1A using NUREG-1368 temperature feedbacks 
Based on the two baseline events, the modeled plant is sufficiently close to the 


































conservative approximation. All other parameters are within available operating limits for 
a nominal full power plant. Using the NUREG-1368 temperature feedback with the fuel 
thermophysical data derived in the present work, appears to adequately approximate the 
reported kinetic response. 
6.2 Unprotected Accidents 
The accident scenarios considered here were taken directly from NUREG-1368 
and modified as needed to fit the modeled plant’s design. Every accident scenario 
evaluated here performed at least as good as the reference design (where data was 
available for comparison). All analyzed scenarios did not exceed ASME Service 
Condition C structural temperature limits (922 K), fuel melting temperatures (1,228 K 
and 1,300 K for driver and blanket respectively), fuel clad eutectic formation (978 K), or 
the salt decomposition temperature (873 K). In most of the considered bounding events, 
the fuel and coolant did not exceed normal operating temperatures. And, for every 
bounding event considered, coolant temperatures never exceeded 600°C. 
6.2.1 Unprotected Loss of Flow – ULOF 
There were two events considered for the ULOF taken directly from NUREG-
1368. The first event, BE4-A, was a nominal trip of a single RCP without protective 
action, N/F SCRAM. The second event was an instantaneous coastdown of a RCP during 
a reactor trip, BE4-B. The loss of flow for both scenarios was initiated by assuming that 
the RCP’s power was instantaneously cut and that the normal coastdown mechanism was 
not available. This was simulated by changing the RCP time dependent junction to a 
single junction with the initial condition of the flow rate of the time dependent junction at 
the time of the pump trip. In both cases, flow reversed through the RCP in ~0.25 seconds. 
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This inserted ~$1 of reactivity in under 2 seconds. This caused a rapid drop in core 
power, which fell faster than flow did in every channel, ensuring that fuel temperatures 
did not rise as reported in NUREG-1368. This suggests that the pressure response of the 
GEM is faster in the one modeled here than the one reported in NUREG-1368. 
For BE4-A, the loss of 1 RCP with no plant trip, the grid plate pressure fell 
rapidly after initiation, causing an immediate negative reactivity insertion. Figure 4.10 
shows the power, total reactivity and GEM reactivity. The response shown in Figure 4-10 
is for the reference BOC core reported by [90]. When core thermophysical properties 
were modeled in more fidelity, the only change was the magnitude of the reactivity 
insertion, -$1 for every core age, otherwise the responses were identical. 
 
Figure 4-10 Reactivity and power response to a loss of 1 RCP without protective action 
For BE4-A, the lower magnitude of 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇 acts to make the transient less 
conservative. The total reactivity became less negative shortly after the event initiation, 
with a stronger temperature feedback, there would be more positive reactivity added. 
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feedback would not affect criticality until the plant had sufficiently cooled down, even 
with a 56% increase in |𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇|, which is the estimated discrepancy. 
The second unprotected loss of flow event occurred when a single RCP 
coastdown mechanism failed during a normal plant trip from full power, BE4-B. This 
event was evaluated for 10 minutes, the approximate time needed for the remaining 
RCP’s to fully coast down. The fuel temperatures are well below thermal limits, but are 
elevated due to the reduced flow, Figure 4.11. Once, natural circulation is established, the 
fuel temperatures will return to normal during a plant trip. 
 
Figure 4-11 Fuel temperatures during a reactor SCRAM with 1 RCP failing to coastdown 
6.2.2 LOHS 
The only LOHS event considered was a modification to BE3-A of NUREG-1368, 
consisting of a complete blockage of RVACS for 12 hours with an indefinite loss of 
power and 1 ACS channel due to sabotage. This was the most temperature limiting of the 





















When comparing with the reported result in NUREG-1368, where temperature peaked at 
699 °C 25-hours after the event initiated with RVACS 25% unblocked, the RVACS 
model used in the present study significantly underestimates the system’s RHR at 
elevated temperatures as RVACS was considered fully unblocked at 12-hours.  
 
Figure 4-12 Loss of heatsink due to sabotage 
6.2.3 ATWOS 
The ATWOS was initiated with an indefinite SBO and a failure of control rods to 
unlatch for 12 hours. Figure 4.12 shows the first 12 hours of the ATWOS compared to 
the temperature profile of a reactor trip with a loss of both ACS channels. The loss of 
power to the RCP’s caused a -1.4$ reactivity insertion causing the reactor to immediately 
shut down. It is expected for the ATWOS to follow the same progression of the nominal 
reactor trip with a loss of both ACS channels, because the power removed by both 
functioning ACS channels is initially small in comparison to the magnitude of decay heat. 
The combined DHR capability of both ACS channels and RVACS, ~5 MW, exceeds 
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upper limit on the peak coolant temperature, with temperature declining after 59.5 hours. 
 
Figure 4-13 Core outlet temperature for ATWOS compared to nominal loss of both ACS 
channels 
The large thermal inertia of the system and multiple paths for passive DHR, 
allows for a benign transient, especially when compared to the extended SBOs that can 
occur with LWRs, much less ones where the plant fails to SCRAM for 12-hours. 
6.2.4 UTOP 
Three different UTOP scenarios were evaluated. The first two are based on 
Bounding Events 1 A and B of NUREG-1368. The third was an over cooling event. BE-
1A was previously discussed as BLE-2, during the evaluation of the core’s temperature 
coefficient of reactivity. 
BE1-B was simulated by preventing a reactor trip, but allowing a plant trip. 
Because, the negative period signal was not received the pumps tripped 10 seconds after 
receiving the N/F trip signal. The event was allowed to continue for 32.4 hours without 
any operator action. One channel of the ACS was inoperative (failed air damper). The 


















caused a larger power excursion due to reduced feedback. At the time the protection logic 
received the trip signal, total core power was 111%. When the RCP’s tripped 10 seconds 
later, total reactor power was 172%. The highest fuel temperatures peaked with reactor 
power and were 1043 K and 1033 K for the driver and blanket assemblies respectively 
(melting temperatures correspondingly are 1,228 K and 1,300 K). The clad/fuel interface 
was 969 K, below the fuel clad interdiffusion melting temperature of 978 K for all 
assemblies and nodes. The Core Outlet temperature peaked approximately 26 seconds 
after rod withdrawal at 822 K. 
Of the thermal limits, the clad fuel interface temperature was the most limiting. 
To properly assess the margin to Fuel Clad Thermal Interaction (FCTI), the average 
channel heat transfer coefficient needed to be adjusted to assess the thermal-hydraulic 
performance of the assembly corner pins. The results of taking into account local 
thermal-hydraulic performance is shown in Figure 4.13. While the pins do not fully 
liquify, the hottest corner pin fuel clad eutectic does melt, peak Fuel Clad Interface (FCI) 
temperature of 1021 K. This can simply be corrected by limiting the power overshoot, 
accomplished by shortening the delay of the pump trip from the reactor trip to 5 seconds, 
the FCI 5-sec curve in Figure 4-14. The remaining curves are for the 10 second time 
delay from a plant trip, since the shorter than a -80 second period trip did not actuate, due 




Figure 4-14 Hottest pin adjusted temperatures during protected transient over power 
BE-1B was analyzed under 4 different conditions for varying temperature 
feedbacks and fuel models all with the 5-second pump trip delay. The NUREG scenario 
used the BOC fuel model with the temperature feedback model from NUREG-1368. It is 
considered the most accurate of the models due to its comparative correlation with 
published data in NUREG-1368. 
Table 4-21 Core Age/Fuel Model Impact on UTOP 
















BOC 4.223 9.223 995.4 969.2 909.4 137.74% 9.6 
MOC 4.406 9.406 1033.2 1014.8 912.6 135.23% 9.7 
EOC 4.161 9.161 1007.8 1042.7 911.4 139.07% 9.5 





















 The remainder of this event follows the general core outlet temperatures during a 
plant trip, with slightly elevated values due to the increased reactor power at the time of 
trip. This can be seen in Figure 4.14. After 34 hours, the core outlet temperature is 
approximately at normal operating temperature. This is with one channel of ACS 
disabled. The long term transient response did not measurably change other than by slight 
changes in the temperature due to different heat additions due to the magnitude of the 
initial power overshoot. What is shown in Figure 4-14, is the event that had the largest 
power overshoot for each of the different reactivity feedbacks and fuel configurations. 
 
Figure 4-15 Extended UTOP with plant trip 
The final unprotected transient over power event is the loss of control of the non-
safety-grade Salt Coolant Pump. To simulate this event the plant was not allowed to trip, 
while the SCP speed increased from 100% flow to 200% flow in 8 seconds. shows the 
resulting transient. The increased cooling initially increased reactivity, but the extent of 
the cooling lowered the reactor vessel pressure which caused a negative reactivity 








































anticipated response. What was expected was for the temperature coefficient of reactivity 
to dominate and cause the reactor to increase power, similar to what occurred in Part 3. 
The temperature reactivity having a lower magnitude than the actual plant, plus the 
deadband of the GEM were contributing to this event. To be able to more accurately 
model this phenomenon, these two items need more careful consideration.
 
Figure 4-16 Salt Coolant Pump overspeed transient response using [90] BOC temperature 
feedbacks. 
When the temperature feedbacks were taken from NUREG-1368, the general 
response was the same, but the power peaked more with the NUREG kinetics data, and 
did not fall off as quickly, Figure 4-16. This suggests that the GEM introduce non-
linearities in the system’s thermal response and that they need to be explicitly modeled in 
the integrated control system design. The contributing factor is the change in PHTS 
pressure due to the contraction of the larger cold pool relative to the smaller hot pool’s 
expansion. 
When analyzed at different time in core age the power would fall off similarly, 
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rapidly and have a lower positive power excursion. For this reason, failure in the salt 
pumps or their control logic are not expected to negatively impact reactor safety. Thus, 
keeping the salt pumps out of the safety envelope is justified. This will need to be 
confirmed with more detailed kinetic and GEM modeling. 
 
Figure 4-17 BE-5C Salt pump overspeed using NUREG-1368 temperature feedbacks 
6.2.5 SBO 
There were two scenarios considered for the SBO. The first, ATWOS, was 
discussed in section 6.2.4. The second is the unfaulted SBO. This corresponds with BE-



































hot pool temperature peaked at 42.25 hours at 481.3 °C. Figure 4-16 shows the hot pool 
temperature during the transient. 
 
 
Figure 4-18 Unfaulted SBO transient Response 
6.2.6 SHX Rupture 
A SHX plate rupture and instantaneous catastrophic loss was simulated. In this 
event the reactor was tripped 20 seconds after initiation, no forced cooling was provided, 
the other ACS system and RVACS both performed nominally. This event was to simulate 
Bounding Event 5 of NUREG-1368. The simulation lasted for 12-hours of model time. 
The resulting core outlet transient is similar to the design basis accident and can be seen 
in Figure 4-17. After 12-hours, forced cooling to the operable AHX is assumed, 

















Figure 4-19 Core outlet temperature during a rupture of a single SHX heat exchanger 
6.2.7 DBA 
The design basis accident was a 36-hour SBO with failure of one ACS. The plant 
response closely mirrored that of BE-5A, SHX plate rupture, but with slightly lower 
temperatures due to the control rods inserting immediately during the SBO. Figure 4-17 
shows the hot pool’s temperature response. 
 










































The addition of the SHTS to the S-PRISM, does not degrade safety related 
performance. In each of the considered bounding events, the modified system exceeded 
nominal plant performance for all published data. PRISM has a large thermal inertia 
limiting the overall plant heat up while the decay heat generation exceeds removal. This 
is further assisted by very little energy being stored in the fuel due to the fuels high 
thermal conductivity. Essentially, as reactor power is removed, so too is the heat. With 
oxide fuels, a significant amount of energy is stored in the fuel, leading to higher 
temperatures with degraded heat flow. 
The addition of the SHTS increases the thermal inertia of the system and provides 
another redundant safety-grade path for DHR. In cases where both safety-grade ACS 
systems are available, complete DHR with no forced circulation is assured at normal 
operating temperatures 45-hours after a trip from full power. The use of fans in the ACS 
allows operators to remove as much decay heat as necessary under normal situations 
when fans and electrical power are available. 
The extended duration of inaccessibility of forced cooling in many of the events 
considered, show that for this design forced cooling is a nicety, not a necessity to prevent 
exceeding normal operational temperatures, much less structural or fuel thermal limits. In 
all events considered, hot pool temperature did not exceed 600 °C.  
The model presented here is limited in that is based entirely on engineering 
estimations of an actual design, not the actual design. Any further investigation or 
authoritative conclusions can only be gained by using actual engineering data. What this 
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model does show is the potential that it has for increasing the operational capability of 













The energy server concept allows for an entirely different business model for a 
utility. Part 4 showed how the safety of the reactor is not dependent upon the balance of 
plant and that the most severe accidents that can be induced by the balance of plant are 
entirely benign for the reactor. The possibilities that this creates are manifold. 
The most obvious of the possibilities is the ability for nuclear technology to 
access every current electrical market from capacity to regulation mileage. Some not as 
intuitive market opportunities include synthetic fuels and other process heat applications. 
While not as hot as needed for many synthetic fuel processes, the salt outlet 
temperature is close to that needed for hydromethanation of coal.[110] Higher 
temperature processes, e.g. conventional fixed bed Lurgi gasification, can be accessed by 
the addition of a high temperature heat pump.[111] It becomes entirely possible for the 
utility to be able to produce the fuel for its combustion turbines on site. But the molecular 
carbon monoxide and hydrogen, which are the products of gasification are the 
fundamental building blocks of the modern economy. 
The site can produce any organic chemical, from liquid fuels to plastics. The heat 
from the reactors can even be used to aid in oil refining. Using inexpensive nuclear heat 
to provide the energy needed to drive the chemical reactions for these processes, instead 
of the expensive feedstock hydrocarbons. Applied to such technologies as Steam Assisted 
Gravity Drain, the salt can be used to transport heat significant distances allowing local 
generation of steam for oil recovery. In the SAGD model, there energy storage tanks are 
the multi-kilometers of piping. The piping, even though it is stainless steel, can be a 
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lower grade such as 316, and of much thinner walls because of the lack of pressure. 
Combined with the high heat of the reactor, recovered bitumen can be upgraded to a more 
transportable form onsite, before being pumped to another location for final processing. 
If the ultimate process is to close the material loop of the industrial economy, 
having an inexpensive enough fuel source is the only means to accomplish this, as 
recycling is fundamentally an energy intensive process. Garbage gasification, either with 









To determine the technical efficacy of the nTES in electrical applications, the 
reference model, Figure 2.1, was applied to a multi-year study period of the Bonneville 
Power Administration. Two scenarios were considered, a conventional plant with no 
renewable resources and one with an increasing renewable energy fraction. The modeling 
technique was simply of maximizing the reactor output for a given energy demand. It 
included no forecasting or model predictive control. Model Predictive Control using 
forecasted information would result in a more optimized sizing ratio of rectors, to storage 
to PCS, to combustion turbines, 1.68 GW(t) nuclear: 1.80 GW(t)-hr storage: 914 MW(e) 












Figure 5-1 nTES integrated with Bonneville Power Administration 
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reactors integrated as described. The reactors including 1 month refueling outages on an 
18-month schedule, had an average capacity factor of 92.3%. This allows for 
conventional economic recovery of the reactor supplying heat to the storage. 
With an increase in the amount of renewable energy on the grid, the capacity factor of the 
nuclear plant went down. The best explanation for this trend is that the increased 
variability of renewable energy created a cost externality that was absorbed by the 
nuclear reactors. The amount of this cost was the value of the reduced revenue from the 
sale of heat from the reactor. If increased reactor utilization was desired the size of the 








Nuclear energy has long been considered for applications associated with 
chemical processes.[113, 114] These have not materialized. The likely cause is having to 
prove to the regulator that the process doesn’t negatively impact reactor operations. By 
using storage to buffer the various processes from the reactor, the proof to the regulator is 
that the buffering salt system won’t negatively impact the reactor, which was done in Part 
4 of the present work. 
One of the interesting possibilities that isn’t usually considered in nuclear 
licensing is the impact of chemical and process explosions. While missile hazards from 
the rotating equipment in a traditional turbine building are considered, chemical 
processes are not. The NRC under the current regulatory framework will consider non-
conventional uses and issue guidance to applicants “in a time frame consistent with the 
licensing schedule”.[115]  
The process heat applications are significant users of energy. Using the 2006 
Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey from 2006 and a survey of the different 
processes used by each industry a rough distribution of energy and temperature are 
provided in Figure 5.2. As can be seen the bulk of process heat applications are below 
1000 °C. These consist predominantly of iron refining applications. The uses around 




Figure 5-2 Estimated process heat distribution from MECS 2006 
Being close to these temperatures the PRISM, can be an effective fit, especially if 
a heat pump is considered to amplify the temperature to the needed process, about 830°C 
is achievable with existing materials and technologies. This allows direct gasification of 
coal which can be used in the direct reduction of iron.[116] Further integration can be 
achieved with processes such as FINEX® or a modification of it to use the excess syngas 
from the reduction process to smelt the iron ore. By using the heat from the reactor to 
produce the syngas, more of the coal is used for reducing the iron. 
The production of hydrogen ranges from 500 to 800. Steam Methane Reforming 
is a common method for hydrogen production and typically occurs between 700-
1,000°C.[117] Raising the steam to 470°C and then using oxygen to combust some of the 
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methane to achieve the remaining heat for the reaction will limit reagent loss and 










Even with the technological development of the current work, it remains to be 
seen if the NRC will allow flexibility with collocating additional technologies. Because 
the process can now be located “off-site”, adjacent to the nuclear facility, the external 
events considered in the Bounding Events needs to include such risks. Jurisdictions that 
allow greater flexibility in plant siting and collocation will see more development of 
process heat applications. The process heat facilities are on par with the nuclear facility 
regarding capital costs, thus regulatory risks will be much higher. 
4.1 Non-Light Water Reactor Licensing 
While the NRC has never licensed a non-light water reactor, Clinch River Breeder 
Reactor was the closest, they have the regulatory ability to be able to do so.[118] There is 
no standardized guidance on how to license a reactor, such as the General Design 
Criteria. NUREG-1368 proposed how to go about modifying those GDC to provide more 
general design guidance to simplify the licensing process. The revised standardized 
licensing has not been issued, but is actively being developed. Similarly, the American 
Nuclear Society is in the process of updating its fast reactor standards, which are used by 
the NRC in determining regulations. 
4.2 Price Anderson and Liability 
Smaller reactors, but still above 100MW(e) are required to carry the maximum 
insurance available under the Price-Anderson Act. This has been identified by many 
SMR developers as an impediment to the future licensing of smaller reactors as the 
insurance premiums are based on much larger reactors and adversely affect the 
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economics of the smaller reactors.[119]There does not exist a solution to this problem 










While the technology developed in the present work creates new possibilities for 
the application of nuclear energy. It is not without limitations. These limitations are 
regulatory and statutory. Many of these limitations are due to nobody ever trying them 
and the regulators developing regulations only for what they have regulated not what they 
potentially might. 
What occurs then is a chicken and egg problem. If the regulator hasn’t regulated 
something in the past and how they would rule on it is unknown and costs money to 
obtain a ruling that may not be favorable, tends to make overcoming such natural 
regulatory barriers to innovation very difficult, unless one has deep pockets and the 
wherewithal to risk losing money on a less than favorable regulatory decision, very little 
will change. In many ways, regulators maintain the world in which they were created, 
stifling innovation and protecting the status quo.[120] 
The simplest approach to solve this problem is to do the technological deployment 
in a country that does not have the same regulatory burden. If that is not an option due to 
technology export restrictions under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, then it is to put the 
least amount of money at risk to move forward, and to spread the risk to a more 
manageable amount. 
After the cessation of the V.C. Summer expansion project, utilities are going to be 
weary of building a new technology, unless it is something that meets a need that they 
don’t currently have fulfilled or creates new market opportunities. Thermal storage and 
PRISM presents such an opportunity for utilities across the country. It also opens the 
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potential to have direct “off site” customers of the heat produced and stored by the 
reactor. It enables these customers to build their own sub-grid using the salt to provide all 
of their energy services. 
While untested in the real world, the paper design created in this current work, 
represents a potential to fulfill many of the needs of utilities in the United States. True 
progress on the policy front will not occur unless there is a broad enough support for the 








Because of the size of the input files to be able to run the various scenarios, they 
are included electronically with the dissertation and are available for download from the 
Georgia Institute of Technology. Because of the complexity of the system studied and 
especially because of the problems that RELAP has with non-condensable gases and the 
small volumes used in the counter-flow heat exchangers, the inputs had to be carefully 
constructed to be able to run. 
There are a number of restart decks that are not included. These input decks were 
used to tweak parameters to achieve the proper steady state conditions or used in situ to 
restart cases that had aborted due to failure. Their inclusion would only complicate the 
explanation of how to generally run this model. 
As a note to users, the models included here were developed using APT Model 
Editor for RELAP5-3D v 4.3.4. They will have errors in the loop check of the IHTS 
loops if run under a different version. I am not sure why this is, but if you are using any 
version other than 4.3.4 plan on needing to fix the loop elevations. On the same note, 
none of the included models will pass the preliminary loop check of Model Editor. 
A.1 Reference Design Initialization 
The initial input deck concurrently starts up the steam generator and reactor. It 
does this using a programed reactor power with a linear ramp, programmed PHTS and 
IHTS pump speed linear ramps, and a PI controller for the feedwater flow control. 
Additionally, the kinetics data and fuel thermophysical properties do not match that of the 
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nTES. If a direct comparison is needed, the data in the reference design needs to be 
adjusted to that of the nTES design. 
To create a steady state restart file: 
1. Run “Reference S-PRISM Initialization.i” 
2. Using the restart file from 1, run “Reference S-PRISM Optimization.i” 
3. Using the restart file from 2, run “Reference S-PRISM Kinetics.i” 
The resulting restart file from step 3 can be used to establish 100% power history 
needed for the accident analysis. This can also be used to provide an initial condition to 
evaluate operational transients. 
A.2 nTES Design Initialization 
The initialization of the nTES S-PRISM design is similar, except that the 
“Optimization.i” is replaced with a file that adjusts the fuel properties based on core age. 
This is then allowed to come to equilibrium and the next restart file implements the 
kinetics. Because of the complexity of the problem and the time needed to run the 
initialization, there may be some things that are implemented in the subsequent restarts 
that should be in the initialization file. To the maximum extent possible, if there was a 
change needed, I would update the initialization file so that the change would propogate 
all the way through, and then remove the short term patch from the later restart file. But 
because it takes 18-hours to run the initialization, there may be some 
redundancy/overlap/not fully implemented changes. 
There are four different fuel scenarios: BOC, MOC, EOC, and NUREG. The 
BOC represents fresh fuel and beginning of cycle conditions. MOC represents the middle 
of cycle, and uses fuel that has swelled completely and is logged with sodium inside its 
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pores. EOC is the same as MOC but with end of cycle kinetics. NUREG is fresh fuel 
(100% theoretical density) but uses the kinetic data taken from NUREG-1368. 
To create a steady-state restart file with kinetics, do the following: 
1. Run “nTES S-PRISM Initialization.i” 
2. Using the restart file from 1, run “nTES S-PRISM Mod IC ____.i” 
3. Using the restart file from 2, run “nTES S-PRISM Kinetics ____.i” 
For the NUREG kinetics use the BOC Mod IC input deck in step 2. 
A.3 Testing and Initialization 
To test the various features of the nTES S-PRISM, each of the subsystems, e.g. 
IHTS, PHTS, RVACS, ACS, SHTS, were modeled as independent and standalone 
systems. One of the difficulties in starting a problem is to have the appropriate pressures, 
temperatures and flow rates. To simplify this, each initialization problem began with the 
reactor in a quiescent shutdown state at 613.0 K. This approach left only pressures 
needing to be determined for the appropriate elevation. This was especially important for 
the counterflow heat exchangers that had a very fine nodalization scheme. To assist in 
accurately determining these pressures, these subsystem testing files were created to 
establish the necessary quiescent state, by allowing a smaller system to come quickly into 
long-term equilibrium. 
The ACS system was set to run in two modes. The first mode was with flow 
secured to the UHS (air dampers CLOSED) and the PHTS IHX wall heat flux set to zero. 
To simulate natural circulation operations, the air damper was opened and the IHX 
primary side wall temperature set to the desired temperature. 
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A.4 Bounding Events 
The bounding baseline events were broken up into two main categories. First 
were those that relied upon an unfaulted reactor trip as the event initiator and those that 
did not. To run the bounding events, the restart file from the appropriate initial condition 
(reactor tripped or the reactor at full power) was used with the event’s input deck. For 
those cases that the initial condition was not the full power condition, the event also 
needed the previous file’s plot file, so that a contiguous plot file output could be made for 
the entire event duration. 
For events that are numbered the run order goes 1, 2, 3 and then the file with just 
the event name. In a few cases there may be a “C” file, this is the continuation file for 
that bounding event and was usually needed because the final event run terminated 
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